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Award-winning CEOs as outside directors
Fabian Gogolin
Abstract
As its core contribution this thesis provides first insights into the role
of CEO award winners as outside directors. We use CEO awards to
identify a subset of high-profile CEOs and study their roles on external
boards. Exploiting this new approach, we first show that investors rec-
ognize and value director reputation. Using a large sample of outside
director appointments, we find evidence of a reputation premium. Fur-
ther, the event study results suggest a significant bias in the selection and
composition of boards. We show that highly reputable directors join the
boards of firms that have produced significant abnormal returns in the
three years prior to the appointment. Next, this thesis provides evidence
that the dynamics and consequences of director reputation are observ-
able at the firm level. We find a statistically and economically important
contemporaneous association between director reputation and firm value.
However, while director reputation is reflected in firm valuation, we show
that it is in no way related to a firm’s day-to-day operations. Further, we
find evidence suggestive of a link between director reputation and cor-
porate governance. Finally, the thesis evaluates whether and how firms
can benefit from individual outside directors. Our results clearly show
that the appointment of highly skilled (and/or highly reputable) outside
directors does not guarantee the future success of a firm. Rather the
results indicate that after years of strong performance, firm performance
reverts to the mean. Similar results emerge from a study on M&A out-
comes. Looking at short- and long-term M&A performance, we find no
evidence suggesting that firms with high-profile outside directors make
better acquisitions. Rather, the results further support the conclusion
that the role of outside directors is less important than often assumed.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The board of directors has a dual role as monitor and advisor. Whereas the mon-
itoring role aims at protecting shareholders against managerial malfeasance, the
advising role involves setting strategy, the selection of new projects and the review
of corporate policies (Adams et al., 2010; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Demb and
Neubauer, 1992).
Outside board members are generally not significant shareholders and they are
also not rewarded with the same type of generous performance-sensitive pay as se-
nior management (Adams and Ferreira, 2008; Yermack, 2004; Fich and Shivdasani,
2006). Nevertheless, within a board, the responsibility to protect shareholder inter-
ests falls almost exclusively on outside directors. If financial incentives are weak,
what motivates outside directors to act in the best interest of shareholders? What
causes outside directors to monitor managers, rather than collude with them? All
these questions directly touch upon the agency conflict between managers and share-
holders. To protect shareholders, it is important to mitigate conflicts and better
understand the dynamics that govern the behaviour of boards and individual direc-
tors.
In this thesis we focus on CEO award winners and their role on outside boards.
They comprise a small, but important subset of outside directors. CEO award
winners have been studied in relation to corporate performance and compensation
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(Malmendier and Tate, 2009), competition (Ammann et al., 2016) and risk-taking
(Shemesh, 2014). Among other things, Malmendier and Tate (2009) find, that the
outside board responsibilities of CEO award winners increase considerably following
an award. Moreover, CEO award winners are more than twice as likely to sit on five
boards or more compared to non-award winners. Therefore, CEO award winners are
represented on a large number of corporate boards and play a pivotal role in setting
strategy and corporate governance standards in large US firms. However, none of
the existing research has focussed on their role as outside directors.
From a shareholder or corporate governance perspective, CEO award winners are
not necessarily the most desirable board members. They hold a CEO position at
a large public firm, increasingly divert their attention towards so-called “celebrity”
activities and often hold multiple board positions at the time of their appointment
(Malmendier and Tate, 2009). So why is there such a strong demand for the services
of these directors?
In line with recent research in this area (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014; Jiang et al.,
2015; Masulis and Mobbs, 2016), the demand for CEO award winners highlights
the importance of reputation in the market for outside directors. As discussed in
Fahlenbrach et al. (2010), CEOs continue to be among the most desirable candidates
to fill vacant board positions. The authors conclude that firms derive a certification
benefit from the appointment of well-known CEOs, despite their limited time and
resources. CEO award winners represent a small subset of highly successful CEOs.
They have longer than average CEO tenure (Malmendier and Tate, 2009) and a
track record of good performance (Ammann et al., 2016). Even more so than the
average CEO, award winners will have established themselves as decision experts
(Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Throughout this thesis we evaluate the roles CEO award winners occupy, how
they are viewed by investors and whether or not their appointment carries impor-
tant performance implications. However, studying a small subset of highly reputable
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directors is also interesting from a theoretical perspective. The application of CEO
awards in the context of the board of directors has three distinct advantages. First,
it allows us to identify and study a small subset of highly reputable directors (iden-
tification). Second, it allows us to further contrast groups of outside directors, i.e.
non-CEO outside directors vs. CEO outside directors vs. award-winning CEO out-
side directors (contrasting). And finally, the time-stamp associated with the CEO
award allows us to design an innovative event study that exploits the exogenous
change in reputation an outside director experiences upon winning a CEO award
(time-stamp).
Within the three chapters of this thesis, we aim to address three questions. First,
we are interested in the question whether or not investors recognize director reputa-
tion in respect to the appointment of a new outside director. This is an interesting
question and has, to our knowledge, not yet been addressed. This question is of in-
terest because it can support or refute how reputation is viewed within the context
of the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Second, we evaluate the consequences of a system where the most reputable
directors will be matched with the most prestigious firms. As the primary agent to
protect shareholder interests, it is not clear whether outside directorships awarded
and accepted based on reputation can result in effective monitoring and the creation
of shareholder value. Do firms that succeed in appointing high-profile directors
perform better or earn abnormal returns? Or are high-profile directors hired for
the certification benefit they provide? Can directors who are appointed on the back
of their reputation be in the interest of shareholders and result in sound corporate
governance?
Finally, we analyze whether individual high-profile directors can observably affect
M&A outcomes. There is a large literature that aims to identify individual director
characteristics or traits that are important for firm-level outcomes. CEO award
winners provide a wide skillset that makes them valuable as board members. If
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incentivized sufficiently, these directors are in a unique position to contribute value
through their board function.
The questions addressed throughout this thesis can add significantly to our un-
derstanding of individual director attributes, the role of reputation in the market
for outside directors and finally result in a better understanding of the composition
and effectiveness of boards in general.
As part of its core contribution this thesis provides first insights in regard to
the role of CEO award winners on corporate boards. Furthermore, the thesis intro-
duces an innovative event study approach that contrasts director’s different career
stages and and the associated reputational capital. In addition to the topical and
methodological innovations, the thesis provides a range of empirical contributions.
First, the thesis highlights the importance of reputation in the director selection
process. We provide convincing evidence that reputation is a commodity for outside
directors. A (good) reputation allows directors to sit on the boards of prestigious
firms that have performed well in the past. The results yield support for the existence
of a significant bias in the selection and composition of boards.
Further, we find convincing evidence that investors recognize director reputation.
Using a sample of outside director appointments, we show that investors attach a
significant premium to the appointment of directors they perceive as more reputable.
Reputation is recognized and valued as part of the director’s human capital. More-
over, it can be interpreted as an indication of the firm’s future growth opportunities.
The event study approach and results presented in this thesis contribute crucially to
our understanding of director reputation and how outside directors are appointed.
Next, this thesis provides evidence that the dynamics and consequences of di-
rector reputation are observable at the firm level. We find a statistically and eco-
nomically important contemporaneous association between director reputation and
firm value. This link has not been previously documented. We conclude that the
positive association arises from two sources. First, director selection allows the most
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reputable directors to sit on the boards of successful firms. And second, the positive
association is a representation of a firm’s human capital and future growth potential.
However, while director reputation is reflected in firm valuation, it is in no way
related to a firm’s day-to-day operations. We find no link between director repu-
tation and different measures of contemporaneous or future operating performance.
The findings are highly intuitive. They indicate that the presence of highly reputable
directors can affect investor’s perception of the firms current and future prospects,
but does not actually translate into better operating performance.
Further, we find evidence suggestive of a link between director reputation and
corporate governance. Our results suggest that appointments of highly reputable di-
rectors can be viewed positively from the shareholders point of view. We argue that
because reputable directors have a vested interest to protect their reputation, corpo-
rate governance can serve as an insurance mechanism. Good governance provisions
can limit the likelihood of managerial malfeasance and the reputational damage re-
sulting from it. Incentives for outside director’s to protect their reputation can hence
lead to the implementation and improvement of existing governance structures.
Finally, the thesis evaluates whether and how firms can benefit from individual
outside directors. If, for example, reputation results in a purely valuation-based
premium, it is questionable whether this premium will persist if it is not accompanied
by an improvement in actual operating performance. We observe a stark contrast
between pre- and post-appointment performance. Despite the documented selection
bias, we find little or no signs of outperformance in the post-appointment period.
Our results clearly show that the appointment of high-profile outside directors does
not guarantee the future success of a firm.
Similar results emerge from an analysis of M&A performance. Advising manage-
ment on M&A’s represents one of the most important board functions. We identify
individuals that are, due to their their managerial expertise, experience and large
social and business networks, in a unique position to positively influence M&A out-
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comes. Looking at short- and long-term M&A performance, we find no evidence
suggesting that firms with high-profile outside directors make better acquisition de-
cisions. Rather, the results support the conclusion that the role ascribed to outside
directors is less important than often assumed.
1.2 Context and motivation
1.2.1 Reputation in economics and finance
Reputation was first formally introduced in economics and applied in settings with
incomplete or asymmetric information. In this context, reputation helped explain
a variety of irrational behaviours and activities in areas including the labour mar-
ket (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Holmstro¨m, 1982), product quality (Shapiro, 1983;
Rogerson, 1983) and credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983). Within this stream
of research, reputation is understood to be an asset that individuals and firms build
up and invest in to trade off short-term profits against long-term benefits. A fitting
example is provided by Nelson (1974) who shows that in some circumstances it pays
for an incumbent to establish a reputation for being aggressive, for instance through
price wars, thereby discouraging potential competitors from future market entry.
When producers establish a reputation for producing high-quality goods, they
have a strong incentive to continue to do so because consumers will reevaluate a
producers reputation at every transaction (Shapiro, 1983). If a firm fails to produce
at a level consistent with its reputation, the reputation will quickly be lost (Rhee
and Haunschild, 2006). In other words, as firms or individuals build up reputation
over time, the reputation becomes increasingly more valuable and worth protecting1
(Diamond, 1989).
1Apart from economics, the concept of reputation has also received considerable attention from
management scholars. For an extensive review of reputation in the context of the organization
see Lange et al. (2011). A more recent exposition of the importance and timeliness of reputation
is presented in a recent editorial aimed at synthesizing existing research, identifying gaps and to
carve out areas of future research (George et al., 2016).
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A (good) reputation is linked to a past provision of high-quality goods or services,
assumes a certain consistency over time and is often defined in terms of economic
performance (Sorenson, 2014). It is understood as an observable signal of quality and
therefore contains specific expectations about future economic performance (Dimov
et al., 2007; Jensen and Roy, 2008).
While the economic literature mostly relies on models to understand how rep-
utation affects exchanges under imperfect information, the concept of reputation
as predominantly been studied in empirical settings in the finance literature. It
has been studied in a range of areas including investment banking (Livingston and
Miller, 2000; Fang, 2005), IPOs (Nanda and Yun, 1997; Gomes, 2000; Lewellen,
2006), sell-side analysts (Jackson, 2005; Fang and Yasuda, 2009), stock exchanges
(Battalio et al., 2007), rating agencies (Mathis et al., 2009), bank loans (Ross, 2010)
and more recently fields such as private equity (Demiroglu and James, 2010) and
venture capital (Atanasov et al., 2012; Krishnan et al., 2011).
Livingston and Miller (2000), for example, study investment bank reputation
using as sample of nonconvertible debt. They study how reputation effects under-
writer fees, bond offering yields, and other expenses related to the issuance. The
authors find evidence suggesting that investment bank reputation can act as a cer-
tification mechanism that ratifies the value of corporate debt issues. In a similar
context, the results of Fang (2005) show that banks’ underwriting decisions reflect
reputation concerns and thus contain information in respect to the issue quality.
Further, investment banks are, in certain circumstances, able to extract rents based
on their reputation and thus have a strong incentive to protect it.
Krishnan et al. (2011) focus on the reputation of venture capital firms. They
examine the association between a venture capitalist’s reputation and long-run per-
formance of IPOs. They find a positive relationship between a VC’s reputation
and the long-run performance of VC-backed IPOs. Highly reputable VC’s select
better-quality firms and are also more involved in the corporate governance of their
8
portfolio firms post-IPO.
Studies of IPOs similarly underline the importance of reputational effects for
the issue underwriter. In an early account Nanda and Yun (1997), for instance,
examine the importance of reputation by analyzing initial returns on IPOs. Lead-
underwriters expose themselves to reputational risk when setting price targets for
IPOs. If they set the initial target price too high, they expose themselves to a loss
in credibility and subsequently a loss in reputation. Nanda and Yun (1997) find
evidence that lead-underwriters suffer reputation costs in the form of a decrease in
market value when they are involved in overpriced IPOs. In a more recent study,
Lewellen (2006) shows that underwriters frequently repurchase shares of poorly per-
forming IPOs to stabilize the price. The findings provide support for a reputation
hypothesis consistent with underwriters stabilizing poorly performing IPOs to pro-
tect their reputation.
Fang and Yasuda (2009) investigate the role of reputation in the context of
analyst forecasts. Amongst other things, they find that personal reputation can
mitigate conflicts of interests and serve as an effective disciplinary device.
Overall, the existing research collectively highlights the importance of reputation
across a range of economic and financial settings. Within the finance literature, the
research can be broadly divided into two streams. The first stream understands
reputation as an asset that is worth protecting (Livingston and Miller, 2000; Fang,
2005; Krishnan et al., 2011) and the second stream understands reputation as a
disciplinary device that helps mitigate conflicts of interest (Fang, 2005; Lewellen,
2006; Fang and Yasuda, 2009). As a disciplinary device, reputation can incentivize
individuals or agents to act in the best interest of, for example, their customer in
order to protect their reputation. Thereby, reputation leads to an incentive system
that allows individuals, firms and managers to trade off short-term gains against
long-term profits. However, while reputation effects have been actively studied in
mainstream finance, the research on reputational effects in respect to the board of
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directors, despite its long-standing theoretical foundation (Fama, 1980; Fama and
Jensen, 1983), is still scarce.
1.2.2 Director reputation
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) first introduced the idea that reputational
concerns can incentivize outside directors to act in the interest of shareholders.
Directors establish themselves as decision experts and are subsequently rewarded
with additional directorships.
A growing number of empirical studies have since attempted to empirically eval-
uate the role of reputation in the respect to the director labour market and its effect
on board and firm outcomes. Existing studies can be divided into those that look
at events that are damaging to a director’s reputation and those that attempt to
directly evaluate the effects of director- or firm-level reputation.
For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) show that following lawsuits, directors
experience a significant decline in the number of their outside board positions. This
decline in the number of board positions is more pronounced if the allegations are
more severe or the director bears greater responsibility. Moreover, directors with
boards seats at firms facing fraud allegations are more likely to lose their board
positions at firms with stronger governance. More recently, Fos and Tsoutsoura
(2014) show that proxy contests, as a result of poor director performance, can be
equally damaging to a director’s future career prospects. Following proxy contests,
directors experience a significant decline in the number of board seats at the firm
targeted with the proxy fight, but also at other non-targeted firms. Furthermore,
reductions in cash dividends (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990), financial and disclosure-
related fraud (Brochet and Srinivasan, 2014) and excessive executive pay (Ertimur
et al., 2012) have been shown to be similarly damaging to a directors’ career.
While the research focussing on particular damaging events has produced rel-
atively clear empirical evidence, measures to directly evaluate director reputation
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are still scarce. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) made a first attempt at measuring and
quantifying director incentives and external reputation. They argue that inside di-
rectors with external board responsibilities are incentivized to be more concerned
with firm performance in order to enhance or maintain their reputational capital.
Whereas this approach offers an interesting way to study the roles and incentives
of non-CEO inside directors, the proposed measure is confined to a subset of inside
directors.
Masulis and Mobbs (2014) introduce a first, more general measure of director
reputation incentives. They exploit firm size as a source of director reputation and
argue that directors derive stronger reputation incentives from sitting on boards
of larger firms. Focussing on directors with multiple directorships, they contrast
relative reputation incentives directors derive from sitting on the board of a large
capitalization firm compared to a firm with a low market capitalization. Addition-
ally, the authors also provide a finer division and assign a weighting of “high” to a
board seat if it is at least 10% larger than the board seat with the lowest relative
market capitalization. The derived reputation incentives are then aggregated at the
board level and related to board- and firm-level outcomes2.
Despite its intuitive nature, the Masulis and Mobbs (2014) measure has several
important limitations. Most importantly, it is a measure that applies only to di-
rectors with multiple directorships. In the case of Masulis and Mobbs (2014), this
excluded almost half of the director-year observations in their sample. Moreover, it
is a measure of relative reputation incentives. It derives its validity from contrast-
ing individual directorships and thereby deducing differential reputation incentives.
The measure, however, fails to account for any other sources of reputation incentives
or concerns.
2The same measure is adopted by Masulis and Mobbs (2016) and Sila et al. (2017). Masulis
and Mobbs (2016) show that high reputation incentives are also associated with fewer firm actions
known to hurt shareholder value. In a very recent study, Sila et al. (2017) employ the same measure
to study the informativeness of stock prices.
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For example, CEOs will have strong incentives to protect their reputation irre-
spective of the number and market capitalization of the board they sit on. Further,
the Masulis and Mobbs (2014) measure ignores firm-specific factors such as firm’s
growth opportunities, past performance or industry-specific reputation effects as
well as director-level factors such as education, experience and age. In a closely
related paper focussing on director career concerns, Jiang et al. (2015) advocate a
different measure. The authors use the number of times a director is mentioned in
the media as their primary and the number of directorships as a secondary measure
of reputation. While the authors manually exclude articles that contain negative or
critical comments, its validity as a general measure of director reputation is limited.
To begin with, it requires that directors are sufficiently covered by major media
outlets. Further, it implicitly assumes that there is no underlying bias in respect to
the media attention received by certain directors, companies or industries.
A director could, for example, be very well respected and highly reputable but
serve on the board of a company in an industry that is inherently unattractive for
the media and investors. Therefore, this director would, despite his qualities and
good reputation, receive a lot less attention than a mediocre director at a more
prominent firm. In respect to certain industries in particular, it is easy to imagine
how they might fall in and out of favour with major media outlets.
Their secondary measure, the number of directorships, has some theoretical foun-
dations (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) and has been applied in earlier work
(Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Gilson, 1990; Ferris et al., 2003) on the board of direc-
tors. However, it fails to distinguish between different directorships and is thus less
intuitive and appealing than the Masulis and Mobbs (2014) measure.
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1.2.3 Motivation
1.3 Research methodology
Following Malmendier and Tate (2009), we use a hand-collected sample of CEO
awards from major national publications such as Business Week, Financial World,
Forbes, Chief Executive, Morningstar.com, Electronic Business Magazine, Industry
Week and the Harvard Business Review. We consider only awards that are promi-
nent enough to serve as a signal of the CEO’s reputation (Malmendier and Tate,
2009; Ammann et al., 2016). Our final dataset includes a hand-collected list of 839
CEO awards conferred between 1975-2013. After accounting for individuals who
won multiple awards, we identify 582 individual award winner.
We use CEO awards to identify a subset of highly reputable directors. An alter-
native would have been to use director awards from sources such as the Outstand-
ing Directors Exchange (ODX) or the National Association of Corporate Directors
(NACD). However, the ODX has, since its inception in 1998, only honoured 130
independent directors across the US. The NACD, on the other hand, initiated its
director awards only in 2012. Therefore, the ability to match the awards with
firm-level or acquisition data is limited3. While director awards would open up an
interesting avenue for future research, the data limitations render them infeasible
for large-sample studies. We construct our variables of interest based on the sample
of 582 individual CEO award winners and employ different empirical techniques to
test our predictions throughout this thesis.
3The NACD has awarded five different Awards including the i) NACD B. Kenneth West Lifetime
Achievement Award, ii) NACD Directors of the Year (two directors were honoured in 2012 and
only one director in the years thereafter), iii) NACD Directorship 100: Hall of Fame, iv) NACD
Directorship 100: Directors, v) NACD Directorship 100: Governance Professionals and Institutions
(additionally, in 2012, the NACD had a category named “NACD Directorship 100: People to
Watch, making it difficult to determine how valuable each of these awards is for a director. Merely,
focussing on the ”NACD Director(s) of the Year” category would have restricted the sample to
merely 6 observations.
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1.3.1 Event study methodology
We use event study techniques in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 to examine investor
reactions in relation to outside director appointments (Chapter 2) and merger and
acquisition announcements (Chapter 4). We use the standard methodology of Dodd
and Warner (1983)4.
Within the event study methodology let t = 0 represent the time of the event.
For each sample security i, the return on the security for time period t relative to
the event, Rit, is
Rit = Kit + eit,
where Kit is the expected return and and eit is the component of returns which is
abnormal or unexpected. It follows therefore, that the abnormal return, eit, is the
difference between the observed return and the predicted return:
eit = Rit −Kit,
Put differently, eit is the difference between the return conditional on the event
and the expected return unconditional on the event. As such, the abnormal return
is a measure of the unexpected change in a stock price associated with a particular
event. We use the market model to describe security returns. The market model for
any security i is
Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + ei,t,
with E[ei,t] = 0 and V AR[ei,t] = σ
2
ei. Ri,t and Rm,t are the period-t returns on
security i and the market portfolio m respectively. ei,t is the zero mean disturbance
term. αi is the intercept and βi the slope. Using the market model, the sample
abnormal return is
eˆi,t = Ri,t − αˆi − βˆiRm,t.
4For a more recent and detailed discussion of the standard event study methodologies, see, for
example, Kothari and Warner (2008) and Campbell et al. (1997).
14
The abnormal return is the disturbance term(eˆi,t) of the market model on an out of
sample basis. For a sample of N events, the cross-sectional mean abnormal return
for any period t is
AARt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ARi,t =
1
N
N∑
i=1
eˆi,t.
The average abnormal returns can be aggregated over the event window t1 through
time t2 (i.e., horizon length L = t2 − t1 + 1)
CAAR(t1,t2) =
t=2∑
t=t=1
AARt.
1.3.1.1 Test statistic
Following Patell (1976) and under the assumption that abnormal returns are uncor-
related and variance is constant, we standardize abnormal returns by their estimated
standard deviation
SARit =
ARit
S (ARit)
,
where to account for the fact that the event-window abnormal returns are an
out-of-sample prediction, the standard error is adjusted by the forecast error
S (ARit) = σˆ (ARi)
√√√√1 + 1
Mi
+
(
Rm,t − R¯m
)2∑t1
τ=t0
(
Rm,τ − R¯m
)2 ,
and where σˆ2 (ARi) is the estimate of the variance of abnormal returns over the
estimation window, defined as follows:
σˆ2 (ARi) =
1
Mi − d
t1∑
t=t0
(ARi,t)
2 ,
where Mi is the number of non-missing returns and d is the degrees of freedom
(e.g. d=2 for the market model). The standardized version of the abnormal returns
can then be cumulated over time t1 through time t2 is then
CSARi(t1,t2) =
t2∑
t=t1+1
ARit
S (ARit)
.
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The cross-sectional average of the standardized abnormal returns is then:
CSAR(t1,t2) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
CSARi(t1,t2).
The standard deviation of CSARi(t1,t2) is estimated from the cross section of
event window abnormal returns:
S(CSAR)(t1,t2) =
√√√√ 1
N(N − 1)
N∑
i=1
[
CSARi(t1,t2) − CSAR(t1,t2)
]2
.
The standardized cross-sectional test statistic for the null hypothesis that the
cumulative average abnormal return is equal to zero is then (Boehmer et al., 1991):
tBMP =
CSAR(t1,t2)
S(CSAR)(t1,t2)
.
1.3.2 Long-horizon event study
To estimate long-term abnormal returns we use a calendar-time approach (also some-
times referred to as Jensen-alpha approach). We calculate monthly abnormal returns
by estimating the intercept of the calendar-time portfolio using the Fama and French
(1993) three factor model. We use a weighted least squares (WLS) regression as
suggested by Fama (1998) and weigh each calendar months by the number of event
observations with the number of assets in the monthly portfolio as the weighting
factor.
ARit = Rit −Rft − βi1(Rmt −Rft)− βi2HMLt + βi3SMBt,
where ARit or alpha is the monthly abnormal return of the calendar-time port-
folio, Rit is the return on a security i, Rft is the risk-free return, Rmt is the return
on a value-weighted market portfolio, SMBt is the return on a diversified port-
folio of small stocks minus the return on a diversified portfolio of big stocks and
HMLt is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of high and low
book-to-market (B/M) stocks.
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For further robustness and as a response to the recent challenges to the tradi-
tional three factor model (Carhart, 1997; Novy-Marx, 2013), we also estimate the
more recently introduced five factor model (Fama and French, 2015).
ARit =Rit −Rft − βi1(Rmt −Rft)− βi2SMBt − βi3HMLt
− βi4RMWt − βi5CMAt,
where ARit or alpha is the monthly abnormal return of the calendar-time portfolio,
Rit is the return on a security i, Rft is the risk-free return, Rmt is the return on
a value-weighted market portfolio, SMBt is the return on a diversified portfolio
of small stocks minus the return on a diversified portfolio of big stocks, HMLt is
the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of high and low book-to-
market (B/M) stocks, RMWt is the difference between the returns on diversified
portfolios of stocks with robust and weak profitability and CMAt is the difference
between the returns on diversified portfolios of stocks of low and high investment
firms which are referred to as conservative-aggressive.
1.3.3 Hypotheses testing
We test for differences in mean using a standard t-test. We test the following hy-
pothesis
H0 : µ1 = µ2
H1 : µ1 6= µ2
and calculate the following test statistic
t =
x¯1 − x¯2√
s21
n1
+
s22
n2
,
where n1 is the sample size of population 1, n2 is the sample size of population 2,
x¯1 is the mean for population 1, x¯2 is the mean for population 2, s1 is the standard
deviation for population 1, s2 is the standard deviation for population 2.
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In a second step, we apply the Wilcoxon rank-sum test and test for differences
in means. The test statistic is:
z =
T − E(T )√
V ar(T )
,
where
E(T ) =
n1(n+ 1)
2
and V ar(T ) =
n1n2s
2
n
and where s is the standard deviation of the combined ranks, ri, for both groups
s2 =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(ri − r¯)2.
1.3.4 Regression analysis
Moreover, we employ different regression models throughout this thesis. The model
choice is predominantly motivated by the type of dependent variable, i.e. continuous,
binary or censored. We estimate a simple multivariate regression model
Yi = β1Zi + β2X
′
i + i,
where Y is the dependent variable. Z is our variable of interest and X ′ is a vector
of control variables for observation i.
We use a logistic regression model whenever the depending variable is binary
Pr(Yi = 1 | Zi, Xi) = G(β1 + β2Zi + β3X ′i),
where Y is a binary dependent variable, Z is our variable of interest and X ′it is
a vector of control variables for observation i. We assume that G is the logistical
distribution.
Finally, when dealing with censored or truncated dependent variables we use a
tobit model. The standard structural equation in the Tobin model is (Tobin, 1958):
y∗i = β1Xi + i,
where i ∼ N (0, σ2). y∗ is a latent variable that is observed for values greater than
τ and censored otherwise. In the typical tobit model and similar to our application
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in Chapter 4, we assume that τ = 0. That means that the data are censored at 0.
In our example, we try to model negotiation time which is naturally censored at 0
days. Thus we have
yi =
{
y∗ if y∗ > 0
0 if y∗ ≤ 0.
1.3.5 Cluster-robust standard errors
We begin with OLS with a single regressor that is nonstochastic, and assume no
intercept in the model5. Let yi = βxi + ui with i = 1, . . . , N and E[ui] = 0, where
xi is nonstochastic. The methodology extends to multiple regression with stochastic
regressors. Now, let i denote the ith of N individuals and g the gth of G clusters.
Then for individual i in cluster g the linear model with clustering is
yig = x
′
igβ + uig,
where xig is a K × 1 vector and E[uig|xig] = 0. To derive the robust clustered
variance estimate, we stack all observations in the gth cluster, and rewrite the linear
model as
yg = Xgβ + ug, g = 1, . . . , G,
where yg and ug are Ng × 1 vectors, Xg is an Ng × K matrix, and there are Ng
observations in cluster g. The OLS estimator is
βˆ = (X ′X)−1X ′y =
( G∑
g=1
X ′gXg
)−1 G∑
g=1
X ′gyg.
The general variance matrix conditional on X is
V [βˆ]) = (X ′X)−1B(X ′X)−1,
with
B = X ′V [u|X]X.
5For a detailed review and discussion of cluster-robust standard errors, see Cameron and Miller
(2015).
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Given the error independence across clusters the cluster-robust estimate of the
variance matrix is
Vˆclu[βˆ] = (X
′X)−1Bˆclu(X ′X)−1,
where
Bˆclu =
G∑
g=1
X ′guˆguˆ
′
gXg,
where uˆg = yg − Xgβˆ is a vector of OLS residuals for the gth cluster. The cluster-
robust variance estimator is similar to the standard estimator with E[ugu
′
g] replaced
with uˆguˆ
′
g.
1.3.6 Panel fixed effects
Finally, we use a panel fixed effects model to examine potential effects on firm value
and firm performance in Chapter 3. Among other things, the advantages of using
panel data include more information, more variability, more degrees of freedom and
ultimately more efficient coefficient estimates (Baltagi, 2008). Most importantly
however, panel data allows for the control of unobservable and individual hetero-
genity (Askildsen et al., 2003). The fixed effects model captures the net effect on
firm value and firm performance. It controls for time invariant and unobservable
firm specific characteristics. We use a simple fixed effects model for firm i = 1, . . . , N
observed across time periods t = 1, . . . , T
yit = βx
′
it + γz
′
i + ci + uit,
where yit is the dependent variable, x
′
it is a K-dimensional row vector of time-varying
explanatory variables and z′i is a M-dimensional row vector of time-invariant explana-
tory variables. β is a K-dimensional column vector of parameter estimates and γ is
a M-dimensional column vector of parameter estimates. ci is a firm-specific effect
and uit is the idiosyncratic error term. Subtracting time averages y¯i =
∑
t yit/Ti,
x¯i =
∑
t xit/Ti and u¯i =
∑
t uit/Ti yields the following model
(yit − y¯i) = β(xit − x¯i) + (uit − u¯i),
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where the individual-specific effect ci and the time-invariant regressors zi cancel.
The fixed effects model allows us to control for omitted variable bias and hence is
an effective technique to limit problems around endogeneity.
1.4 Structure
The thesis is structured in the form of three linked studies. Each study is based on
its own dataset and methodology. The structure is as follows.
Chapter 2 evaluates the value of director reputation using a sample of outside
director appointments. The findings are presented in Chapter 2, entitled The value
of director reputation: Evidence from outside director appointments. The results
in this chapter are based on a sample of outside director appointments. For every
appointment we collect information from sources such as Who’s Who in Finance and
Business and NNDB, appointing and appointee firm characteristics from Compustat
and stock market data from CRSP.
Drawing on the findings from Chapter 2, the second stage of the research specif-
ically evaluates the role of award-winning CEOs as outside directors at the firm
level. Chapter 3 entitled Director reputation and firm outcomes: The case of award-
winning CEOs uses a large cross-section of S&P 1500 firms to evaluate the role
of reputation in the matching of firm and director. As the primary agent to pro-
tect shareholder interests, it is not clear whether outside directorships awarded and
accepted based on reputation can result in effective monitoring and promote share-
holder value. In particular, the chapter examines implications for firm performance
and corporate governance.
And finally, Chapter 4 analyses the role of award-winning CEOs on corporate
boards and examines whether they can improve acquisition outcomes. The chapter
entitled Award-winning CEOs in the board room: the case of acquisitions is based
on a sample of mergers and acquisitions of firms covered by RiskMetrics. The final
sample includes 3,157 mergers and acquisitions for the period from 1996-2013.
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1.5 Contribution
Despite several recent advances in the area of director reputation (Masulis and
Mobbs, 2014, 2016; Jiang et al., 2015; Sila et al., 2017), the research is still at a
very early stage. The difficulty to design and empirically test measures of director
reputation, have prevented further advances and a better understanding.
This thesis introduces CEO awards as a tool to identify a group of outside di-
rectors that have not yet been studied. We provide first insights in the role of these
CEO award winners as outside directors. They are among a small subset of highly
reputable directors and as such particularly interesting to study. Empirically inves-
tigating this subset of directors allows us to better understand the role of reputation
in the matching of firm and directors, explore whether investors recognize reputation
and identify performance implications.
Moreover, the results presented throughout this thesis are particularly valuable
because they are based on unique datasets. We combine unique and hand-collected
data with well-established and broadly used existing datasets. The combination of a
novel measure and unique datasets to study director reputation of outside directors
allows us address new questions and uncover new relationships. Thereby, this thesis
provides valuable additional insights and adds significantly to the existing literature.
From a methodological perspective this thesis makes a considerable contribution
by introducing an innovative event study around the conferral of the CEO award.
The event study design helps circumvent some of the well-known problems around
endogeneity that apply to most studies in this area. The proposed methodology
aims to exploit differential career concerns across the directors career and uncover
whether investors recognize reputation in respect to director appointments.
Further, the thesis also yields several significant empirical contributions. First,
the thesis clearly highlights the importance of reputation in the director selection
process. The underlying selection process is not random and makes the interpre-
tation of firm-level studies on the board of directors difficult (Adams et al., 2010).
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We can clearly show that reputation is a commodity for outside directors. Having
a (good) reputation, allows directors to access the most prestigious board seats.
Further, we show that they accept appointments to the boards of firms that have
significantly outperformed in the past. The results indicate that reputable directors
seem to join the boards of firms that have experienced rapid growth over an ex-
tended period of time. While many studies have touched upon this issue, few have
provided direct evidence showing how reputation affects director selection.
Second, the thesis also contributes to a very recent strand of literature focussing
on the firm-level implications of director reputation incentives (Masulis and Mobbs,
2014, 2016). We show that consequences of director reputation are directly observ-
able at the firm level. We find a statistically and economically important contem-
poraneous association between director reputation and firm value. This link has not
been previously documented. We show that it stems from director selection, on the
one hand, and a causal link on the other hand. Using a sample of outside director
appointments, we show that investors react more positively to the appointment of a
director they perceive as more reputable. This is an important finding and has not
previously been documented.
Further, we show that while director reputation is reflected in firm valuation,
it is in no way related to a firm’s day-to-day operations. We find no link between
director reputation and different measures of contemporaneous or future operating
performance. This finding is intuitive and indicates that reputation is a phenomenon
that affects investor’s perception rather than operational profitability. To investors
the recruitment of a highly reputable director serves as a signal of future growth
potential. Interestingly, the empirical evidence indicates that this signal does not
translate into actual performance changes. The findings help us to better understand
the firm-level consequences of director reputation and its importance for investors.
Third, we establish a theoretical and empirical link between director reputation
incentives and corporate governance. Because reputation becomes more valuable as
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it is built up (Diamond, 1989), highly reputable directors have strong incentives to
protect their reputation. Directors can benefit from the implementation of gover-
nance provisions in two ways. From the director’s perspective, governance provisions
can be viewed as a mechanism to limit reputational damage in case of managerial
malfeasance or oversight failures. Moreover, through the improvement of governance
provisions directors can also establish themselves as oversight experts and indicate
their ability as diligent monitors (Fama, 1980).
Finally, this thesis adds to several key questions in the broader area of corporate
governance and the board of directors. The thesis contributes to existing knowledge
by addressing the question of whether or not firms benefit from the appointment
of individual outside directors. We observe a stark contrast between pre- and post-
appointment performance. That is, despite a significant selection bias leading to
a highly significant contemporaneous value effect, post-appointment performance
shows little or no signs of abnormal returns. Our results clearly show that the
appointment of high-profile (and/or highly reputable) outside directors does not
guarantee the future success of a firm. Rather the results indicate that, after years
of strong performance leading up to the appointment of a highly sought after outside
director, firm performance mean reverts.
Similar results emerge from an analysis of M&A performance. While advising
management on M&A decisions is often quoted as one of the key responsibilities of
the board, we find no evidence that individual outside directors, irrespective of their
quality and reputation, help a firm make better acquisition decisions. Neither long-
term stock performance following the appointment nor M&A performance reveal
that individual outside directors contribute observably to the long-term success of
a firm. Instead, our results indicate that the role of outside directors may be more
limited than often assumed.
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1.6 Research Dissemination
Research projects leading up to the development of the three papers that can be
found in this thesis were presented at a variety of seminars such as the International
Doctoral Colloquium at Northeastern University (Shenyang, China), Dublin City
University and Queen’s University Belfast.
Chapter 2, “Director reputation and firm outcomes: The case of award-winning
CEOs” has been submitted to the Midwest Finance Association for presentation at
their annual meeting in Chicago, Illinois in March 2017.
Chapter 3 entitled “The value of director reputation: Evidence from outside di-
rector appointments” has been accepted for presentation at the 2016 Paris Financial
Management Conference and is currently under review at the Journal of Business
Research, an ABS3 journal.
The last part, Chapter 4, “Award-winning CEOs in the board room: The case of
acquisitions” is currently being prepared for submission to the International Review
of Financial Analysis.
Further, applying the methodological understandings a side-project has resulted
in an ABS3 publication in Economic Letters.
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Chapter 2
The value of director reputation:
Evidence from outside director
appointments
2.1 Introduction
Reputation is a well-known commodity in the market for outside directors (Fama,
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Recent research has highlighted the importance of
director-level reputation in respect to monitoring (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014; Jiang
et al., 2015), firm outcomes (Masulis and Mobbs, 2016) and director career concerns
(Brochet and Srinivasan, 2014; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Fos and Tsoutsoura,
2014). However, many questions in respect to the costs and benefits of director
reputation remain unanswered.
One area where reputation is particularly important but has not been directly
studied is director appointments. Outside directorships are an important source of
prestige and serve as a signal of quality in the market for corporate directors. Kaplan
and Reishus (1990) argue that while boards retain directors based on loyalty and
relationships, director appointments are largely made based on reputation. It is not
clear, however, whether firms benefit from the appointment of a reputable director
and how investors view such appointments. Do investors recognize reputation as
a resource and an incentive device that motivates directors to act in their best
interest? Or do they take a critical stance and view highly reputable directors as
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potentially time constrained directors waiting to “trade-up” as described in Masulis
and Mobbs (2014) and take board positions at more prestigious firms? There are,
to our knowledge, no studies that have directly studied director reputation using
outside director appointments. This study attempts to close this gap.
Existing studies tend to compare the announcement returns of CEO directors to
those of non-CEO directors. Fich (2005) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2010), for exam-
ple, find that investors react more positively to the appointment of a CEO. CEO
directors, however, differ from non-CEO directors in many ways. This empirical
approach likely uncovers differences in the quality of the appointed directors, rather
than providing insights in respect to director reputation (Adams et al., 2010).
In this paper, we are interested in the role of director reputation and not dif-
ferences between groups of directors (CEOs and non-CEOs). Therefore, we take a
different approach than Fich (2005) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2010). We use CEO
awards as an identification tool to identify individuals that will retrospectively have
enjoyed similar careers. All CEO award winners will become CEOs, will act as
CEO of a large public firm for an extended number of years and will end up win-
ning a CEO award. Upon winning a CEO award, the CEO will gain the so-called
“superstar status” (Ammann et al., 2016; Malmendier and Tate, 2009).
We argue that CEO awards contribute significantly to a director’s reputation
and serve as an important signal in the market for corporate directors. While the
role of CEO award winners has been studied in relation to the CEO’s firm, little
is known about their role on corporate boards. Malmendier and Tate (2009) show
that among other things, such as engaging in a range of “celebrity” activities, the
CEO’s outside board responsibilities increase considerably following a CEO award.
However, the potential to study the effect of CEO awards in relation to outside
board appointments has, so far, been overlooked.
Accounting for the directors different career stages, as well as various director-
and firm-level variables, we examine whether investors react observably different
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after a director has won a CEO award. The main focus of this paper is to study the
short-term value effect around the outside director appointment of a sample of CEO
award winners. However, we also address several interesting follow-on questions. For
example, we test whether the reputation of a director is related not just to the first
CEO award, but also further increases with the number of awards a director wins.
We also study whether or not the investor reaction at the CEO’s own firm differs
according to whether or not the CEO has won an award. Finally, we investigate the
long-term implications of appointing CEO award winners as outside directors. We
study director selection dynamics before the appointment and value consequences
after the outside director is appointed. Again, we specifically focus on the director’s
different career stages and contrast the periods before and after a director has won
the first CEO award.
As in Malmendier and Tate (2009), we use a hand-collected sample of prestigious
CEO awards conferred by editorials of major national publications. For the identified
CEO award winners we search LexisNexis for outside director appointments. Our
final sample consists of 432 first-time director appointments across different career
stages, before and after the directors win the first CEO award.
Our expectation is that directors enjoy the highest relative level of reputation
at the point in time when they are CEO and have won their first CEO award. The
CEO award will be conferred as a result of good performance, over an extended
period of time, at a large public company and marks the pinnacle of the directors
career (Ammann et al., 2016; Malmendier and Tate, 2009). We argue that directors
appointed to outside boards after they win the first award will generate significantly
more positive investor reactions than at any other point throughout their career. In
particular, we contrast three different stages of the directors career: i) active CEO,
ii) award-winner and iii) CEO award winner.
Outside director appointments are particularly well suited for the purpose of
this study because firms actively communicate career highlights and achievements
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of the appointed director. We argue that firms do so in order to justify as well as to
promote the new appointment. The appointment of Leonard D. Schaeffer, CEO of
WellPoint, provides a fitting example and highlights how investors may be positively
(or negatively) swayed through the appointment announcement:
“Mr. Schaeffer was recently selected by BusinessWeek magazine as one
of the ”Top 25 Managers of the Year,” and by WORTH magazine as one
of the ”50 Best CEOs in America” for his leadership of WellPoint, one
of the nation’s largest publicly traded health care companies. WellPoint
operates in California as Blue Cross of California and as UNICARE
Life & Health Insurance Company throughout the rest of the nation.”
(Business Wire, 14 February 2001, retrieved from LexisNexis)
This study makes several important contributions. First and foremost, the key
result in this study is consistent with recent research pointing to the importance of
director-level reputation in the market for outside directors (Masulis and Mobbs,
2014, 2016; Jiang et al., 2015). By contrasting the announcement of a homogeneous
group of directors across different stages of their career, before and after they win
a CEO award, we show that the appointment of a director who is an active CEO
and has won a CEO award yields significantly higher announcement returns. At the
same time, we show that the CEO position or a CEO award per se are associated
with significantly smaller announcement returns.
Our univariate results reveal significantly higher investor reactions to the ap-
pointment announcement of a CEO award winner. The documented effect is sta-
tistically and economically meaningful. The announcement returns for CEO award
winners are five times higher than those for non-CEO award winners (0.85% vs.
0.17%). For a 3-day event window, the effect is equivalent to $249 ($55) million
for the average (median) appointing firm. Similar results emerge from a formal
regression analysis. Within our multivariate framework, the variable of interest
throughout is CEO × First Award. This interaction term identifies the appoint-
ments of directors who are active CEOs and have won a CEO award and contrasts
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them with appointments at different stages of the directors career, i.e. before and
after the director wins the first award and before and after the director becomes
CEO. To identify a reputation effect we control for a range of additional director-
and firm-level variables such as gender, founder status, whether or not the director’s
primary work is outside the US, number of outside board seats, education as well as
firm size, R&D expense and profitability. The documented premium attached to the
appointment of an outside director who is a CEO and has won an award ranges from
2.02% to 2.09%. For the average (median) firm in our sample, the value effect for
a 3-day event window translates into an increase in market capitalization between
$591($131) and $614 ($136) million1
Moreover, our results reveal that a director’s career stage is an important deter-
minant of the observed announcement returns. The documented positive effect is
confined to a small set of CEO award winners. Investor reactions to the appointment
of a CEO who has not yet won an award (CEO) are, in comparison, significantly
more negative. A similar effect can be observed for the appointment of directors who
are non-chief executives (Other Executives). Similar results emerge for the indicator
variable that signifies whether or not directors have won their first CEO award (First
Award). We find significantly lower announcement returns to the appointment of
directors who have won an award but are not or no longer active CEOs.
Because our analysis covers directors across different stages of their career we
cannot fully rule out that our results partially reflect the relative value attached
to a director’s career stage at the time of appointment (i.e. CEO vs. Other Chief
Executive vs. Other Executive), rather than differences in director reputation. To
add further robustness to our hypothesis, we re-estimate our baseline regression for
a sample of CEO director appointments. This allows us to further increase the
homogeneity in our sample to CEO award winners who are all active CEOs at the
time of their appointment as outside directors. Again, we find significantly more
1The value effect is calculated as the lowest (2.02%) and highest (2.09%) estimated coefficient
on CEO × First Award multiplied by the average (median) market capitalization.
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positive investor reactions if the appointed director has won an award. Our findings
demonstrate that investors recognize and value director reputation.
Additional tests reveal that whether or not a CEO wins a second award is less
important. We find no evidence that investor reactions are stronger for CEO’s who
have won two (or more) awards. This indicates that while the first award signifi-
cantly increases the director’s reputation and demand in the market for corporate
directors, winning a second (third or fourth) award does not. This is consistent with
the underlying assumption in Malmendier and Tate (2009) who argue that CEOs
are elevated to a “superstar status” upon winning the first CEO award.
This paper contributes to the understanding of director reputation in the di-
rector selection process. Long-term performances measures show that reputable
directors join the boards of firms that have performed well in the past. We docu-
ment highly significant abnormal monthly returns in the 24-months and 36-months
pre-appointment period. We document monthly abnormal returns in the range of
0.53-0.82% and 0.58-0.68% respectively.
This study also contributes more generally to our understanding of outside di-
rector effectiveness and whether or not individual directors are important for firm
performance. Given the high quality of the directors in our sample (all the direc-
tors end up winning a CEO award), we would expect that firms benefit from the
appointment of such a high profile director or, at least, that the firm’s continue to
perform as they did before the appointment. Comparing pre- and post-appointment
performance, however, reveals a stark contrast. Our results shed doubt on the effect
individual outside directors may have through their board functions.
Further, the study shows that successful CEO’s are indeed rewarded with outside
directorships. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) along with several other
more recent papers argue that directors (or CEOs) are rewarded with outside board
positions for good performance. Our findings provide strong support for this argu-
ment. We find evidence of significant abnormal monthly returns in the 12-month,
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24-month and 36-month pre-appointment period for the CEOs in our sample.
And finally, we contribute through the introduction of a new event study design
to evaluate the value consequences of director reputation. The approach advocated
in this study has important advantages. Most studies on the boards of directors are
conducted at the firm-board level and given the concern of Hermalin and Weisbach
(1998), that boards are, at least partially, endogenously chosen, any result suggesting
a relation between corporate governance and firm outcomes is difficult to interpret.
Using an event study allows us to design a test of director reputation that is not
confounded by sample selection concerns.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss
the motivation and the empirical strategy of the paper. Section 3 presents the data
and descriptive statistics. The results are presented in Section 4, Section 5 and
Section 6. The conclusion is presented in Section 7.
2.2 Background and empirical strategy
2.2.1 Reputation of outside directors
Outside directorships are important because they are a source of prestige (Mace,
1986) and serve as a signal of quality in the market for corporate directors (Fama,
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, it is not clear what motivates directors
to be effective monitors. Because financial incentives do not play a significant role
(Booth and Deli, 1996; Yermack, 2004; Adams and Ferreira, 2008), recent research
has focussed on director reputation as an important incentive device (Masulis and
Mobbs, 2016, 2014; Jiang et al., 2015).
Masulis and Mobbs (2014), for example, show that directors with multiple di-
rectorships distribute their time and effort unequally across their directorships. Di-
rectors tend to prioritize their efforts at firm’s who award them greater prestige.
Reputation incentives can significantly increase an outside directors’ board meeting
attendance and involvement in committees, decrease the willingness to relinquish
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directorships and lead to better firm outcomes. Masulis and Mobbs (2016) find
fewer actions known to hurt director reputation at directorships ranked more highly
by outside directors. The evidence suggests, that reputation incentives can greatly
affect how directors allocate their time and affect board effectiveness. Jiang et al.
(2015) provide further evidence and show that more reputable directors are also more
likely to dissent, that dissension is rewarded in the market for outside directors and
that dissension is linked to better corporate governance and market transparency.
While the evidence highlights the importance of reputation as an incentive device,
reputational damage can also negatively affect a directors’ career. For example,
Fich and Shivdasani (2007) show that following a lawsuit, directors experience a
significant decline in the number of their outside board positions. This decline in
the number of board positions is more pronounced if the allegations are more severe
or the director bears greater responsibility. Moreover, directors with boards seats at
firms facing fraud allegations are more likely to lose their board positions at firms
with stronger governance. More recently, Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014) show that
proxy contests, as a result of poor director performance, can be equally damaging to
a director’s future career prospects. Following proxy contests, directors experience a
significant decline in the number of board seats at the firm targeted with the proxy
fight, but also at other non-targeted firms. Reductions in cash dividends (Kaplan
and Reishus, 1990), financial and disclosure-related fraud (Brochet and Srinivasan,
2014) and excessive executive pay (Ertimur et al., 2012) have been shown to be
similarly damaging to a directors’ career.
Overall, the recent evidence clearly outlines the important role of reputation
in the labour market for outside directors. The research suggests that reputation
serves as an incentive for directors to be diligent monitors, can lead to better firm
outcomes and that actions resulting in reputational damage for the firm or the direc-
tor significantly affect the director’s future career. However, given the difficulties to
directly measure and test reputation, many questions around the costs and benefits
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of director reputation remain unanswered.
2.2.2 Existing measures and motivation
While the research focussing on particular damaging events has produced relatively
clear empirical evidence, identifying measures of director reputation remains diffi-
cult. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) construct a measure of director incentives for inside
directors based on their outside board responsibilities. The authors argue that direc-
tors are incentivized to be effective monitors in order to protect their reputational
capital. While the measure is an interesting first step to study the reputational
capital of directors, it is restricted to inside directors.
Masulis and Mobbs (2014) introduce a more general measure of reputation incen-
tives for outside directors. They argue that firm size can serve as an important source
of prestige and is directly related to a directors reputation. Following their rationale,
directors derive stronger incentives from sitting on the board of larger firms because
those firms award them greater visibility and news coverage. Moreover, sitting on
the board of a large and prestigious firm can serve as a signal of competence and
certification in the labour market for directors. Masulis and Mobbs (2014) contrast
reputation incentives directors derive from high- and low-capitalization firms and
aggregate them at the board level. Masulis and Mobbs (2014) show that directors
distribute their time and energy unequally based on the relative prestige they derive
from a board position. The authors also show that when a directorship increases
in its ranking, the director’s board attendance improves and performance improves.
On the other hand, directors are less willing to step down from a board position
of a prestigious firm, even if these firms perform poorly. The same methodology is
adopted by Masulis and Mobbs (2016) and Sila et al. (2017) and related to firm-level
outcomes and the informativeness of stock prices respectively.
In spite of its intuitive and appealing nature, the measure of Masulis and Mobbs
(2014) only applies to outside directors with multiple directorships. Therefore, it is
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still severely limited as a general measure of director reputation incentives. More-
over, because director reputation incentives are aggregated at the board level, the
methodology cannot be easily adopted and applied in the context of outside director
appointments.
In a related study, Jiang et al. (2015) adopt a measure of a director’s media
mentions as a primary tool to study reputation. While there is some validity in this
approach, it would be difficult to adopt as a general measure of director reputa-
tion.The measure requires a director be sufficiently known to be covered by main-
stream media outlets and it also assumes that there is not underlying bias in the
coverage of certain regions, industries and companies.
Overall, none of the existing measures can easily be adopted in the context of
outside director appointments to study director reputation. Instead, this study
aims to design a sample of outside director appointments that allows us to exploit
an exogenous shock in a director’s reputation and study its implications.
The rationale for the methodology employed in this paper is the following. Be-
cause we are interested in the role of director reputation and not differences between
groups of directors that are inherently different (CEOs and non-CEOs), we take a
different approach than Fich (2005) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2010). We use CEO
awards as an identification tool to identify individuals that will retrospectively have
enjoyed similar careers. They are suitable for a study of director reputation for
several reasons.
First, CEO award winners are a subset of highly reputable outside directors.
As discussed in Fahlenbrach et al. (2010), CEOs are among the most demanded
outside board members. CEO award winners are a subset of successful CEOs, with
longer than average tenure (Malmendier and Tate, 2009) and a track record of good
performance (Ammann et al., 2016). Even more so than the average CEO, award
winners will have established a reputation as decision experts and are thus attractive
candidates to fill vacant board positions.
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Second, based on past performance, agents form and establish expectations about
an individual’s future performance (Sorenson, 2014; Dimov et al., 2007; Jensen and
Roy, 2008). This notion fits well in the context of boards and the rationale outlined
in Fama and Jensen (1983). CEO award winners, in particular, have established a
reputation as successful CEOs. The CEO award serves as a public signal that further
spotlights their success and achievements. Further, given their long tenure as CEOs
(Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Ammann et al., 2016), their financial incentives are
negligible, making this subset of directors particularly suitable for a study of director
reputation (Yermack, 2004). Instead, notable board positions add to the profile of
a CEO award winner and can be viewed as reputation enhancing.
Third, due to their extended tenure as CEO of large public firms, the financial
incentives of CEO award winners are negligible. This is particularly true at the
time when they are still active CEOs. As such, reputation or a preservation and en-
hancement of the existing reputation is the primary concern of CEO award winners.
This makes them particularly suitable for a study of director reputation (Yermack,
2004).
Finally, because CEO award winners have such a high reputation, they have
particularly strong incentives to protect this reputation (Diamond, 1989). Poor
performance (Yermack, 2004), fraud (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007) or board oversight
failures (Fos and Tsoutsoura, 2014) reflect badly on the CEOs reputation and may
cause them to lose their board seats and impede their ability to obtain directorships
in the future. These attributes make them especially suitable subjects of study in
respect to director reputation.
We argue that CEO awards contribute significantly to a director’s reputation
and serve as an important signal in the market for corporate directors. We exploit
this exeogenous shift in a director’s reputation and examine whether investors react
observably different after a director has won a CEO award. While the main focus
of this study is the short-term effect around director appointment announcements,
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we also focus on the long-term implications of appointing CEO award winners.
2.2.3 Empirical strategy
We follow the standard methodology of Dodd and Warner (1983) and estimate
cumulative abnormal returns using the market model for 1 year of trading data prior
to the event window2. For our univariate analysis we estimate cumulative abnormal
returns for a 3-day (-1,1), 5-day (-2,2) and 11-day (-5,5) event window. As part of
the multivariate analysis, we then estimate the following regression model3
CARi =α0 + β1CEOi + β2FirstAwardi + β3CEOi × FirstAwardi
+ β4X
′
i + µi,
(2.1)
CARi is the 3-day (-1,1) cumulative abnormal return of director announcement i.
CEO is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the director is the CEO of another firm
at the time of appointment. FirstAward is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
director has won an award at the time of the appointment. CEO × FirstAward
is an interaction effect that is equal to 1 if the director is the CEO of another firm
and has won an award at the time of appointment. Control variables (Xi) include
director and firm characteristics.
To ensure the robustness of our results we re-estimate a similar model for a
subset of 237 CEO outside director appointments
CARi = α0 + β1FirstAwardi + β2X
′
i + µi, (2.2)
Fich (2005) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) find evidence of a certification effect
associated with the appointments of CEOs. In a similar way, investor reactions could
differ according to the director’s career stage. We include control variables to capture
different stages of the director’s career (Other Chief Executive and Other Executive)
2For a more recent and thorough review of the methodology see Kothari and Warner (2008).
3We include the pre-announcement periods in our estimation window because it is likely that
the upcoming director appointment is known to the public before its official announcement by the
company. However, we provide additional results for a (0,2) and (0,3) event window to show that
the effect is robust if we exclude the pre-appointment period. The results are presented in the
Appendix A
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and the total number of awards as a measure of ability (Total Number of Awards).
We include a control variable for gender (Female) because female executives have
been shown to behave differently compared to their male counterparts. Faccio et al.
(2016), for example, show that firms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, are
less volatile and have a higher chance of survival. Further, Chevalier and Ellison
(1999) provide an example of how mutual fund managers who attended higher-SAT
undergraduate institutions earn higher risk-adjusted returns throughout their career.
As a proxy for academic excellence and ability, we include an indicator variable for
whether or not the director received part of his or her education in an Ivy League
institution (Ivy League) and whether or not the director has a Ph.D or equivalent
(Ph.D./J.D./M.D).
Additional controls include an indicator variable for whether or not the direc-
tor is a founder or co-founder (Founder/CoFounder), a control for whether or not
the appointee works in the US (International Appointment). We include the total
number of board seats held by the director (Number of Directorships) (Fich and
Shivdasani, 2006; Falato et al., 2015) and an indicator variable to identify appoint-
ments of industry CEOs (Industry CEO)4. To control for firm characteristics, we
include a measure of firm size (LN(Assets)), firm value (Market-to-Book), research
intensity (R&D Expense) and the contemporaneous (ROA) and lagged operating
profitability (ROAt−1)5.
Finally, we evaluate the long-term implications around director appointments.
In a first step, we analyze stock market long-term performance before the appoint-
ment to test whether this small group of reputable directors intentionally join the
boards of firms that perform well. Secondly, we test for signs of long-term outper-
formance following the appointment. We look at long term excess returns for the
12-months, 24-months and 36-months event window pre- and post-appointment. We
4We define industries using the Fama-French 48 industry classifications. Using the Fama-French
12 industry classification or 2-digit SIC Codes does not change our results
5Definitions of all variables throughout this study can be found in Appendix A
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use a calendar-time approach and calculate monthly calendar-time portfolio returns
for the director appointments in our sample (Dutta and Jog, 2009; Kothari and
Warner, 2008). However, the empirical validity of the traditional three factor model
has been strongly challenged by Carhart (1997) and Novy-Marx (2013). Therefore,
we calculate the monthly abnormal return by estimating the intercept of a calendar-
time portfolio for the more recently introduced five factor model (Fama and French,
2015). Fama (1998) recommends using weighted least squares (WLS) or compara-
ble methods to weight calendar months by the number of event observations. We
estimate the Fama-French five factor model (Fama and French, 2015) where the
weighting factor is based on the number of assets in the monthly portfolio.
ARit =Rit −Rft − βi1(Rmt −Rft)− βi2SMBt − βi3HMLt
− βi4RMWt − βi5CMAt,
(2.3)
where ARit or Alpha is the monthly abnormal return of the calendar-time portfolio,
Rit is the return on a security i, Rft is the risk-free return, Rmt is the return on
a value-weighted market portfolio, SMBt is the return on a diversified portfolio
of small stocks minus the return on a diversified portfolio of big stocks, HMLt is
the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of high and low book-to-
market (B/M) stocks, RMWt is the difference between the returns on diversified
portfolios of stocks with robust and weak profitability and CMAt is the difference
between the returns on diversified portfolios of stocks of low and high investment
firms which are referred to as conservative-aggressive.
As pointed out by Fama (1998) and Kothari and Warner (2008), this methodol-
ogy has distinct advantages over methodologies relying on buy-and-hold abnormal
return to evaluate long-term performance. The calendar-time approach of Fama and
French (1993) allows us to take into account cross-correlations across event firms and
the return distribution provides a close approximation of the normal distribution.
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2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
We use a hand-collected list of CEO awards, in line with Malmendier and Tate (2009)
and Shemesh (2014). The awards are from different sources such as Business Week,
Financial World, Forbes, Chief Executive, Morningstar.com, Electronic Business
Magazine, Industry Week and the Harvard Business Review. In total, our sample
includes 839 CEO awards between 1975-2013. After accounting for those CEOs who
have received multiple awards, we identify 582 individual award-winning CEOs.
Using the names of those individual award-winning CEOs, we search the Lexis/Nexis
data retrieval system for newspaper articles and press releases covering director ap-
pointments. Similar to Fich (2005), we impose two restrictions. First, we exclude
appointments that were announced alongside other major company news such as
dividend announcements, the appointment or retirement of executives and direc-
tors or proposed acquisitions. Second, we exclude appointments that constitute a
director re-election. Following this procedure yields a total of 920 outside director
appointments for 269 individual directors.
While the choice of control variables is motivated by those used in Fich (2005),
our final sample is distinctively different. Fich (2005) collects appointments for
directors of Fortune 1000 companies and examines whether investors react more
positively to the appointment of some directors than others. The main finding is
that investors react more positively to the appointment of a director who is CEO
at another firm. The sample in this study, on the other hand, collects outside
director appointments for a sample of directors that all end up winning a CEO
award. The goal is not to compare different groups of directors, but instead compare
announcement returns across different stages of a director’s career.
For every appointment we collect information from sources such as Who’s Who
in Finance and Business and NNDB, accounting data from Compustat and stock
market data from CRSP. The variables of interest are the interaction term CEO ×
First Award and First Award. The former variable is equal to 1 if the director is the
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CEO of a company and has won a CEO award at the time of his appointment. The
variable First Award is used within the subsample of CEO director appointments
and is equal to 1 if an appointed director has won a CEO award. Further, we
include dummy variables to control for a director’s different career stages. We
include a variable equal to 1 if the appointed director is a chief executive but not
the CEO (Other Chief Executive) and we include a variable that is equal to 1 if
the appointed director is a non-chief executive (Other Executive). Moreover, we use
indicator variables to control for gender (Female), whether or not the director is a
founder or co-founder of the company (Founder/CoFounder) and whether or not the
director’s main employee is outside the US (International Appointment). To take
into account whether or not directors hold additional outside board positions, we
include two variables: i) the total number of outside board seats (Number of Board
Seats) and ii) an indicator variable if the director holds more than 4 outside board
seats at the time of his or her appointment (More Than 4 Board Seats). Finally,
we include two variables to control for the directors level of education. First, we
include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the director holds a Ph.D., J.D. or M.D.
and second we include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the director has completed
at least parts of his or her education at an Ivy League institution.
Finally, we include total assets (Assets), market capitalization (Market Capital-
ization), a variable to capture market valuation compared to the firms book value
defined as market capitalization over book equity (Market-to-Book). We include a
firms research and development costs calculated as R&D expenditure over lagged
assets (R&D Expense. Lastly, we include a return on asset as a measure of firm prof-
itability defined as operating income before depreciation over lagged assets (ROA).
Our final sample for which all required information is available consists of 432
first-time director appointments of 238 individual directors from 1977 to 2015. We
then follow the standard methodology of Dodd and Warner (1983) and estimate
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using the market model for 1 year of trading
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Table 2.1: Director characteristics
The table below reports director-level descriptive statistics. The sample consists of 432 outside director appoint-
ments of 238 individual directors from 1977 to 2015. For every appointment we collect information from sources
such as Who’s Who in Finance and Business and NNDB. The number of observations is reported in column (1),
mean and median in column (2) and (3) respectively, standard deviation in column (4) and the 10th and 90th per-
centile in column (5) and (6).
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. p10 p90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO 430 0.584 1 0.494 0 1
Other Chief Executive 430 0.042 0 0.201 0 0
Other Executive 430 0.107 0 0.309 0 1
Retired 430 0.265 0 0.442 0 1
Female 429 0.096 0 0.294 0 0
Founder/CoFounder 430 0.051 0 0.221 0 0
International Appointment 432 0.049 0 0.215 0 0
Number of Board Seats 430 2.177 2 1.337 1 4
More Than 4 Board Seats 432 0.176 0 0.381 9 1
PhD/J.D./M.D. 430 0.126 0 0.332 0 1
Ivy League 430 0.288 0 0.454 0 1
First Award 432 0.567 1 0.496 0 1
Total Number Awards 432 1.479 1 0.975 1 3
2 Or More Awards 432 0.269 0 0.444 0 1
3 Or More Awards 432 0.123 0 0.328 0 1
4 Or More Awards 432 0.060 0 0.238 0 0
data prior to the event window6.
2.3.1 Director characteristics
Information about the director sample is presented in Table 2.1. Overall, at the
time of the appointment, 4% of the directors are other non-chief executives, 11%
are chief executives but not CEOs, 58% are active CEOs and 27% are retired. The
majority of award winners in our sample are male (>90%). Approximately 5%
of the appointees are founders or co-founders and a similar proportion constitutes
appointments of individuals who primarily work outside the US. Moreover, at the
time of appointment, the average director holds 2.2 corporate board seats. In respect
to education, approximately 13% of the directors in the sample hold a Ph.D.,J.D.
or M.D. and almost 30% have received at least part of their education in an Ivy
League institution.
Further, we find that just over half (57%) of the appointments occur after the
6We provide results for the alpha and beta coefficient estimated using the market model and 1
year of trading data to show that the estimation period is suitably long. We also estimate CARs
with market-adjusted returns to eliminate the possibility that biased market model parameters
are driving the results. The results in our main analysis are robust to the use of market-adjusted
returns.
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director has won the first CEO award. In total, the directors in our sample win
approximately 1.5 awards throughout their career, 27% are multiple award winners
(i.e. they won at least 2 or more awards throughout their career), 12% have won 3
or more awards and 6% have won 4 or more awards.
2.3.2 Appointing and appointee firm characteristics
Descriptive statistics for the appointing and appointee firm are presented in Table
2.2. As expected, we find that overall award winners are on average appointed to very
large firms ($46 billion in total assets and $29 billion in market capitalization). The
average appointing firm has a market-to-book value of 3.4, research and development
expenses of 6% and a return on asset of 13%. The cumulative abnormal return
for director appointments is positive but insignificantly different from zero across
different event windows. We find a 0.3%, 0.6% and 0.4% for the 3-day, 5-day and
11-day event window surrounding the director appointment.
Next, we focus on the firms of CEOs who are appointed as outside directors.
We find that the average appointee firm is smaller than the average appointing firm
($46,606 vs. $25,627) in our sample. However, looking at the median we find exactly
the opposite ($6,443 vs. $9,489), implying that a small number of very large firms
significantly impacts the average firm size of the appointing firms. This fact is further
supported by the high standard deviation in respect to total assets. In contrast to
appointing firm CARs, we observe negative, but insignificant, negative cumulative
abnormal returns if a CEO is appointed as outside director. The announcement
returns are between -0.5% and -0.6% across the different event windows.
Finally, we assess multicollinearity within our regression model. Multicollinearity
is a problem and can severely affect regression estimates, if two or more variables
are determined by a linear combination of other variables in a regression model.
We employ two commonly used measures to assess if multicollinearity is a cause
for concern: i) variance inflation factor (VIF) and ii) tolerance. If all variables are
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Table 2.2: Appointing and appointee firm characteristics
The table below provides descriptive statistics for all appointing and appointee firm characteristics used in the
main analysis. The sample consists of 432 outside director appointments of 238 individual directors from 1977 to
2015. Balance sheet data is from Compustat and stock market data from CRSP. Cumulative abnormal returns are
computed using the market model for 1 year of trading data prior to the event window around the director appoint-
ment. The number of observations is reported in column (1), mean and median in column (2) and (3) respectively,
standard deviation in column (4) and the 10th and 90th percentile in column (5) and (6).
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. p10 p90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Appointing firm
Firm characteristics:
Assets ($M) 423 46,606 6,443 120,034 282 125,451
Market Capitalization 423 29,256 6,495 63,777 429 70,419
Market-to-Book 423 3.382 2.324 3.669 0.708 7.004
R&D Expense 417 0.059 0.005 0.183 0.000 0.138
ROA 423 0.133 0.146 0.113 0.013 0.253
ROA(t−1) 417 0.126 0.144 0.118 0.000 0.247
Announcement returns:
CAR[-1,1] 407 0.003 0.002 0.038 -0.038 0.049
CAR[-2,2] 407 0.006 0.004 0.048 -0.048 0.058
CAR[-5,5] 408 0.004 0.001 0.079 -0.077 0.088
Appointee firm
Firm characteristics:
Assets ($M) (Appointee) 222 25,627 9,489 60,330 927 49,539
Market Capitalization (Appointee) 222 21,332 8,786 35,240 1,356 60,547
Market-to-Book (Appointee) 221 3.986 2.463 4.221 1.156 8.765
R&D Expense (Appointee) 220 0.047 0.006 0.090 0.000 0.149
ROA (Appointee) 221 0.149 0.145 0.084 0.035 0.264
ROA(t−1) (Appointee) 220 0.149 0.143 0.082 0.037 0.254
Announcement returns:
CAR[-1,1] (Appointee) 220 -0.006 -0.005 0.028 -0.040 0.025
CAR[-2,2] (Appointee) 219 -0.005 -0.006 0.040 -0.055 0.040
CAR[-5,5] (Appointee) 219 -0.006 -0.009 0.056 -0.070 0.058
orthogonal to each other the VIF and tolerance are equal to 1. A tolerance of less
than 0.1 and equivalently an VIF of greater or equal to 10, on the other hand, are
problematic and indicate multicollinearity is an issue. We find a mean VIF of 1.56
and no variables pass the threshold. The results are presented in Table ??.
2.4 Investor reaction to director appointments
The aim of this section is to evaluate whether announcement returns to director
appointments differ according to the reputation of the appointed director. For ex-
ample, Fich (2005) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) document positive announcement
returns to the appointment of CEO directors. They argue that investors react posi-
tively to the announcement of a CEO director because a CEO provides a certification
benefit for the appointing firm and because the CEO, through his innate ability and
expertise, can help the firm realize its growth potential. This study takes a different
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approach. We identify CEO award winners and focus on their appointments as out-
side directors. This strategy allows us to construct a sample of directors who will
all become CEOs and win a CEO award throughout their career. Our expectation
is, that their reputational capital should be highest at the point when they are ac-
tive CEOs of a firm and have won a CEO award. To test this, we collect director
appointments across different stages of CEO award winners career, i.e. before and
after the director became CEO and before and after the director won the first CEO
award. In particular, we contrast announcement returns across three different stages
of the director’s career (Other Executive vs. Other Chief Executive vs. CEO) and
before and after the director wins the first CEO award (First Award).
2.4.1 Univariate analysis
First, we look at univariate statistics comparing announcement returns for different
subsets of directors. We report mean and median cumulative abnormal returns
across the 3-day, 5-day and 11-day event window. The results are presented in
Table 2.3. Univariate results for CEO directors are presented in Panel A, those
directors who have won a CEO award in Panel B and those that are CEOs and have
won an award in Panel C.
The univariate results are in line with our expectations. We find more positive
announcement returns for the appointment all three groups of directors: i) directors
who are CEOs ii) directors who have won an award and iii) directors who are CEOs
and have won a CEO award. Although the announcement returns for the appoint-
ment of an outside director who is a CEO (Panel A) and an outside director who
has won a CEO award (Panel B) are more positive, the differences in announce-
ment returns are not statistically significant. Most importantly, however, we find
that the appointment of directors who are CEO and have won an award generates
significantly more positive announcement returns. We find statistically significant
and economically meaningful differences (0.85% vs. 0.17%) in announcement re-
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Table 2.3: Appointing firm CAR’s: Univariate analysis
The table below provides descriptive statistics for all appointing and appointee firm characteristics used in the
main analysis. The sample consists of 432 outside director appointments of 238 individual directors from 1977 to
2015. Balance sheet data is from Compustat and stock market data from CRSP. Cumulative abnormal returns are
computed using the market model for 1 year of trading data prior to the event window around the director appoint-
ment. The number of observations is reported in column (1), mean and median in column (2) and (3) respectively,
standard deviation in column (4) and the 10th and 90th percentile in column (5) and (6).
Panel A Outside director Outside director
is CEO is not CEO
Mean Mean t-Value z-Value
(Median) (Median) (t-test) (Wilcoxon test)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR[-1,1] 0.0060 -0.0002 1.614
(0.0025) (0.0001) 1.372
CAR[-2,2] 0.0074 0.0035 0.8197
(0.0060) (0.0002) 1.430
CAR[-5,5] 0.0082 -0.0007 1.125
(0.0043) (-0.0019) 0.970
Panel B Outside director Outside director
is award-winner is not award-winner
Mean Mean t-Value z-Value
(Median) (Median) (t-test) (Wilcoxon test)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR[-1,1] 0.0035 0.0033 0.0655
(0.0024) (0.0011) 0.373
CAR[-2,2] 0.0073 0.0039 0.7086
(0.0058 ) (0.0033) 0.518
CAR[-5,5] 0.0074 0.0009 0.8265
(0.0011) (-0.0050) 0.509
Panel C Outside director Outside director
is CEO and is not CEO and
award-winner not award-winner
Mean Mean t-Value z-Value
(Median) (Median) (t-test) (Wilcoxon test)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR[-1,1] 0.0085 0.0017 1.775∗
(0.0057 ) (0.0002) 1.969∗∗
CAR[-2,2] 0.0116 0.0038 1.789∗
(0.0084) (0.0015) 1.979∗∗
CAR[-5,5] 0.0172 0.0002 1.955∗∗
(0.0118) (-0.0030) 1.858∗
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turns in the 3-day event window for the award-winning CEOs in our sample. An
announcement return of 0.85% translates into an increase in market capitalization
of approximately $249 ($55) million for the average (median) appointing firm in our
sample. The documented increase in market value is even more pronounced for the
5-day and 11-day event window with value effects of of approximately $339 ($75)
million and $503 ($112) million respectively. We argue that those are the directors
with the highest relative reputation. They derive reputation and status from their
position as CEO of another firm and from the CEO award. The CEO award can be
viewed as a public signal of the CEO’s quality and can thus considerably increase
the CEOs reputation.
2.4.2 Multivariate analysis
Next, we test whether our findings are robust in a multivariate framework. We
estimate a simple regression model with the 3-day cumulative abnormal return as
the dependent variable. The variable of interest is an interaction term equal to
one if the director is a CEO and has won a CEO award (CEO × First Award)
at the time of appointment. We estimate five different models. The results for the
baseline model are presented in column (1). In the second column (2), we control for
additional director-level variables such as founder or co-founder status of the director
(Founder/CoFounder), whether or not the appointed director’s primary work is
outside the US (International Appointment) and the number of board seats (Number
of Board Seats). We include founder status in our model because investors might
view the appointment of a founder or co-founder differently to the appointment
of a non-founder. For example, a founder might have a higher equity ownership
than non-founding directors and thus have a different perspective on short- and
long-term strategy. In a similar fashion, investors might react differently to the
appointment of a foreign or international director. Masulis et al. (2012) analyse
the costs and benefits associated with foreign (or international) directors. Among
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other things, they find that the presence of foreign directors can improve cross-
border M&A outcomes. On the other side, they also find that the board meeting
attendance of foreign directors is low and that firms with foreign directors tend to
exhibit lower performance. Furthermore, the number of board seats has been widely
discussed and applied as a control variable in the context of boards. It is often
referred to as a director or board “busyness” indicator (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006;
Field et al., 2013; Ferris et al., 2003). In the third column (3), we further control for
the educational level of the appointed director (Ph.D./J.D./M.D. and Ivy League)
to capture potential differences in ability. In the fourth column (4), we add an
indicator variable to control for whether or not the appointed director is a CEO of
a firm in the same industry. Appointing a CEO from the same industry could be
viewed positively in the sense that this director has a high level of industry-specific
knowledge which could be valuable for the firm. Finally, in column five (5), we
replace the number of board seats variable with a variable that specifically identifies
directors that can be considered “very busy” (More Than 4 Board Seats). Again, the
appointment of these directors could be viewed considerably more negative because
of their inability to attribute a lot of time and energy to their new board position.
The results are reported in Table 2.4.
The results of our multivariate analysis are in agreement with the univariate
results. We find evidence that, across our sample, investor reactions are significantly
stronger for the appointments of CEOs who have won a CEO award. The premium
attached to announcements of this subset of directors (CEO×FirstAward) ranges
from 2.02% to 2.10% (column (1) to column (6) in Table 2.4). Our results are
highly significant at the 1% level (p¡0.000). Our findings provide direct evidence
that investors recognize the CEO award as a reputation-enhancing mechanism or
event and react significantly more positive to the appointment of a CEO award
winner. For the average (median) firm, the documented short-term value effect is
equivalent to $591 ($131) to $614 ($136) million.
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Table 2.4: Determinants of appointing firm CAR’s: First CEO award
This table reports regression results with the 3-day cumulative abnormal return associated with an outside director
appointment as dependent variable. The sample consists of 432 outside director appointments of 238 individual di-
rectors from 1977 to 2015. t−statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedas-
ticity and director-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
CAR[-1,1]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CEO × First Award 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗
(2.78) (2.66) (2.63) (2.62) (2.66)
CEO -0.0142∗∗ -0.0138∗ -0.0137∗ -0.0142∗ -0.0147∗∗
(-2.00) (-1.92) (-1.91) (-1.96) (-2.03)
First Award -0.0126∗ -0.0115∗ -0.0115∗ -0.0114∗ -0.0119∗
(-1.94) (-1.75) (-1.72) (-1.72) (-1.81)
Total Number Awards -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0019
(-0.89) (-0.82) (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.86)
Other Chief Executive -0.0028 -0.0035 -0.0034 -0.0032 -0.0030
(-0.29) (-0.35) (-0.34) (-0.32) (-0.31)
Other Executive -0.0205∗∗∗ -0.0212∗∗∗ -0.0211∗∗∗ -0.0211∗∗∗ -0.0208∗∗∗
(-3.12) (-3.22) (-3.18) (-3.19) (-3.15)
Female -0.0180∗∗∗ -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.0185∗∗∗ -0.0188∗∗∗ -0.0190∗∗∗
(-3.46) (-3.43) (-3.37) (-3.35) (-3.39)
Founder/CoFounder -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0019
(-0.22) (-0.26) (-0.24) (-0.27)
International Appointment -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0014
(-0.30) (-0.24) (-0.16) (-0.20)
Number of Board Seats -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013
(-0.84) (-0.91) (-0.86)
More Than 4 Board Seats -0.0065
(-1.37)
Ph.D./J.D./M.D. -0.0033 -0.0032 -0.00330
(-0.62) (-0.61) (-0.61)
Ivy League 0.0012 0.0016 0.0016
(0.29) (0.37) (0.35)
Industry CEO 0.0062 0.0058
(0.61) (0.56)
LN(Assets) -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0015
(-1.59) (-1.58) (-1.58) (-1.48) (-1.52)
Market-to-Book -0.0011∗ -0.0011∗ -0.0011∗ -0.0012∗ -0.0012∗
(-1.70) (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.78) (-1.81)
R&D Expense -0.0033 -0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0017
(-0.15) (-0.06) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.08)
ROA 0.0669∗ 0.0675∗ 0.0666∗ 0.0673∗ 0.0692∗∗
(1.96) (1.93) (1.92) (1.94) (2.00)
ROA(t−1) -0.0237 -0.0234 -0.0227 -0.0219 -0.0245
(-0.59) (-0.57) (-0.55) (-0.53) (-0.59)
Intercept 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.0341∗∗∗ 0.0344∗∗∗ 0.0334∗∗∗ 0.0328∗∗∗
(2.61) (2.75) (2.78) (2.65) (2.65)
Observations 398 398 398 398 398
R2 0.067 0.069 0.070 0.071 0.073
49
Next, we look at the different career stages included in our model (Other Ex-
ecutive vs. Other Chief Executive vs. CEO). Our findings show that the positive
effect is confined to CEO award winners. In comparison, investor reactions to the
appointment of a CEO who has not won an award, are significantly more negative.
A similar effect can be observed for the appointments of directors who are non-
chief executives (Other Executive). The coefficient on Other Chief Executive is also
negative but not significant7.
Further, we find a significantly negative effect for First Award. This variable
predominantly captures the effect of CEO award winners who are no longer, i.e.
retired CEOs. The variable includes the appointments of directors who have ceased
their CEO position and assumed other non-CEO positions or are retired8.
With respect to our control variables, we find that the appointment of female
directors (Female) is viewed especially critically by shareholders. The announcement
returns for female directors are almost 2% lower than those for male directors and
highly significant (p¡0.000). To better understand the drivers behind the negative
coefficient we provide additional results in the Appendix A.
First, we compare additional descriptives for female and non-female directors.
We find the announcement returns are, as predicted by the negative regression coef-
ficient, predominately negative. The minimum returns on female directors is of the
same magnitude as the minimum return on all other directors (-9.16% vs. -9.36%).
However, it is apparent that the reactions on the other end of the distribution differ
considerably. Looking at the maximum announcement return as well as the 75th
and 90th percentile highlights that the positive returns are higher for male directors.
The documented effect is surprising but is in line with what has been documented
7However, within our sample, only 18 appointments fall into this category.
8It is important to consider that the indicator variables CEO, Other Chief Executive and Other
Executives used to capture the “career stage effect” are in reference to the career stage Retired.
We have chosen Retired as the reference in order to uncover differences in investor reactions to the
appointment of non-chief executives, other chief executives and the CEOs. Our results highlight
that investors reactions differ systematically according to the directors career stage.
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for the appointments of female CEOs. Lee and James (2007) find significantly more
negative stock market reactions to female CEO appointments.
Next, we explore whether the appointment returns on some individual female
directors are driving our results. We find that, out of 21 individual female directors
in the sample, the average (median) appointment returns are negative for 15 (13)
and positive for 6 (8). However, we fail to observe heavily negative announcement
returns for any one female director. A possible explanation is, that especially for
extremely large firms, the pool of female directors with the right profile is extremely
small and that in an attempt to create gender-diverse boards, firms appoint female
directors whose expertise does not match the core business of the appointing firm
and is thus viewed as suboptimal by investors.
Finally, looking at firm-level variables, we find a negative association with the
firm’s market-to-book ratio and a positive association with the firm’s current oper-
ating profitability.
2.4.3 Multiple award winners
Having shown that investors react more positively if the appointed director is a
CEO award winner, a natural follow-on question is whether the observed premium
increases with the number of CEO awards a CEO has won. While we expect that
winning a second CEO award may still further increase a CEO’s reputation, the
second award does not carry the same weight and importance as the first CEO
award. Our three variables of interest to measure this effect are: an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the director has won two or more awards (2 Or More Awards),
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the director has won 3 or more awards (3 Or More
Awards) and another indicator variable equal to 1 if the director has won 4 or more
awards (4 Or More Awards). We interact those variables with an indicator variable
indicating that the director is a CEO (CEO). For consistency, we include the same
set of control variables as in column (5) in 2.4. The results are presented in Table
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2.5.
Table 2.5: Determinants of appointing firm CAR’s: Multiple Awards
This table reports regression results with the 3-day cumulative abnormal return associated with an outside director
appointment as dependent variable. The sample consists of 432 outside director appointments of 238 individual di-
rectors from 1977 to 2015. t−statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedas-
ticity and director-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
CAR[-1,1]
(1) (2) (3)
2 Or More Awards 0.0001
(0.01)
CEO × 2 Or More Awards -0.0034
(-0.38)
3 Or More Awards 0.0059
(0.39)
CEO × 3 Or More Awards -0.0083
(-0.53)
4 Or More Awards -0.0147
(-1.40)
CEO × 4 Or More Awards 0.0065
(0.45)
CEO 0.0017 0.0017 0.0004
(0.33) (0.39) (0.09)
Other Chief Executive 0.0027 0.0029 0.0021
(0.28) (0.30) (0.22)
Other Executive -0.0119∗∗ -0.0117∗ -0.0126∗∗
(-1.98) (-1.95) (-2.08)
Female -0.0188∗∗∗ -0.0184∗∗∗ -0.0192∗∗∗
(-3.41) (-3.33) (-3.53)
Founder/CoFounder -0.0013 -0.0015 0.0005
(-0.20) (-0.22) (0.07)
International Appointment -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0011
(-0.19) (-0.16) (-0.16)
More Than 4 Board Seats -0.0069 -0.0069 -0.0068
(-1.41) (-1.41) (-1.39)
Ph.D/J.D./M.D. -0.0024 -0.0021 -0.0025
(-0.42) (-0.36) (-0.44)
Ivy League 0.0015 0.0015 0.0014
(0.34) (0.36) (0.33)
LN(Assets) -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0014
(-1.51) (-1.51) (-1.46)
Market-to-Book -0.0010∗ -0.0010∗ -0.0010∗
(-1.67) (-1.67) (-1.68)
R&D Expense -0.0034 -0.0029 -0.0037
(-0.15) (-0.13) (-0.17)
ROA 0.0633∗ 0.0631∗ 0.0633∗
(1.82) (1.80) (1.80)
ROA(t−1) -0.0251 -0.0259 -0.0251
(-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.61)
Intercept 0.0184 0.0177 0.0189
(1.64) (1.61) (1.64)
Observations 398 398 398
R2 0.059 0.060 0.062
Overall, we find no evidence suggesting that the investor reaction increases with
the number of awards a CEO has won. The coefficients on all our variables of interest
are small and most importantly insignificant. As in our main analysis, we observe
significantly lower announcement returns for the group of directors classified as Other
Executives. Similarly, we continue to observe a highly negative coefficient for the
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appointment of female directors. The effect is equivalent to almost 2%. Finally,
operating profitability, measured as return on assets (ROA), has a slight positive
effect on the stock price reaction while the relative value of the firm, measured as
its market value to its book value (Market-to-Book), has a slightly negative effect.
We conclude that the benefit from winning an additional award does not increase
the director’s reputation in the same way as the first CEO award. Winning the
first CEO award significantly improves the director’s profile and visibility, winning
another award does not.
2.4.3.1 CEO director appointments
Our previous results could simply be driven by the fact that investors react more
positively to the appointment of a CEO (Fich, 2005; Fahlenbrach et al., 2010). To
further reduce the heterogeneity in our sample, we reduce it to a subset of CEOs.
Within this subsample, we can now distinguish between CEOs (CEOs who have not
yet won an award) and CEO award winners and test whether investors react more
positively to the appointment of CEOs who have won an award. Our sample includes
237 CEO outside director appointments. We re-estimate our baseline regression
using a similar set of control variables and use the 3-day cumulative abnormal return
around the director appointment as the dependent variable. The results are reported
in Table 2.6.
We include all variables we have included in our main analysis and estimate
4 different models. As before we control for gender, founder status, whether the
appointed director primarily works outside the US, other board responsibilities,
education and whether or not the appointed director is the CEO of a firm in the
same industry. Finally, we include the same set of firm-level control variables.
The results further support our argument that investors attach a premium to the
recruitment of directors who have won a CEO award. We find significantly more
positive announcement returns between 0.92-0.97%. Across the different models the
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Table 2.6: Determinants of appointing firm CAR’s: CEO appointments
This table reports regression results with the 3-day cumulative abnormal return associated with the appointment
of a CEO as outside director. The sample consists of 237 CEO outside director appointments. t− statistics given
in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and director-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
CAR[-1,1]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Award 0.0092∗∗ 0.0094∗∗ 0.0097∗∗ 0.0097∗∗
(2.08) (2.09) (2.12) (2.11)
Total Number Awards -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0023
(-0.84) (-0.88) (-0.88) (-0.89)
Female -0.0211 -0.0215 -0.0218 -0.0222
(-1.59) (-1.62) (-1.61) (-1.61)
Founder/CoFounder 0.0008 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004
(0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
International Appointment -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0011
(-0.01) (-0.14) (-0.17) (-0.12)
More Than 4 Board Seats -0.0068 -0.0068 -0.0066
(-1.27) (-1.26) (-1.20)
Ph.D./J.D./M.D. -0.0043 -0.0043
(-0.71) (-0.70)
Ivy League -0.0006 -0.0002
(-0.10) (-0.04)
Industry CEO 0.0035
(0.31)
LN(Assets) -0.0027∗∗ -0.0026∗ -0.0026∗ -0.0026∗
(-2.02) (-1.96) (-1.96) (-1.82)
Market-to-Book -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013
(-1.45) (-1.54) (-1.50) (-1.47)
R&D Expense 0.0021 0.0027 0.0030 0.0019
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04)
ROA 0.0541 0.0556 0.0549 0.0549
(1.44) (1.43) (1.41) (1.41)
ROA(t−1) -0.0276 -0.0260 -0.0256 -0.0239
(-0.59) (-0.54) (-0.53) (-0.48)
Intercept 0.0308∗∗ 0.0312∗∗ 0.0318∗∗ 0.0307∗
(1.98) (1.99) (2.00) (1.81)
Observations 237 237 237 237
R2 0.055 0.058 0.060 0.060
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estimated coefficients are significant at the 5% level. The positive coefficient on First
Award shows that investors recognize the CEO award as a reputation enhancing
event and consider it when evaluating director appointments.
The average (median) size of the appointing firm in the CEO subsample is
$43,725 ($8,581) billion implying a value effect for the average (median) firm of
between $402 and $424 ($79 and $83) million . Interestingly, whether or not the
appointed CEO is female or male is not important any more. Our results imply
that the previously observed negative effect observed for female directors is centred
around the appointment of non-CEO directors.
As before, we look at multiple award winners and do not find that various mea-
sures of winning multiple awards are related to announcement returns. We conclude
that investors indeed recognize and value a directors reputation.
One concern throughout our analysis are the relatively low coefficients of deter-
mination (R2 between 5.5% and 7%). However, the magnitude of the documented
R2 values is in line with those reported in other studies around director or board
appointments. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), Lin et al. (2003) and Davidson et al.
(2004), for example, use CARs as their dependent variable in similar settings and
document R2 values of similar magnitude.
2.5 Investor reaction in the CEOs’ own firms
In this section we look at the stock price reaction at the CEO’s own firm. It is not
clear how shareholders view a CEO’s appointment as outside director. On the one
hand, outside director appointments at large and prestigious firms could serve as
signal of the CEO’s quality, allow access to external resources and help promote the
firm’s strategic objectives. On the other hand, however, the appointment could also
be judged as an event that will distract the CEO from the day-to-day operations of
his own firm. Consistent with the notion that outside appointments of CEOs are
viewed critically by shareholders, Fich (2005) documents that outside appointments
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of active CEOs result, on average, in a decline in firm value of 0.64%. The reaction
is considerably more negative if the CEO is not of retirement age (between 62 and
66).
After showing that reputation is valued by the shareholders of the appointing
firm, we now examine whether CEOs who have won an award are looked upon more
favourably when appointed as outside directors. We argue that shareholders may
judge CEO award winners to be more capable and hence react more positively (or
less negatively) to their appointments as outside directors.
We begin our analysis by looking at univariate results and compare cumulative
abnormal returns at the CEO’s firm around the 3-day, 5-day and 11-day event
window. We then re-estimate our baseline regression using the 3-day cumulative
abnormal returns for the CEO’s own firm as our dependent variable. As before
we include various director- and firm-level control variables. Univariate results are
presented in Table 2.7 and multivariate results in Table 2.8.
Table 2.7: CEO’s own firm CARs: Univariate analysis
This table presents univariate results for the 3-day, 5-day and 11-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around
the appointments of CEOs as outside directors at the CEO’s own firm. We report mean and median cumulative
abnormal returns. The table compares CARs for CEOs who have won an award and those who have not. We report
we report a t-test for means in column (3) and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for medians in column (4).
CEO is CEO is no
award winner award winner
Mean Mean t-Value z-Value
(Median) (Median) (t-test) (Wilcoxon test)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR[-1,1] -0.0059 -0.0069 0.255
(-0.0055) (-0.0050) 0.034
CAR[-2,2] -0.0050 -0.0053 0.057
(-0.0066) (-0.0048) -0.052
CAR[-5,5] -0.0094 -0.0037 -0.742
(-0.0088) (-0.0086) -0.797
While we find that, overall the investor reaction to a CEO’s outside director
appointment is slightly negative, our univariate and multivariate results do not
reveal a significant association between the stock market reaction at the CEO’s
firm and CEO awards. Our univariate results show that the stock price reaction is
slightly less negative for the 3-day and 5-day, but more positive for the 11-day event
window. However, the differences are not statistically significant.
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Table 2.8: Determinants of CEO’s own firm CARs
This table presents univariate results for the 3-day, 5-day and 11-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around
the appointments of CEOs as outside directors at the CEO’s own firm. We report mean and median cumulative
abnormal returns. The table compares CARs for CEOs who have won an award and those who have not. We report
a t-test for means in column (3) and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for medians in column (4).
CAR[-1,1]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Award 0.0012 0.0010 0.0012 0.0005
(0.29) (0.23) (0.28) (0.12)
Retirement Age 0.0038 0.0048 0.0054 0.0058
(0.68) (0.84) (0.96) (1.06)
Total Number Awards 0.0025 0.0034 0.0033 0.0034
(1.08) (1.30) (1.32) (1.40)
Female 0.0029 0.0029 0.0023
(0.46) (0.45) (0.33)
Founder/CoFounder -0.0109 -0.0113 -0.0127
(-1.00) (-1.05) (-1.18)
International Appointment 0.0130 0.0126 0.0148
(1.42) (1.33) (1.54)
Number of Board Seats -0.0018 -0.0022
(-1.05) (-1.26)
Ph.D./J.D./M.D. 0.0123∗
(1.92)
Ivy League 0.0044
(0.95)
LN(Assets) (Appointee) 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.01) (-0.12) (-0.09) (-0.19)
Market-to-Book (Appointee) -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0010
(-0.94) (-1.24) (-1.34) (-1.48)
R&D Expense (Appointee) 0.0020 0.0068 0.0077 0.0067
(0.08) (0.26) (0.30) (0.28)
ROA (Appointee) 0.0610 0.0648 0.0688 0.0795
(1.10) (1.27) (1.34) (1.53)
ROA(t−1) (Appointee) -0.0223 -0.0268 -0.0265 -0.0317
(-0.38) (-0.49) (-0.48) (-0.58)
Intercept -0.0150 -0.0140 -0.0111 -0.0119
(-0.87) (-0.78) (-0.62) (-0.68)
Observations 216 216 216 216
R2 0.025 0.039 0.043 0.072
Looking at our regression results, we find that the coefficients on First Award
and Retirement Age are both positive but insignificant. Overall, we find little ex-
planatory power in the director- and appointee firm-level control variables. We find
some evidence that the reaction is less negative if the CEO has a Ph.D or equivalent.
In a further but unreported specification we have also included appointing firm-level
control variables but the results for our variables of interest remain unchanged.
2.6 Long-term performance around director ap-
pointments
In this section, we focus on three different questions. First, we evaluate whether pre-
appointment performance plays a role for the director appointments in our sample.
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And second, we look at how and whether firm performance changes after the director
appointment. In other words, do firms benefit from appointing reputable executives?
And finally, we are interested whether CEO’s are rewarded with outside directorships
for good performance at the firms they head.
We evaluate firm performance by looking at the 12-month, 24-month and 36-
month event window. We first analyze pre- and post-appointment performance for
all directors in our sample. We compute long-term performance for all appointments
in our sample, CEO directors, award-winning directors and award-winning CEO
directors. We then carry out the same analysis for the pre-appointment period for
the subsample of CEOs. We calculate monthly calendar-time portfolio returns using
the Fama-French five factor model (Fama and French, 2015). We present results for
all director appointments in Table ?? and Table 2.10. The results on CEO director
appointments are presented in Table 2.11
Our results show that the directors in our sample join the boards of firms that
have performed well in the past. We find some evidence of abnormal monthly
returns at the 12-month horizon. However, the alphas are only significant for our
overall sample and the subset of award-winners. More importantly, however, we
find evidence of significant and consistent outperformance at the 24- and 36-months
horizon. The results imply that highly reputable directors have access to the boards
of firm’s that have performed well in the past. We observe alphas in the range of
0.53-0.82% for the 24-month and 0.58-0.68% at the 36-month horizon.
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Comparing pre-appointment to post-appointment performance reveals a striking
difference. There is no evidence of outperformance across all post-appointment peri-
ods. This is particularly significant given the outperformance in the pre-appointment
period leading up to the appointment. Moreover, the director is unlikely to join the
board of a firm whose future prospect the director judges to be poor. We interpret
our evidence to mean that the directors falsely interpret the firm’s past performance
as a signal for future performance and join the boards of firms that have performed
extremely well in the past. Moreover, our results shed doubt on the notion that
individual outside directors have a significant effect on firm outcomes.
Finally, Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that CEOs are re-
warded with outside board positions if the firms they head perform well. To address
this question, we look at the long-term performance of the CEO’s firm before he
or she is appointed as outside director. We find significant outperformance at the
CEO’s own firm for all three pre-appointment windows. The monthly abnormal
performance is between 0.68-1.70%. The documented abnormal returns are larger
for CEOs who have not yet won the CEO award. This is in line with the conclusions
of Malmendier and Tate (2009), who show that CEOs win an award after long and
successful careers but following the award the CEO’s firm tends to underperform. If
CEO’s have not yet won an award, their firms are more likely to be younger and at a
high-growth stage. The firms of CEOs who have won an award, on the other hand,
are more likely mature firms that enter a process of slowing and mean-reverting
growth.
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2.7 Conclusion
Unlike most economic systems, financial incentives are not the primary incentive
device in the market for outside directors. Instead, director reputation has been
recognized as an essential commodity that governs director selection and determines,
at least to some extent, the effectiveness of individual directors and the board as a
whole.
We study the role of director reputation using a short- and long-term event study.
We collect outside director appointments for the CEO award winners across different
stages of their career. Exploiting an exogenous shift in reputation, induced by
prestigious CEO awards, we show that investors recognize and value the reputation
of appointed outside directors. We confirm the robustness of the documented effect
for a subsample of CEO director appointments. Given the large average firm size in
our sample the appointment of a CEO award winner translates into an economically
meaningful short-term value effect.
Given the high quality of the directors in our sample (all the directors end up
winning a CEO award), we would expect that firms benefit from the appointment
of such a high profile director in the long-run. This intuition, however, is not sup-
ported by the findings. Comparing long-term stock performance for the three year
pre- and post-appointment period reveals a stark contrast. We find significant out-
performance before the appointment on the one hand and little or no signs of out-
performance in the period after the appointment. Given the high demand for their
services, reputable directors join the boards of firms that have performed well for an
extended period of time. However, the post-appointment results suggest that the
appointment of a reputable outside director does not necessarily create value in the
long-run. The findings call into question the general consent that outside directors
have a role apart from monitoring.
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Chapter 3
Director reputation and firm
outcomes: The case of
award-winning CEOs
3.1 Introduction
CEOs continue to be highly demanded as outside directors and CEO-level experi-
ence is still considered one of the most important qualities when appointing a new
director. However, despite their experience and ability, it is unclear why firms hire
CEOs and whether they are valuable as directors (Fich, 2005; Fahlenbrach et al.,
2010). A study by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) suggests that busy directors are un-
able to properly monitor management and consequently firm performances suffers.
Yet, the most skilled directors are often also those that are most time constrained.
More recent research indicates that whether or not a board is busy might not ulti-
mately determine its effectiveness (Field et al., 2013). Instead, the effectiveness of
outside directors is determined to a large extent by incentives.
Since financial incentives are not strong (Yermack, 2004; Adams and Ferreira,
2008), preserving and enhancing reputation is considered the primary concern of
outside directors (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). A good reputation is im-
portant in the appointment process (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990) and also determines
the effort and time a director allocates towards a directorship (Masulis and Mobbs,
2014, 2016).
64
Instead of measuring reputation, we use prestigious CEO awards conferred by
editorials of major national publications (Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Shemesh,
2014) to identify a small number of highly reputable CEOs. Given their managerial
experience, CEO position and proven track record, CEO award winners are among
the most reputable executives available in the director labour market (Malmendier
and Tate, 2009; Ammann et al., 2016). Most importantly, however, CEOs have
no financial incentives to accept board positions. Instead, notable board positions
add to the profile of the CEO and can be viewed as a strictly reputation enhancing
activity.
We use prestigious CEO awards conferred by editorials of major national publi-
cations (Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Shemesh, 2014) as an exogenous shift in status
and reputation to identify a small number of highly reputable CEOs. Given their
managerial experience, CEO position and proven track record, CEO award winners
are among the most reputable executives available in the director labour market.
Most importantly, however, CEOs have no financial incentives to accept board po-
sitions. Instead, notable board positions add to the profile of the CEO and can be
viewed as a strictly reputation enhancing activity.
The aim of this study is to understand whether a system where reputation serves
as currency and incentive, i.e. the most reputable directors will be matched with the
most prestigious board seats, can be in the interest of shareholders and can result
in effective monitoring. It is not clear whether shareholders should take a critical
stance towards a system relying on reputation-based matching between firm and
director or whether this system represents an efficient way to match the director’s
human capital to the boards where it can be applied most effectively.
We expect a positive association between award-winning CEOs as outside di-
rectors on the board of directors and firm performance for several reasons. We
argue that the expected positive association is due to two different influences. First,
selection dynamics and second the intrinsic value CEO award winners add to the
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board.
The so-called “superstar status” of CEO award winners (Malmendier and Tate,
2009), will result in a selection and matching process where CEO award winners are
matched to the most prestigious boards. They will carefully evaluate the risk-return
trade-off and will only accept appointments that offer the greatest reward and least
risk in terms of reputation and future career prospects.
Once appointed, CEO award winners are in a unique position to contribute value
through their board functions. They possess a high level of managerial experience,
have access to large social and business networks and can leverage their reputation
and media presence to exert influence on the board.
Secondly, we also expect that the presence of outside directors who are CEO
award winners is positively associated with the quality of corporate governance.
Reputation becomes more valuable as it is built up (Diamond, 1989). Because the
CEO award marks a relative peak in terms of reputation and status, the potential
costs resulting from poor monitoring are high. From the perspective of outside
directors, corporate governance can be viewed as an insurance mechanism to limit
reputational damage.
Moreover, implementing governance provisions that restrict management and are
in the interest of shareholders, can serve as a signal of director prowess and increase
their ability to obtain directorships in the future.
To test our expectations we identify the outside board positions of award-winning
CEOs using the RiskMetrics director database. Our sample includes a large cross-
section of Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 1500 firms from 1996-2013. We use three
measures to evaluate the effect of award-winning CEOs. We count the total number
of CEO award winners, an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has at last one CEO
award winner and the fraction of CEO award winners serving as outside directors
and evaluate the consequences for firm performance and corporate governance.
We find that in addition to their CEO responsibilities, award-winning CEOs
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occupy important board functions. While representing a small fraction of directors
in the sample, they hold significantly more outside board positions than the average
director (2.00 vs. 0.96), are represented on more committees (1.75 vs. 1.63) but at
the same time are almost three times more likely to have missed 75% of the board
meetings (0.05 vs. 0.02). Our findings highlight some of the problems resulting
from the reputation-based matching of directors. CEO award winners are given a
relatively larger share of the board responsibilities despite having considerably less
time to allocate to their board functions.
In line with our predictions we find evidence of a value premium attached to firms
with award-winning CEOs as outside directors. Keeping debt constant, the increase
in Tobin’s Q associated with a one standard deviation increase in the number of
award-winning CEOs is equivalent to an increase in firm value of $468 million for
a firm with average total assets. Moreover, we find that the effect can only be
observed using valuation based measures such as Tobin’s Q. There is no evidence
that the presence of award-winning CEOs on the board is in any way related to a
firm’s operating performance (ROA). The results match our expectations and can be
consolidated with the findings of Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) who find that appointing
CEO directors has no observable effect on operating performance. Moreover, given
outside directors’ limited access to firm- and project-specific information, they have
little scope to influence the day-to-day management of the firm or its assets (Demb
and Neubauer, 1992; Adams et al., 2010; Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013). Instead,
outside directors’ contribution to firm value is likely to be through the channel of
value-added growth or higher return on assets required in the future (Kang et al.,
2016).
We use the Entrenchment index of Bebchuk et al. (2009) to measure the quality of
a firm’s governance provisions. Firms with award-winning CEOs have significantly
lower entrenchment, i.e. better governance. Our results hold when we control for
within-firm variation in individual governance provisions, suggesting that award-
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winning CEOs are directly involved in promoting better governance and abolishing
governance provisions that hurt shareholders. In particular, we find a reduced likeli-
hood of staggered boards, limits to amend by-laws and supermajority requirements
for mergers and acquisitions.
In order to establish the robustness of our results we explore several alternative
narratives that could explain our results. We show that the documented value
premium is not determined by past values of our dependent variable, differences in
the quality of governance, director clustering around firms whose CEOs are also CEO
award winners, alternative variable specifications or additional control variables.
Using market-to-book as an alternative measure of firm value and return on sales
(ROS) as an alternative measure of operational efficiency leaves our results and
conclusions unchanged. Finally, we show that the value premium associated with
CEO award winners disappears once they are retired. We conclude that the value
premium stems, at least partially, from the CEO’s position and the certification
benefit it provides for the appointing firm.
We include firm-fixed effects in all regressions to control for any firm-level omitted
variables that are time invariant and year-effects control for any changes in the
macro environment. Moreover, we present a range of tests to ensure the robustness
of our tests to omitted variables, nonlinear dependencies, sample construction and
outliers. To further ensure the robustness of our results we present two additional
tests. Because firms with award-winning CEOs differ significantly from the average
firm on our sample linear controls may not adequately account for the differences.
Unaccounted nonlinear firm characteristics could cause the association with firm
value and corporate governance. Tests using a propensity score matched sample
confirm our results. Finally, we use an alternative definition of our variable of
interest and count the number of CEO awards held by all outside directors (instead
of the number of award winners). The results confirm our previous findings. Further,
they suggest that the number of awards is a less important indicator of reputation
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than the number of individual CEO award winners on the board. This indicates that
the reputational benefit derived from winning additional CEO awards is diminishing.
Our findings make several important contributions to the literature. First and
foremost, this paper shows that the incentive structure of the director labour mar-
ket can lead to positive firm outcomes for firms that succeed in recruiting highly
reputable directors, such as award-winning CEOs. While they may not seem like
good monitors at first sight, strong incentives and self-interest make them valuable
directors from the shareholders point of view. Our findings add to the recent litera-
ture showing that reputation incentives can lead to better monitoring (Jiang et al.,
2015), can reduce the likelihood of negative firm outcomes (Masulis and Mobbs,
2016), increase the time directors commit towards a directorship and finally result
in positive firm outcomes (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014).
Second, our paper adds to the literature on busy directors and busy boards (Fer-
ris et al., 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Field et al., 2013). Our findings suggest
that incentives and not time-constraints ultimately determine director or board ef-
fectiveness. Field et al. (2013) show that for a sample of IPO firms, busy boards
are not necessarily detrimental. We argue that IPO firms offer outside directors
financial as well as reputation incentives. The ownership stake of outside directors
is 33% in the sample of Field et al. (2013), suggesting the potential for considerable
financial rewards. The positive results of Field et al. (2013) could thus be explained
by a mixture of financial and reputational incentives that lead directors to be ef-
fective monitors and valuable board members. Overall, we interpret our findings to
mean that incentives are central to a board’s effectiveness.
Third, the study contributes to the understanding of the role of outside directors.
The results of Kang et al. (2016) suggest, the role of outside directors may be
better evaluated using a measure of value-added growth rather than operational
profitability. Especially in large firms, outside directors have very limited access to
firm- or project-specific information (Dominguez-Martinez et al., 2008; Adams et al.,
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2010; Cornelli et al., 2013). Their ability to influence the management of assets in
place is thus very limited.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our
empirical predictions. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. In Section 4
and Section 5 we present our main results and in Section 6 we consider the robustness
of our results. The conclusion is presented in Section 7.
3.2 Theoretical considerations and hypotheses de-
velopment
In this section we review the relevant literature and develop hypotheses whether
and how award-winning CEOs as outside directors can impact firm outcomes. It
is unclear whether firm’s can benefit from CEO directors (Fich, 2005; Fahlenbrach
et al., 2010). In an early account, Fich (2005) finds positive announcement returns
upon appointing another firm’s CEO. Fahlenbrach et al. (2010), in turn, show that
the positive stock price reaction is limited to the appointment of the first CEO to
the board. Most importantly, the authors show that the presence of CEO directors
does not affect a firm’s operating performance. They provide no conclusive answer
to the question why CEOs continue to be highly demanded as outside directors.
One potential explanation is that CEOs are too busy to act as effective moni-
tors. Core et al. (1999), for example, show that CEOs of firms with busy directors
receive excessive pay, suggesting that busy boards are not effective. Similarly, Fich
and Shivdasani (2006) suggest that busy directors are unable to fulfill their monitor-
ing duties which will subsequently result in poor firm performance. More recently,
Field et al. (2013) show that for a sample of IPO firms a busy board is not nec-
essarily detrimental. Instead the number of directorships held by outside directors
can be seen as a function of their skill and experience (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Hence, whether or not a board is busy might not ultimately determine its effective-
ness. Instead, recent research suggests that director effectiveness is to a large extent
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determined by incentives.
Because financial considerations are secondary (Yermack, 2004; Adams and Fer-
reira, 2008), reputation serves as the primary motivator for outside directors and
having a reputation as a good monitor increases the likelihood of additional fu-
ture board appointments (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Recent empirical
research indicates that reputational damage can severely affect a directors’ future
career (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Brochet and Srinivasan, 2014; Ertimur et al.,
2012; Fos and Tsoutsoura, 2014).
For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) show that following lawsuits, directors
experience a significant decline in the number of their outside board positions. This
decline in the number of board positions is more pronounced if the allegations are
more severe or the director bears greater responsibility. Moreover, directors with
boards seats at firms facing fraud allegations are more likely to lose their board
positions at firms with stronger governance. More recently, Fos and Tsoutsoura
(2014) show that proxy contests, as a result of poor director performance, can be
equally damaging to a director’s future career prospects. Following proxy contests,
directors experience a significant decline in the number of board seats at the firm
targeted with the proxy fight, but also at other non-targeted firms. Reductions in
cash dividends (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990), financial and disclosure-related fraud
(Brochet and Srinivasan, 2014) and excessive executive pay (Ertimur et al., 2012)
have been shown to be similarly damaging to a directors’ career.
While negative firm outcomes can be damaging to a director’s career, reputation
incentives can also lead directors to be effective monitors and lead to positive firm
outcomes (Masulis and Mobbs, 2016, 2014; Jiang et al., 2015). Masulis and Mobbs
(2014), for example, show that reputation incentives can significantly affect the
likelihood of an outside directors’ board meeting attendance and involvement in
committees as well as increase the likelihood that these directors remain on the
board in times of bad firm performance. Masulis and Mobbs (2016) find evidence
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suggesting that directors prioritize their efforts according to the relative prestige
derived from each directorship. In particular, the authors note fewer actions known
to hurt director reputation at directorships ranked more highly by outside directors.
The evidence suggests, that reputation incentives can greatly affect how directors
allocate time and resources towards their board functions.
We identify a small group of highly reputable executives using prestigious CEO
awards and evaluate their roles as outside directors. Given their proven track record,
managerial experience and CEO award, these CEOs are among the most reputable
executives in the director labour market. Most importantly, however, CEOs have
no financial incentives to accept board positions. Instead, accepting board positions
can be viewed as a reputation enhancing exercise. We evaluate the consequences of
reputation incentives for this small group of highly reputable and time-constrained
CEOs.
If properly incentivized, CEO award winners are in a unique position to fulfill
those responsibilities. As CEOs they are central to a firm’s success, as part of a
board they can better understand structural challenges and strategic issues. As
such, CEO experience can be a valuable resource and help boards fulfill their advis-
ing and monitoring duties. Given the high demand for their services, CEO award
winners will be able to carefully chose what boards to sit on. They will only accept
board seats at firms that offer the least risk and greatest reward in terms of reputa-
tion. Moreover, the firm will derive a certification benefit from appointing the CEO
(Fahlenbrach et al., 2010). The appointment will serve as a vote of confidence for the
firm, its management and its future prospects. Moreover, as well-known CEOs, they
are likely to have more influence than the average outside director to influence other
board members and corporate strategy. They can actively lobby for changes in the
management team or against policies and strategies they consider value-destroying.
In times of conflict, for example they can, if necessary, openly oppose management
and actively leverage their reputation and media presence to support their agenda.
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Hence, our first hypothesis is:
H1: Award-winning CEO outside directors are matched to firms that experience
better firm performance than firms with no award-winning CEO as outside directors.
CEO awards mark the relative peak of a CEO’s career in terms of status and
reputation. Among other things, such as engaging in a range of “celebrity” activities,
the CEO’s outside board responsibilities increase considerably following the award
(Malmendier and Tate, 2009). In a theoretical model, Diamond (1989) shows that
agents have stronger incentives to maintain their reputation as it becomes more
valuable. The model also predicts that a single failure can cause a strong decline in
its value.
Following this rationale, CEO award winners have particularly strong incentives
to protect their reputation. From the perspective of outside directors, corporate
governance can be viewed as an insurance mechanism to limit reputational damage.
Improving corporate governance will reduce the likelihood of managerial malfeasance
and limit the liability of the board. Moreover, implementing governance provisions
that restrict management are in the interest of shareholders and can serve as a signal
of director prowess. It is thus in the interest of the CEO award winner to promote
sound corporate governance. Our second hypothesis:
H2: Award-winning CEO outside directors are matched to firms that have stronger
governance provisions than firms with no award-winning CEOs as outside directors.
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3.3 Data, descriptive statistics and univariate re-
sults
3.3.1 Data
We test our hypotheses using a large cross-section of S&P 1500 firms for the time
period 1996 to 2013. The governance data used in this study are from RiskMetrics,
accounting data are from Compustat, compensation data are from Execucomp, stock
return data from CRSP, and institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters
Institutional (13f) Holdings. We exclude firms incorporated outside the U.S. To
merge the RiskMetrics database with Compustat and CRSP we use the procedure
outlined in Coles et al. (2014). Because we use lagged variables throughout our
analysis we adjust dollar values to constant 2005 dollars.
We use a hand-collected list of CEO Awards (Malmendier and Tate, 2009;
Shemesh, 2014). The awards are from different sources: Business Week, Financial
World, Forbes, Chief Executive, Morningstar.com, Electronic Business Magazine,
Industry Week and the Harvard Business Review. In total, our sample includes 839
CEO Awards between 1975-2013. After accounting for those CEOs who have re-
ceived multiple awards, we identify 582 individual award-winning CEOs. Of those,
429 appear as directors in the RiskMetrics database. More details on the construc-
tion of the sample, the CEO Awards used in this study and the matching procedure
are provided in Appendix E.
3.3.2 Director-level
In total, there are 263,053 director-firm-year observations in the RiskMetrics database.
Out of those, 183,932 are outside director-firm-year observations. The results are
reported in Table 3.1. The average (median) director age is 61.5 (62) years. 13.6%
of the directors are female and 10.6% hold a CEO position. Half a percent of all
directors are outside directors who are CEOs and have won an award. Every direc-
tor has, on average, one other outside board position. Less than 2% of all outside
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Table 3.1: Director-level descriptive statistics and univariate results
The table below reports descriptive statistics for various director-firm-level variables for all outside directors in the
RiskMetrics database from 1996-2013 in Panel A and results of a univariate analysis in Panel B. In Panel B, column
(1) and (2) report the averages for the two groups. Column (3) reports the difference between the two groups and
column (4) reports the p-value for a test that Column (1) is equal to Column (2).
Outside Directors
Observations Mean Median
Panel A (1) (2) (3)
Director age 183,712 61.479 62.000
Director tenure 165,308 7.619 6.000
Female director 174,938 0.136 0.000
CEO director 183,931 0.106 0.000
AwCeo outside director 183,932 0.005 0.000
Outside directorships 165,341 0.967 1.000
Attended <75% of Meetings 183,931 0.018 0.000
Owns less than 1% 145,788 0.882 1.000
Audit committee member 165,415 0.504 1.000
Compensation committee member 165,415 0.489 0.000
Governance committee member 165,405 0.382 0.000
Nominating committee member 165,415 0.435 0.000
Number of committee memberships 183,932 1.627 1.000
Award-winning
CEO p-value for
Outside Other p-value for Wilcoxon
Directors Directors Difference test (1)=(2) rank-sum test
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outside directorships 2.000 0.961 1.039 0.000 0.000
Attended <75% of meetings 0.048 0.017 0.031 0.000 0.000
Audit committee member 0.350 0.504 0.155 0.000 0.000
Compensation committee member 0.545 0.488 0.056 0.000 0.000
Governance committee member 0.400 0.382 0.018 0.260 0.260
Nominating committee member 0.435 0.453 0.018 0.249 0.249
Number of committee memberships 1.747 1.626 0.121 0.001 0.000
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directors missed more than 25% of their firm’s board meetings and approximately
88% have less than one percent of the voting power. About half (50.4%) of the
directors are a member of the audit committee, 48.9% are part of the compensation
committee, 38.3% a member of the governance committee and 43.5% are part of the
nominating committee. The mean (median) number of committee memberships is
1.63 (1).
Univariate comparisons in Panel B of Table 3.1 show that award-winning CEO
outside directors hold, on average, more outside board positions than the average
outside director. They are also more than twice as likely to miss more than 25% of
board meetings but have significantly more board committee responsibilities. Over-
all, the findings suggest that award-winning CEOs are highly desired as outside
directors, are more likely to be part of a board committee but, given their respon-
sibilities as CEO, are less likely to attend board meetings. This emphasizes the
problem that the most desired or suitable board members are also those with the
least time to allocate towards board responsibilities.
3.3.3 Firm-level
Our firm-level sample has 23,907 firm-year observations and 2,584 firms. An overview
of the data is presented in Table 3.2.The average firm controls $16.726 billion in to-
tal assets, has a market capitalization of $8.093 billion and sales of $6.004 billion.
On average every board has 9 directors. In approximately 90% of firms, outside
directors represent a majority of the board. The average Tobin’s Q is 1.87 and
an entrenchment index of 2.20. In terms of our variables of interest, there are 739
firm-year observations and 242 firms with at least one award-winning CEO outside
director. On average, every board has 0.035 award-winning CEO outside directors
and the maximum number in any given firm-year observation is 3. Looking at the
1st and 99th percentile, reveals that the top 1% of firms have 1 award-winning CEO
outside director, representing a fraction of 11% of outside directors. Moreover, it
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Table 3.3: Firm-level univariate results
The table below provides results of a univariate analysis of firm characteristics. The variable of interest is Tobin’s
Q. First, we sort firms into two groups based on whether they have award-winning CEO outside directors. Column
(1) and (2) report the averages for the two groups. Column (3) reports the difference between the two groups and
column (4) reports the p-value for a test that Column (1) is equal to Column (2). Dollar values are in 2005 dollars.
Award-winning No Award-winning
CEO CEO p-value for
Outside Director Outside Director p-value for Wilcoxon
(N=739) (N= 23,146 ) Difference test (1)=(2) rank-sum test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Performance and governance measures
Tobin’s Q 2.130 1.824 0.306 0.000 0.000
ROA 0.156 0.147 0.008 0.042 0.009
Entrenchment index 1.912 2.205 -0.292 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Control variables
Assets ($M) 69,973 15,026 54,946 0.000 0.000
Sales ($M) 19,647 4,861 14,785 0.000 0.000
Board size 11.393 9.350 2.043 0.000 0.000
Fraction outside directors 0.762 0.710 0.051 0.000 0.000
R&D expense 0.032 0.027 0.005 0.010 0.000
Capital expenditures 0.058 0.056 0.002 0.368 0.000
Capital intensity 0.443 0.417 0.025 0.281 0.000
Leverage 0.346 0.393 0.046 0.000 0.000
Risk 0.392 0.415 0.023 0.004 0.002
Segments 2.639 2.320 0.318 0.000 0.035
CEO ownership 0.003 0.009 0.006 0.000 0.000
shows that the firms in the 99th percentile are more than 10 times larger than the
firms in the 90th percentile. Details of all variable definitions used in this study are
provided in Appendix B.
Univariate results, comparing firms with award-winning CEOs as outside direc-
tors and all other firms are presented in Table 3.3. We find that award-winning
CEOs sit on the boards of very large firms with substantially higher total sales
($19.6 billion versus $4,86 billion). The firms differ significantly from the average
firm on key variables. They invest more in R&D activity, operate with higher lever-
age, have more business segments and less institutional ownership. In terms of board
structure, we find that CEO award winners sit on firms with bigger boards (11.4 vs.
9.4 directors), with a larger fraction of outside directors (0.76 vs. 0.71) and more
outside board responsibilities (15.8 vs. 6.9). Finally, we find that CEO ownership
is also considerably lower among these firms (0.003 vs. 0.009).
Looking at our variables of interest, we find that firms with award-winning CEOs
as outside directors have significantly higher Tobin’s Q and ROA and a lower en-
trenchment index (i.e. better governance).
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3.4 Firm performance
In this section, we test our first hypothesis in a multivariate model.
3.4.1 Specification
We begin by formally investigating if the outside board positions of CEO award
winners are associated with firm value by estimating the following regression:
Yit = α0 + αi + αt + β1AwCEOit + β2X
′
it + µit, (3.1)
Yit is a measure of firm i’s performance in year t. We use two performance measures:
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for valuation and ROA as a measure of the profitability of
assets in place. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of total assets plus the market
value of equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes to total assets.
ROA is calculated as operating income before depreciation over lagged assets1. Our
variable of interest is AwCEOi. This variable takes three forms. First, the number
of award-winning CEOs who serve on the board as outside directors (Number),
then an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has at least one award-winning
CEO serving as outside director on its board (Dummy) and finally, the fraction of
directors who are award-winning CEOs and serve as outside directors of the firm
(Fraction). All regressions control for firm- and year fixed effects, αi and αt. Time-
varying control variables (Xit) include board characteristics, firm characteristics,
organizational complexity and CEO characteristics, and other firm characteristics
prior studies show are related to firm performance and governance mechanisms.
Board characteristics include the natural log of the total number of directors on
the board (LN(Board size)) and the level of board independence measured as the
fraction of outside directors on the board (Fraction outside directors). Board size,
in particular, has been shown to be negatively associated with firm value (Yermack,
1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998).
1The construction of our performance measures is motivated by Gorodnichenko and Weber
(2016).
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To control for firm characteristics, we include a measure of research intensity
(R&D expense), investment (Capital expenditures), and capital structure (Capital
intensity and Leverage). Proxies for organisational complexity include the natural
logarithm of sales (Firm size) and the number of business segments2 (Segments).
Prior studies such as Linck et al. (2008) and Boone et al. (2007), for example, show
that measures of firm complexity are related to board composition and its effective-
ness. Finally, we control for CEO characteristics in the form of the percentage of
common shares outstanding owned by the CEO (CEO ownership).
3.4.2 Results
The results of our baseline regressions are reported in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. The
results show that CEO award winners serving as outside directors on a firm’s board
are significantly positively related to firm valuation. The coefficients are consistently
positive and highly significant across different variations of our variable of interest.
In terms of economic significance, the results indicate a substantial valuation effect.
Increasing the number of CEO award winners by one standard deviation is associated
with a 0.028 (0.134 x 0.206) higher Tobin’s Q. Assuming the firm’s debt remains
constant, for a firm with average total assets the increase in Tobin’s Q is equivalent
to an increase in firm value of $468 million ($16,726 x 0.028). The coefficient on the
indicator variable in column (2) is slightly larger than the coefficient on the number
of award-winning CEOs in column (1) (0.146 vs 0.134). We interpret that to mean
that firms disproportionately benefit from appointing the first CEO award winner
to their board. As the number of award-winning CEOs increases, the benefits from
an additional appointment decreases.
At the same time, however, we find no evidence that the appointment of high-
profile outside directors can help firms to improve the profitability of their assets in
2Compustat contains information on four segment types: BUSSEG (Business Segment),
GEOSEG (Geographic Segment), OPSEG (Operating Segment - mixed business and geographic)
and STSEG (State Segment). We use business segments (BUSSEG) to identify if firms have, for
example, similar operations in different industries or different operations within the same industry.
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Table 3.4: Award-winning CEO outside directors and Tobin’s Q
The table below reports regression results where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of total
assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes to total assets. AwCEO
outside director is the number of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms and have won a CEO award. We
use the number in column (1), an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has at least one AwCEO outside direc-
tor in column (2) and the fraction of AwCEO outside director with respect to the total board size in column (3).All
variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in
all regressions but not reported. t− statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3)
AwCeo outside director (Number) 0.134∗∗∗
(3.04)
AwCeo outside director (Dummy) 0.146∗∗∗
(2.85)
AwCeo outside director (Fraction) 1.319∗∗∗
(2.76)
LN(Board size) -0.062 -0.061 -0.057
(-1.16) (-1.14) (-1.06)
Fraction outside directors 0.024 0.025 0.025
(0.36) (0.37) (0.37)
R&D expense 4.569∗∗∗ 4.562∗∗∗ 4.568∗∗∗
(6.82) (6.81) (6.82)
Capital expenditures 0.253 0.255 0.253
(1.02) (1.03) (1.02)
Capital intensity -0.181∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(-5.70) (-5.68) (-5.70)
Leverage -0.504∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗
(-7.56) (-7.56) (-7.56)
LN(Sales) -0.394∗∗∗ -0.394∗∗∗ -0.394∗∗∗
(-12.96) (-12.95) (-12.97)
Risk 0.322∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
(5.72) (5.71) (5.72)
ROA 4.369∗∗∗ 4.371∗∗∗ 4.370∗∗∗
(24.65) (24.63) (24.65)
ROAt−1 0.446∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗
(3.99) (3.98) (3.99)
ROAt−2 0.511∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(4.91) (4.91) (4.92)
Segments -0.016∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.016∗∗
(-2.52) (-2.52) (-2.53)
CEO ownership -0.617 -0.612 -0.612
(-1.33) (-1.32) (-1.32)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23128 23128 23128
R2 0.339 0.339 0.339
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place (ROA). All three variations of our variable of interest are consistently insignif-
icant.
In sum, our results are consistent with our first hypothesis (H1). We find that
firms with award-winning CEOs on the board have better future growth opportu-
nities. At the same time, however, we do not find any evidence that these firms
perform better operationally. We interpret our results as an indication that award-
winning CEOs are recruited to boards to help firms realize their growth potential but
fail to have an active input in day-to-day operations. Our results are consistent with
Kang et al. (2016) who find that the industry experience of CEO directors does not
help improve a firm’s profitability, but is valuable in enhancing value-added growth.
Moreover, our findings can also be reconciled with those of Fahlenbrach et al. (2010).
The authors show that appointing CEO directors does not have an affect on ROA3.
3.5 Corporate governance
In this section, we test our second hypothesis. Legal and reputational risks faced by
outside directors are substantial and can directly affect their future ability to attain
future board positions. Implementing and lobbying for sound corporate governance
is thus in the interest of outside directors, and particularly, directors with a lot to
lose in terms of reputation and status. Given their status, award-winning CEOs
have the authority to support and implement new governance mechanisms.
3.5.1 Specification
We begin formally investigating whether and how the outside board positions of CEO
award winners are associated with firm value by estimating the following regression:
Qit = α0 + αi + αt + β1AwCEOit + β2X
′
it + µit, (3.2)
3Similar to Fahlenbrach et al. (2010), we find no effect of CEO directors on Tobin’s Q or ROA.
For consistency, we use the total number of CEO directors, an indicator variable equal to one if
the firm has at least one CEO director, and the fraction of CEO directors to the total number of
directors. We conclude that CEO directors have no effect on firm valuation or the profitability of
assets in place. The results are reported in Appendix B.
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Table 3.5: Award-winning CEO outside directors and ROA
The table below reports regression results where the dependent variable is ROA. ROA is defined as operating in-
come before depreciation and taxes. AwCEO outside director is the number of outside directors who are CEOs of
other firms and have won a CEO award. We use the number of award-winning CEO outside directors in column (1),
an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has at least one award-winning CEO outside director in column (2) and
the fraction of award winners to total board size in column (3). All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th per-
centile values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported. t− statistics
given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
ROA
(1) (2) (3)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) -0.002
(-0.60)
AwCEO outside directors (Dummy) -0.004
(-1.09)
AwCEO outside directors (Fraction) -0.024
(-0.55)
LN(Board size) -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(-5.84) (-5.83) (-5.86)
Fraction outside directors -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(-1.39) (-1.38) (-1.39)
R&D expense 0.661∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗
(10.06) (10.06) (10.06)
Capital expenditures 0.605∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗
(23.13) (23.13) (23.13)
Capital intensity -0.037∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(-7.25) (-7.24) (-7.25)
Leverage -0.060∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗
(-8.86) (-8.87) (-8.87)
LN(Sales) 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(10.57) (10.56) (10.58)
Risk -0.057∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗
(-9.37) (-9.37) (-9.37)
Segments -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(-3.48) (-3.48) (-3.48)
CEO ownership -0.069 -0.069 -0.069
(-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.49)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23239 23239 23239
R2 0.281 0.281 0.281
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Qit is a measure of firm i’s governance in year t. Governance is measured using the
entrenchment index of Bebchuk et al. (2009). Bebchuk et al. (2009) show that a
governance index based on the six governance provisions: staggered boards, limits
to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and superma-
jority requirements for mergers and charter amendments is better able to explain
the negative association between weak governance and firm value than the origi-
nally proposed governance index of Gompers et al. (2003). The original index of
Gompers et al. (2003) included all twenty-four governance provisions covered by the
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). Bebchuk et al. (2009) show that
the remaining 18 governance provisions, not included in the entrenchment index, are
not associated with a reduction in firm value or negative abnormal returns. The en-
trenchment index (E index) ascribes every firm a score from 0 to 6 and is calculated
as the number of governance (entrenching) provisions a given firm has in place at
a given year. AwCEOi is the number of award-winning CEO outside directors on
the board of directors. That is, we count the number of outside directors who are
CEO’s of other firms and have won a CEO award. As before, we use three variations
of this variable in our regression specification. First, the number of award-winning
CEOs who serve on the board as outside directors (Number), then an indicator vari-
able equal to one if a firm has at least one award-winning CEO serving as outside
director on its board (Dummy) and finally, the fraction of directors who are award-
winning CEOs and serve as outside directors of the firm (Fraction). All regressions
control for firm- and year fixed effects, αi and αt. Similar to our previous speci-
fication, we include time-varying controls (Xit) such as board characteristics, firm
characteristics, organizational complexity and CEO characteristics, and other firm
characteristics prior studies show are related to firm performance and governance
mechanisms.
In a second step we look at individual governance provisions by estimating the
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following model:
Pr(Zit = 1 | AwCEOit, Xit) = G(β1 + β2AwCEO + β3X ′it), (3.3)
Zit is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the firm had an individual gov-
ernance provision in a particular firm year. We estimate the model individually
for the six governance provisions that make up the entrenchment index: staggered
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes,
and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. AwCEOi is
the number of award-winning CEO outside directors on the board of directors. That
is, we count the number of outside directors who are CEO’s of other firms and have
won a CEO award4. Time-varying control variables (Xit) include board character-
istics, firm characteristics, organizational complexity and CEO characteristics and
other firm characteristics prior studies show are related to firm performance and
governance mechanisms.
3.5.2 Results
Gompers et al. (2003) provide a detailed first investigation of corporate governance
and firm performance. They find that an investment strategy based on low- vs. high-
governance firms provides significant abnormal returns for the period 1990-1999.
The governance index is constructed using all twenty-four governance provisions
covered by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). Several follow-on
studies have since presented different approaches to refine the governance index of
Gompers et al. (2003).
Cremers and Nair (2005) construct an index based on internal and external
governance provisions based on four provisions of the Gompers et al. (2003) index
and show that those four provisions are significantly negatively related to firm value,
measured by Tobin’s Q. However, the authors do not address the importance of the
4We restrict our analysis to one version of our variable of interest to preserve space. The results
for the two alternative measures yield quantitatively similar results.
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Table 3.6: Award-winning CEO outside directors and the entrenchment index
The table below reports regression results where the dependent variable is the entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al.,
2009). The index comprises six individual governance provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments.
AwCEO outside director is the number of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms and have won a CEO
award. We use the number of award-winning CEO outside directors in column (1), an indicator variable equal to
one if the firm has at least one award-winning CEO outside director in column (2) and the fraction of award win-
ners to total board size in column (3). All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile values and expressed
in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported. t − statistics given in parentheses are
based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Entrenchment Index
(1) (2) (3)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) -0.109∗∗
(-2.01)
AwCEO outside directors (Dummy) -0.135∗∗
(-2.03)
AwCEO outside directors (Fraction) -1.160∗∗
(-2.08)
LN(Board size) 0.233∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(2.81) (2.81) (2.76)
Fraction outside directors 0.389∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(3.34) (3.34) (3.34)
R&D expense -0.121 -0.118 -0.123
(-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.39)
Capital expenditures -0.313 -0.313 -0.311
(-1.28) (-1.28) (-1.27)
Capital intensity 0.013 0.013 0.013
(1.04) (1.04) (1.04)
Leverage 0.083 0.083 0.083
(1.43) (1.42) (1.43)
LN(Sales) 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(3.04) (3.04) (3.04)
Risk -0.316∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗
(-3.55) (-3.55) (-3.55)
ROA -0.406∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.406∗∗∗
(-2.65) (-2.66) (-2.65)
ROAt−1 -0.228∗ -0.228∗ -0.228∗
(-1.80) (-1.80) (-1.80)
ROAt−2 0.013 0.013 0.012
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Segments 0.023∗ 0.023∗ 0.023∗
(1.92) (1.91) (1.92)
CEO ownership 1.602∗∗∗ 1.603∗∗∗ 1.600∗∗∗
(3.61) (3.61) (3.61)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19941 19941 19941
R2 0.025 0.025 0.025
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remaining twenty governance provisions included in the original index and also make
no attempt to further explore whether the four included provisions are individually
important.
In a different approach, based on a broad set of 51 firm-specific provisions repre-
senting both internal and external governance, Brown and Caylor (2006) construct
a Gov-Score and show that seven provisions underlying their index can sufficiently
explain the relationship between governance and firm value.
We use the entrenchment index (E index) of Bebchuk et al. (2009) because the
authors convincingly show that an index based on a small number of provisions is
more successful in explaining the governance-firm value relationship. The results for
the entrenchment index are presented in Table 3.6 and the results for the individual
governance provisions in Table 3.7.
Our results support the notion (H2) that award-winning CEOs as outside di-
rectors are associated with better governance5. In particular, we find a signifi-
cantly negative association between award-winning CEO outside directors and the
entrenchment index. Higher values of the index indicate higher levels of entrench-
ment and, as such, weaker governance or shareholder protection.
Next, looking at individual governance provisions we find further support for
our hypothesis. Estimating a logit fixed effects model allows us to look in more
detail at the within-firm determinants of governance provisions in place6. Again,
we can show that the presence of outside directors who are CEO’s and have won
an award reduces the likelihood of certain governance provisions being in place. We
find a significant effect on three out of six provisions (staggered boards, limits to
amend by-laws and supermajority requirements for mergers and acquisition). Most
noteworthy, the coefficients on firm size and board size are both significant and
5We use the same set of control variables to be consistent throughout this paper. The results
are robust if we use Tobin’s Q instead of ROA and to the inclusion of additional controls.
6At the cost of reducing the sample size, in some cases considerably, we are better able to test
whether governance provisions are directly related to award-winning CEO outside directors. In
the case of charter amendments, for example, the sample size is reduced to 3,022 indicating that
there is little overall variation in this specific governance provision.
87
positive, implying that as firms and boards grow larger, the board is more likely
to implement provisions that are in the interest of the management and the board,
rather than the shareholders. This points to the importance of our findings and
the role highly reputable outside directors can play in improving governance and
reducing agency conflicts. In sum, the results indicate that highly reputable outside
directors, such as award-winning CEOs, can help improve governance provisions in
place and thus can be viewed favourably from the perspective of the shareholders.
3.6 Explaining the valuation effect
In this section we explore different explanations for the valuation effect documented
in Section 3.4. In particular, we examine the impact of lagged values of our de-
pendent variables, differences in corporate governance, we control for firms whose
current CEO has won a CEO award, examine whether the effect persists after the
CEO’s retirement, test whether the results are driven by the selection of our depen-
dent variables, and finally whether the results are robust to additional variables7.
3.6.1 Can lagged performance measures explain the effect?
A natural question that arises is whether the value effect we document can be
explained by past values of our performance measures. That is, do award-winning
CEOs simply chose to sit on boards of firms that have performed best in the past
and are likely to continue to do so in the future. To examine this question we include
lagged values of Tobin’s Q and ROA and re-estimate our baseline regression. Yt−1
and Yt−2 refer to the first and second lag of the dependent variable. The results are
presented in Table 3.8. Results for Tobin’s Q are in Panel A and results for ROA
in Panel B8.
7Additionally, we have studied performance changes around director appointments employing
methodologies used in Fich (2005) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2010). The results are provided in
Appendix B.
8We have not included lagged values of the dependent variable in our baseline regression because
it considerably reduces the size of our sample.
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We find that the first and second lag have substantial explanatory power in
explaining Tobin’s Q and ROA. However, our results remain largely unchanged. The
number of award-winning CEOs acting as outside directors is consistently related
to firm value but not profitability. Accounting for past values of Tobin’s Q, the
coefficient on our variable of interest slightly decreases to 0.091 (compared to 0.134
in our baseline regression) but remains highly significant. Holding the value of debt
constant, this implies a value effect of $314 million. The inclusion of past values
of ROA does not change the insignificant relation between award-winning CEOs as
outside directors and the profitability of assets in place.
3.6.2 Differences in governance quality
It is well-known that governance provisions affect firm performance (Bebchuk et al.,
2009; Gompers et al., 2003; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). We have previously shown
that firms with award-winning CEOs as outside directors have higher firm value,
measured as Tobin’s Q, and also better governance. To control for the possibility
that the value effect may be driven by differences in quality of governance in this
section we re-estimate our baseline regression including the entrenchment index in
Panel A and the individual governance provisions in Panel B9. Results are reported
in Table 3.9
Controlling for all the variables used in our baseline regression, we find that the
valuation effect persists. Moreover, the results lend further support to the validity
of the sample employed in this study. Similar to Bebchuk et al. (2009), we find
that the entrenchment index is significantly negatively related to both firm value
and firm profitability. Looking at individual governance provisions we find that
limits to amend by-laws and poison pills in particular play an important role in
determining firm value but do not affect our results. We thus conclude that while
9We do not include the entrenchment index in our baseline regression because it reduces our
sample size by approximately 16%. Moreover, we have included the fraction of outside directors
as an indirect measure of board independence.
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Table 3.8: Lagged values of Tobin’s Q and ROA and firm performance
The table below reports regression results for our baseline regression including lagged values of the dependent vari-
able. The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q and ROA. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of total assets plus the market value
of equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes to total assets and ROA is defined as operating in-
come before depreciation and taxes. Yt−1 and Yt−2 refer to the lagged values of the respective dependent variable.
AwCEO outside director is the number of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms and have won a CEO
award. We use the number of award-winning CEO outside directors in column (1), an indicator variable equal to
one if the firm has at least one award-winning CEO outside director in column (2) and the fraction of award win-
ners to total board size in column (3). All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile values and expressed
in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported. t − statistics given in parentheses are
based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Panel A Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.091∗∗∗
(2.60)
AwCEO outside directors (Dummy) 0.093∗∗
(2.22)
AwCEO outside directors (Fraction) 0.884∗∗
(2.30)
Yt−1 0.385∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗
(19.18) (19.20) (19.18)
Yt−2 0.033∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(2.34) (2.34) (2.34)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18141 18141 18141
R2 0.431 0.431 0.431
Panel B ROA
(1) (2) (3)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) -0.001
(-0.27)
AwCEO outside directors (Dummy) -0.002
(-0.54)
AwCEO outside directors (Fraction) -0.008
(-0.25)
Yt−1 0.379∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗
(22.41) (22.42) (22.42)
Yt−2 -0.066∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(-6.39) (-6.39) (-6.39)
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18161 18161 18161
R2 0.395 0.395 0.395
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Table 3.9: Governance and firm performance
The table below reports regression results for our baseline regression including additional control variables. As be-
fore the dependent variables are Tobin’s Q and ROA. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of total assets plus the market value of
equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes to total assets and ROA is defined as operating income
before depreciation and taxes. AwCEO outside director is the number of outside directors who are CEOs of other
firms and have won a CEO award. Panel A controls for corporate governance measured using the entrenchment
index of (Bebchuk et al., 2009) and Panel B uses the six individual governance provisions: staggered boards, limits
to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and
charter amendments that make up the entrenchment index. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile
values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported. t − statistics given
in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and
∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Tobin’s Q ROA
Panel A (1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.138∗∗∗ -0.003
(2.78) (-0.73)
Entrenchment index -0.019∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(-3.61) (-3.12)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 19941 20014
R2 0.310 0.276
Tobin’s Q ROA
Panel B (1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.138∗∗∗ -0.003
(2.78) (-0.72)
Staggered board -0.018 -0.000
(-1.08) (-0.06)
Limits to amend by-laws -0.037∗∗ -0.002
(-2.19) (-1.08)
Limits to amend charter 0.001 -0.002
(0.02) (-0.39)
Supermajority -0.009 -0.000
(-0.43) (-0.05)
Golden parachutes -0.041∗∗∗ -0.002
(-2.64) (-1.52)
Poison pill 0.002 -0.004∗∗
(0.11) (-2.40)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 19941 20014
R2 0.310 0.276
governance is clearly important, it cannot explain the valuation effect associated
with award-winning CEOs on the board of directors.
3.6.3 Current CEO is CEO award winner
One potential concern is, that instead of being a proxy for the value added by CEO
award winners, the positive association is due to the fact that the CEO is also a
CEO award winner. When considering outside board positions, the CEO might feel
the least risk and potentially greatest rewards can be derived from sitting on the
92
boards of CEOs who have also won a CEO award. While Malmendier and Tate
(2009) find that the performance tends to revert to the mean following the CEO
award, the positive and significant association could be driven by the CEO and not
the board. To control for this possibility, we include an indicator variable equal to
one if the CEO is a CEO award winner (Current CEO award winner). The results
are presented in Table 3.10. Panel A presents results for Tobin’s Q and Panel B for
ROA.
In line with our expectation, we find that Current CEO award winner is sig-
nificantly and positively related to Tobin’s Q. The coefficient of 0.228 is highly
significant (p¡0.000) and economically almost twice the size of the effect observed
for award-wining CEO outside directors. Most importantly, however, the effect
observed for our variable of interest remains positive and highly significant. The
coefficient observed for AwCEO outside directors is 0.128 and highly significant
(p¡0.000). Compared to our baseline regression, the coefficient is slightly smaller
(0.128 vs 0.134). Moreover, the observed t-statistic is 2.96 compared to 3.04 in
the main regression. The value effect associated with award-winning CEOs on the
board decreases from $468 million (Table 3.4) to $435 million ($16,726 × 0.026).
The results indicate that $33 million of the explained value effect ($468 million -$435
million) are indeed attributable to the CEO being a CEO award winner. Neverthe-
less, despite adding an additional and highly significant explanatory variable, our
results hold. Award-winning CEO outside directors are associated with significantly
higher firm value, but are in no way related to operational efficiency.
3.6.4 Alternative specifications of dependent variables
Another possibility is that the association between Tobin’s Q, even though it is
the standard performance measure used in the governance literature (Demsetz and
Lehn, 1985; Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Lang and Stulz, 1994;
Yermack, 1996; Coles et al., 2008, 2015; Kang et al., 2016), and firm value arises
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Table 3.10: Current CEO award winner and firm performance
The table below reports regression results where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q and ROA. Tobin’s Q is the
ratio of total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes to total
assets and ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation and taxes. AwCEO outside director is the num-
ber of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms and have won a CEO award. Current CEO award winner is
an indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s current CEO has won a CEO award. Results for Tobin’s Q are re-
ported in Panel A and results for ROA in Panel B. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile values and
expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported. t− statistics given in parenthe-
ses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Tobin’s Q
Panel A (1) (2) (3)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.128∗∗∗
(2.96)
AwCEO outside directors (Dummy) 0.140∗∗∗
(2.76)
AwCEO outside directors (Fraction) 1.256∗∗∗
(2.70)
Current CEO award winner 0.228∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(4.01) (4.02) (4.01)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23128 23128 23128
R2 0.341 0.341 0.341
ROA
Panel B (1) (2) (3)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) -0.002
(-0.61)
AwCEO outside directors (Dummy) -0.004
(-1.10)
AwCEO outside directors (Fraction) -0.025
(-0.56)
Current CEO award winner 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34)
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23239 23239 23239
R2 0.281 0.281 0.281
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randomly and is not actually due to a value effect.
We take several precautions to make sure that is not the case. In Panel A, we
use the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q and the natural logarithm of the industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q (Bebchuk et al., 2009) and re-estimate our baseline regression.
The industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is calculated as a firm’s Tobin’s Q minus the median
industry Tobin’s Q. Industry is defined using the 48 industry classifications of Fama
and French. This allows us to better control for potential outliers or industry-specific
results. In Panel B, we use the market-to-book ratio as an alternative measure
of valuation and return on sales (ROS) as an alternative measure of operational
efficiency10. The results are reported in Table ??.
Our results are robust to all specifications. Coefficients for the natural logarithm
of Tobin’s Q and the natural logarithm of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q are both
positively associated with firm value. The results are also robust to the use of
market-to-book and return on sales as alternative dependent variables. Again, we
document a highly significant value effect, but no effect on operational efficiency.
3.6.5 Additional control variables
Finally, it is possible that the positive association with Tobin’s Q is caused by other
omitted variables. We include all variables included in Coles et al. (2008) and Coles
et al. (2015) in our baseline regression and additionally control for lagged values of
our dependent variables and several other specifications to confirm the robustness
of the observed value effect. In this subsection, we control for additional potentially
omitted variables. Specifically we include measures of institutional ownership, firm
age and board diversity.
10In another unreported specification we use Sales/Assets instead of ROS but the results remain
unchanged.
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Table 3.11: Alternative dependent variables and firm performance
The table below reports regression results of our baseline regression using the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q and
the natural logarithm of an industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in Panel A and the Market-to-book ratio and return on
sales (ROS) as an alternative measure of valuation and operational efficiency in Panel B. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of
total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes to total assets.
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is calculated as a firm’s Tobin’s Q minus the median industry Tobin’s Q. Industry is
defined using the 48 industry classifications of Fama and French. Market-to-book is market capitalization over book
equity and ROS is operating income before depreciation over lagged sales. AwCEO outside director is the number
of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms and have won a CEO award. All variables are winsorized at 1st
and 99th percentile values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported.
t− statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clus-
tering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Panel A LN(Tobin’s Q) LN(industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q)
(1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.041∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(2.65) (2.64)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 23128 11821
R2 0.378 0.169
Panel B Market-to-Book ROS
(1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.412∗∗∗ 0.056
(2.62) (0.80)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 23127 20769
R2 0.173 0.012
3.6.5.1 Institutional ownership
Intervention by institutional blockholders is widespread (McCahery et al., 2016) and
stronger external monitoring or intervention by institutional investors could affect
firm value. Stronger external monitoring may be conducive to firm value and the
governance provisions in place. We use the number of institutional blockholders
that own more than 10% of the common shares outstanding as a proxy for external
monitoring and re-estimate our baseline regression.
The results are presented in Panel A of Table 3.12. Our results remain un-
changed. Institutional ownership does not affect the positive association between
award-winning CEO outside directors and Tobin’s Q. While being significantly neg-
atively related to ROA, the coefficient of interest remains insignificant.
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3.6.5.2 Firm age
It is possible that firm age is related to the number of award-winning CEOs on the
board and to firm value. In particular, award-winning CEOs may sit on young and
high-growth firms. If this was the case, the association with firm value could arise
through a selection process. Field et al. (2013), for example, show that newly listed
and less established firms have greater need for board advising and could particularly
benefit from CEO award winners on the board of directors. We include the natural
logarithm of firm age as an additional control and re-estimate the baseline regression.
The results are presented in Panel B of Table 3.12. We find that firm age is
negatively associated with Tobin’s Q and ROA. The link between award-winning
CEOs and firm value, however, remains unchanged. The results confirm the view
that older firms generally have less growth opportunities and thus lower firm value.
Moreover, our results indicate that as a firm matures, the return on assets decreases.
The documented effect is highly statistically significant.
3.6.5.3 Board diversity
Next, we specifically look at board diversity and its potential effect on firm value.
We measure diversity across two dimensions: gender (the fraction of female directors
on the board) and non-US employed board members (the fraction of directors whose
primary employment is outside the US).
Greater diversity could affect firm value in two ways. First, greater diversity
could lead to an increase in firm value (Carter et al., 2003; Kim and Starks, 2016).
Boards with award-winning CEOs may simply be more diverse and as a result pos-
itively associated with firm value. Another view on diversity is, that regulations
requiring a certain percentage of minority representation on the board can have
an adverse effect on firm value (Dittmann et al., 2010; Adams and Ferreira, 2009).
Therefore, we include a measure of gender diversity and test its effect on our results.
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The motivation to include nationality as another dimension of diversity stems
from recent research that discusses the role of foreign directors (Masulis et al., 2012;
Naveen et al., 2013). Without providing clear predictions on the effect on firm
value, the results imply that different perspectives and expertise can improve board
decision-making and for example reduce board groupthink (Coles et al., 2015).
The results are presented in Panel C of Table 3.12. Both measures of diversity
are insignificantly related to Tobin’s Q and return on assets. We conclude that the
value effect is robust and not affected by measures of board diversity.
3.6.6 Are CEO award winners equally valuable after retiring
from their CEO position?
An interesting follow-on question that arises is whether the positive association be-
tween award-winning CEOs and firm value persists after the CEOs retirement. This
allows us to further investigate whether the CEO adds value through his position
as CEO or whether his individual qualities and experience are the sole driver of the
valuation effect. If, for example, this was the case the positive association should
persist following the CEOs retirement. However, if firms derive value from the
directors CEO position, retired CEOs would be considered less valuable.
We evaluate this question using the same methodology and empirical strategy
outlined before. However, this time we specifically look at outside directors who
are retired CEOs and have won a CEO award (Retired AwCEO outside directors).
As before we use the total number, an indicator variable and the fraction of retired
award-winning CEOs serving as outside directors on the firm’s board. The results
for Tobin’s Q are presented in Panel A and the results for ROA are presented in
Panel B of Table 3.13.
We find no indication that retired CEO award winners are associated with higher
firm valuation or profitability. The coefficients are uniformly insignificant across all
specification. Our results lend support to our interpretation that award-winning
CEOs, at least partially, derive value from their CEO position.
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Table 3.12: Additional control variables and firm performance
The table below reports regression results of our baseline regression using the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q and
the natural logarithm of an industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in Panel A and the Market-to-book ratio and return on
sales (ROS) as an alternative measure of valuation and operational efficiency in Panel B. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of
total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes to total assets.
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is calculated as a firm’s Tobin’s Q minus the median industry Tobin’s Q. Industry is
defined using the 48 industry classifications of Fama and French. Market-to-book is market capitalization over book
equity and ROS is operating income before depreciation over lagged sales. AwCEO outside director is the number
of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms and have won a CEO award. All variables are winsorized at 1st
and 99th percentile values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported.
t− statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clus-
tering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Panel A Institutional ownership
Tobin’s Q ROA
(1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.134∗∗∗ -0.002
(3.04) (-0.58)
Blockholder -0.019 -0.006∗∗∗
(-1.45) (-4.24)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 23128 23239
R2 0.339 0.282
Panel B Firm age
Tobin’s Q ROA
(1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.137∗∗∗ -0.001
(3.09) (-0.32)
LN(Firm age) -0.140∗ -0.042∗∗∗
(-1.75) (-6.30)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 23128 23239
R2 0.340 0.288
Panel C Board diversity
Tobin’s Q ROA
(1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.153∗∗∗ -0.004
(3.16) (-0.96)
Fraction female directors -0.168 0.008
(-1.18) (0.53)
Fraction international directors -0.022 -0.002
(-0.70) (-0.59)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 18547 18625
R2 0.329 0.277
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Table 3.13: Retired award-winning CEO outside directors and firm performance
The table below reports regression results where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q and ROA. Tobin’s Q is the
ratio of total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes to total as-
sets and ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation and taxes. Retired AwCEO outside director is the
number of outside directors who are retired CEOs of other firms and have won a CEO Award. Results for Tobin’s
Q are reported in Panel A and results for ROA in Panel B. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile
values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported. t − statistics given
in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and
∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3)
Retired AwCEO outside directors (Number) -0.038
(-0.93)
Retired AwCEO outside directors (Dummy) -0.046
(-0.86)
Retired AwCEO outside directors (Fraction) -0.316
(-0.67)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23128 23128 23128
R2 0.338 0.338 0.338
ROA
(1) (2) (3)
Retired AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.006
(1.56)
Retired AwCEO outside directors (Dummy) 0.007
(1.42)
Retired AwCEO outside directors (Fraction) 0.066
(1.59)
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23239 23239 23239
R2 0.281 0.281 0.281
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3.7 Robustness tests
Having established our main results, we present further robustness tests of our two
hypotheses. To account for nonlinear dependencies and the fact that firms with and
without award-winning CEOs as outside directors differ on many key dimensions, we
use a propensity score matched sample and re-examine our predictions. Finally, we
use a modification of our variable of interest and count the number of CEO awards
held by all CEO outside directors as opposed to counting the number of CEO award
winners11.
3.7.1 Propensity score matched sample
The univariate results presented in Table 3.3 show that firms with award-winning
CEOs as outside directors differ substantially from the average firm in our sample.
If the linear controls used in the main analysis do not adequately account for these
differences, unaccounted nonlinear factors could cause the firm value effect. An
empirical approach to address this issue is to create a propensity score matched
sample (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).
The procedure works as follows. Using a probit model, we first regress the
number of AwCEO outside directors on all the control variables used in our main
analysis (Table 3.4). We then estimate the probability that a firm has a CEO award
winner as outside director and match firms on the closest propensity score. We
match without replacement and require the propensity score to be within ± 5% of
each other. The resulting sample consists of 624 matched observations and a total
of 1,248 firm-year observations.
We present univariate results in Panel A and multivariate in Panel B of Table
3.14. The multivariate specification takes the same form as in our main analysis.
Using a propensity score matched sample to address the possibility that firms with
11We report additional robustness tests controlling for outliers and certain industries in Appendix
B.
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Table 3.14: Propensity score matched sample
The table presents univariate and multivariate results on a propensity score matched sample. The observations
are matched on the closest propensity score. Matching is done without replacement and the propensity score for a
matched pair is required to be within ± 5%. The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q, ROA and the entrenchment
index by (Bebchuk et al., 2009). Tobin’s Q is the ratio of total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book
value of equity minus deferred taxes to total assets and ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation and
taxes. The entrenchment index consists of six individual governance provisions: staggered boards, limits to share-
holder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter
amendments. AwCEO outside director is the number of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms and have
won a CEO award. Univariate results are presented in Panel A and multivariate results in Panel B. All variables are
winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions
but not reported. t − statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity
and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Award-winning CEO No award-winning CEO p-value for
Outside Directors Outside Directors Difference test (1)=(2)
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobin’s Q 2.171 2.011 0.159 0.049
ROA 0.161 0.161 0.000 0.987
Entrenchment index 1.967 2.137 0.170 0.034
Entrenchment
Tobin’s Q ROA index
Panel B (1) (2) (3)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.214∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.132∗∗
(2.99) (1.01) (-2.13)
LN(Board size) 0.106 -0.006 0.787∗∗∗
(0.56) (-0.36) (3.11)
Fraction outside directors -0.520∗ -0.017 1.133∗∗∗
(-1.91) (-0.68) (3.05)
R&D expense 6.116∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ -1.211
(8.05) (4.52) (-1.19)
Capital expenditures -2.537∗ 0.730∗∗∗ 2.416∗
(-1.83) (6.85) (1.83)
Capital intensity -0.0929 -0.0267∗∗ -0.404∗∗
(-1.46) (-2.48) (-2.18)
Leverage -0.834∗∗∗ -0.0733∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗
(-3.88) (-3.32) (2.78)
LN(Sales) 0.060∗∗ 0.006 -0.353∗∗∗
(2.27) (1.47) (-7.86)
Risk 0.673∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.658∗∗
(1.70) (-6.15) (-2.12)
ROA 5.829∗∗∗ -1.318∗∗
(9.64) (-2.11)
ROAt−1 1.375∗∗ 0.593
(2.18) (0.77)
ROAt−2 1.092∗ 0.521
(1.79) (0.97)
Segments -0.042∗∗ -0.004∗ 0.007
(-2.38) (-1.93) (0.26)
CEO ownership 6.193∗∗ -0.075 0.338
(2.05) (-0.70) (0.15)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1248 1248 1052
R2 0.535 0.313 0.136
102
Table 3.15: Outside directors number of CEO awards
The table below reports regression results where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q and ROA. Tobin’s Q is the ra-
tio of total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes to total assets
and ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation and taxes. Number of CEO awards is the number of
CEO awards held by all outside directors on the board of directors. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th per-
centile values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported. t− statistics
given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Entrenchment
Tobin’s Q ROA index
(1) (2) (3)
Outside directors number of CEO awards 0.044∗∗ -0.000 -0.087∗∗
(2.18) (-0.17) (-2.02)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No No
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes No
Control Variables as in Table 3.6 No No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23128 23239 19941
R2 0.339 0.281 0.026
award-winning CEOs represent a non-random sample and differ significantly from
the other firms in our sample, our results mirror those of our main analysis. Our
univariate results indicate that award-winning CEO outside directors are associated
with higher firm value and better governance but do not show any sign of improved
profitability. This pattern is confirmed by our multivariate results.
3.7.2 Alternative variable definition: Outside directors num-
ber of CEO awards
As an additional robustness check we consider an alternative definition for our vari-
able of interest. Instead of counting the number of award-winning CEOs who serve
as outside directors on a firm’s board, we count the total number of CEO awards
held by all outside directors (Outside directors number of CEO awards).
Re-estimating our baseline regression using the number of awards confirm our
results. However, the coefficient is substantially smaller indicating that the results
are not driven by a few individuals with a high number of awards, but rather that
the person is more important than the number of awards held.
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3.8 Conclusion
Given the limited effectiveness of director compensation as an incentive, reputation
concerns have sparked considerable interest in the literature. This paper adds to the
understanding of reputation as the primary incentive device in the director labour
market. We explore whether a system relying on reputation-based matching between
firm and director is in the interest of shareholders. As a primary agent to protect
shareholder interests, it is not clear whether directorships awarded and accepted
based on reputation can result in effective monitoring.
We explore the consequences of this reputation-based director-firm matching
based on a small group of award-winning CEOs. Given their track record, extensive
managerial experience and the CEO award, these CEOs are highly demanded as
outside directors. More importantly, however, they have no financial incentives to
accept outside directorships. Instead, it can be viewed as a reputation enhancing
activity. Given their strong incentives to preserve their reputation, award-winning
CEOs are in a unique position to be effective monitors.
We find evidence of a considerable positive value premium attached to firms with
award-winning CEOs as outside directors. There is no evidence that the presence of
award-winning CEOs on the board is in any way related to a firm’s operating per-
formance (ROA). The results match our expectations and can be consolidated with
the findings of Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) who find that appointing CEO directors
has no observable effect on operating performance. Moreover, given outside direc-
tors’ limited access to firm- and project-specific information, they have little scope
to influence day-to-day management of the firm or its assets (Demb and Neubauer,
1992; Adams et al., 2010; Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013). Instead, outside direc-
tors’ contributions to firm value are likely to be through the channel of value-added
growth or higher return on assets required in the future (Kang et al., 2016).
Further, we show that reputable directors can result in better governance. Given
their strong self-interest to protect their reputation, it is in their interest to promote
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sound corporate governance. By doing so, they limit the likelihood of managerial
malfeasance and also the reputational damage incurred from oversight failure or
poor performance.
In summary, the findings underscore the importance of reputation incentives
when examining the quality of director monitoring. They highlight that whether a
board is busy or not does not ultimately determine its effectiveness. Moreover, it
shows that firms can benefit from recruiting highly reputable directors and provides
a partial explanation for why CEOs are highly demanded as outside directors. In
the case of award-winning CEOs, the consequences of reputation-based director-firm
matching can be viewed positively by shareholders.
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Chapter 4
Award-winning CEOs in the board
room: the case of acquisitions
4.1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions represent a large portion of US firms’ overall investment
and advising management on M&A’s represents one of the most important board
functions. Several recent papers show that individual director attributes (Huang
et al., 2014; Francis et al., 2015; Gu¨ner et al., 2008; Dittmann et al., 2010) and
director networks (Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Schmidt, 2015; Ren-
neboog and Zhao, 2014; Wu, 2011) can significantly affect acquisition outcomes.
In this chapter we examine the role of award-winning CEOs on corporate boards
and analyse whether their involvement in the acquisition-making process can yield
significant improvements in M&A outcomes. These so-called “Superstar CEOs”
offer a unique range of characteristics and attributes that make them a valuable
asset in respect to target selection and throughout merger negotiations.
Given their proven track record, managerial experience and expertise, these
CEOs are among the most skilled and highly-demanded executives available in the
director labour market. Fahlenbrach et al. (2010), for example, point out that firm’s
still consider CEO-level experience as one of the most important and desired quali-
ties when appointing a new director. However, while the role of CEO award winners
has been studied in relation to the CEO’s firm (Malmendier and Tate, 2009), little
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is known about the role these award winners subsequently play on corporate boards.
However, they can play a particularly important role for several reasons.
Once appointed, award-winning CEOs are likely to exert considerably more in-
fluence on the board of directors and the management team than the average outside
director. In times of conflict or disagreement, they can leverage their status to crit-
ically comment on, or openly oppose acquisition plans1 (Fahlenbrach et al., 2010).
Among others, Fogel et al. (2014) argue that powerful independent directors, proxied
using their social network power, are better able to monitor and advise management
because of their access to information and greater credibility in challenging top man-
agement. Moreover, CEOs, in contrast to other, non-corporate directors, are better
equipped to identify suitable targets, evaluate potential synergies and conflicts and
ultimately improve M&A outcomes.
Moreover, CEOs have access to large social and business networks. These net-
works can be tapped to recruit executives, learn about new business opportunities
and gather information about potential acquisition targets. For instance, Renneboog
and Zhao (2014) show that director networks can provide distinct informational ad-
vantages throughout M&A negotiations. This is further supported by Cai and Sevilir
(2012), who show that firms obtain higher announcement returns when acquirer and
target share a common director2. Therefore, through the provision and access to
large networks, CEOs provide further resources that can help firms make better
acquisition decisions.
Finally, in addition to their individual qualities and experience, reputation and
career concerns make award-winning CEOs valuable from the shareholders point of
view. Reputation is considered the primary non-financial risk concern of corporate
directors and can serve as an incentive to allocate time and resources to properly
1The analysis of firm-level outcomes revealed that outside directors who are CEO award winners
sit on significantly more board committees than other outside directors.
2However, the association between networks and announcement returns is not clear-cut. Ishii
and Xuan (2014) and Wu (2011) find a negative correlation between connections and announcement
returns while Schmidt (2015) finds higher announcement returns when advisory needs are high and
lower returns when monitoring needs are high.
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monitor management (Masulis and Mobbs, 2016, 2014; Jiang et al., 2015). Thus,
CEO award winners have a strong personal interest to monitor and advise manage-
ment carefully.
Further, having advised a firm or its management on particularly value-destroying
acquisitions could be seen as a sign of weak monitoring and could negatively af-
fect the directors career. Board decisions that indicate governance failures (Fich
and Shivdasani, 2007) or weak monitoring (Brochet and Srinivasan, 2014; Fos and
Tsoutsoura, 2014) have been shown to impede the director’s ability to obtain direc-
torships in the future. It is thus in the interest of directors to avoid being associated
with largely value-destroying deals.
Given the large scope of CEO award winners to positively affect the acquisition-
making process, we anticipate a positive effect on a firm’s acquisition outcomes. In
particular, we test this hypothesis by examining M&A completion, the likelihood of
diversification, M&A performance and several important deal characteristics.
We begin by collecting all mergers and acquisitions for S&P 1500 firms cov-
ered by RiskMetrics from 1996-2013 from the Security Data Company’s (SDC) U.S.
Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Our final sample consists of 3,157 mergers and
acquisitions. Similar to Malmendier and Tate (2009), we use a hand-collected list
of CEO awards and identify award-winning CEOs serving as outside directors in
the RiskMetrics database. After accounting for multiple award winners, we iden-
tify 429 individual award-winning CEOs in the RiskMetrics database. We define
Award-winning outside directors as those directors who are active or former CEOs,
have won at least one CEO award and hold an outside position at a firm in our
sample. Using this methodology we identify 236 M&A’s that were completed while
the acquirer had at least one award-winning outside director on its board.
Using the total and cumulative number of completed M&A’s by the firms in
our sample, we find that firms with award-winning outside directors complete sig-
nificantly fewer acquisitions. Our results imply that while larger firms, on average,
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complete more M&A’s, an increase in the number of award-winning outside direc-
tors has the opposite effect. This finding can be interpreted as an indication that
managerial experience in the form of highly skilled CEOs on the board of directors
can help firms focus on their internal growth and potentially reduce the likelihood
of empire-building and value-destroying behavior by the management. This view is
further supported by the finding that the same firms are also less likely to diversify.
Diversification in particular is often associated with a discount in firm value (Lang
and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Servaes, 1996; Lamont and Polk, 2002), and
can be used as a measure of deal quality (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). The evidence
supports the view that award-wining outside directors can help firms preserve value
by reducing the number of M&As and likelihood of diversification.
Next, to directly assess acquisition outcomes, we look at acquisition performance.
We use three different metrics to assess a firm’s acquisition performance: cumulative
abnormal announcement returns and abnormal dollar return to evaluate short-run
performance and a monthly calendar-time portfolio approach to evaluate long-term
performance.
Overall, the announcement returns for S&P 1500 firms from 1996-2013 are slightly
positive. The returns for firms with award-winning outside directors, on the other
hand, are consistently negative across the three-day (-1,+1), five-day (-2,+2) and
eleven-day (-5,+5) event window. The differences between those completed by firms
with award-winning outside directors and all other firms ranges from 0.96% for the
three-day (-1,+1) event window to 1.26% for the eleven-day (-5,+5) window and
are statistically significant. Moreover, diversifying deals and those with a relative
value of more than 25% of the market value of the acquirer are particularly value
destroying. Upon the inclusion of firm and deal characteristics, however, a simple
regression model reveals no significant signs of underperformance.
Due to the size of firms with award-winning outside directors cumulative ab-
normal returns might not reveal the full extent of value destruction caused by
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M&A’s. To further assess acquisition performance, we calculate abnormal dollar
returns (Moeller et al., 2004). Throughout the sample period, S&P 1500 firms spent
$2.2 trillion on mergers and acquisitions. Firms with award-winning outside direc-
tors were involved in 7% of all M&A’s, responsible for 23% of the total dollar value
spent on M&A’s and associated with 68% of the dollar losses. They spent almost
four times more on every acquisition ($2.2 billion vs. $585 million) and on average
lost approximately nine times more per acquisition ($20 million vs. $182.9 million).
Moreover, an evaluation of deals resulting in losses greater or equal to $1 billion,
reveals that firms with award-winning outside directors are associated with 40% of
these so-called large loss deals.
Finally, to rule out that firms with CEO award winners on the board perform
badly upon announcement but outperform in the long-run due to better target
selection and synergies, we evaluate the long-term performance of acquisitions using
the Fama-French three factor model and value-weighted monthly portfolio returns.
Similar to our previous results, we find no indication that acquisitions made by firms
with award-winning CEOs perform better in the long run.
Next, to evaluate whether CEO award winners can improve certain important
aspects of the acquisition process rather than performance, we examine various deal
characteristics. Specifically, we focus on deal value, negotiation time and the method
of payment. We first assess whether completed deals differ in total and relative deal
size. Not surprisingly, we find that firms with award-winning CEOs as outside
directors complete deals that are significantly larger in total dollar value. However,
they do not differ significantly in relative size.
Negotiation time is another important aspect of M&A negotiations. Longer ne-
gotiation times can lead to an increase in transaction costs, increase uncertainty and
the potential for moral hazard. Reducing negotiation time could thus be a poten-
tial avenue through which award-winning outside directors can positively affect the
acquisition process. Their large social and business networks allow them an infor-
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mational advantage and their respective firm to reduce the time and costs involved
in gathering information and closing the deal (Renneboog and Zhao, 2014; Karsten
et al., 2015). Similar to Renneboog and Zhao (2014), we find some evidence that
CEO award winners are able to reduce the time needed to complete M&A negoti-
ations. However, the effect disappears upon the inclusion of industry fixed-effects.
Thus indicating that negotiation times may differ significantly across industries and
that controlling for industry-effects is important when analyzing negotiation time.
While the evidence suggest that the method of payment can affect acquisition
performance (Travlos, 1987; Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002), issues surrounding
potential changes in corporate control following an equity offer seem to dominate
the choice of payment. A cash payment is strictly preferred over an equity payment
if the target’s ownership structure is concentrated and institutional or blockholder
ownership levels at the acquiring firm are intermediate or low (Faccio and Masulis,
2005). Additionally, firm size is also a major determinant of the chosen method of
payment (Moeller et al., 2004). For example, Moeller et al. (2004) find that cash
payments are significantly more likely in acquisitions by small firms. We find that
firms with CEO award winners as outside directors are less likely to conclude a deal
with an all cash or cash and mixed payment. We do not find a significant effect on
the use of equity.
Overall, our results suggest that deals completed by firms with award-winning
CEOs on their board of directors mirror deals of large firms. It is well-known
that large deals are viewed especially critically by the market (Moeller et al., 2004,
2005). We conclude that while there is evidence that these firms indeed complete
fewer acquisitions and diversifying bids, bids that involve CEO award winners are
especially value-destroying. The total dollar loss incurred through acquisitions is
substantial. They are involved in less than a tenth of the acquisitions in our sample
but responsible for over two-thirds of the dollar losses. Our evidence shows that the
ability of individual directors to improve M&A performance is limited. Firm and
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deal size seem to primarily determine acquisition performance and deal structure.
However, our finding that individual directors may only play a limited role in
respect to acquisition outcomes, cannot necessarily be generalized. Award-winning
CEOs sit predominantly on the boards of large firms. One possible explanation for
our findings would be that once firms reach a certain size, acquisition decisions might
involve considerations such as preserving market share or buying out a competitor
that are costly but part of a larger overall strategic agenda. Moreover, directors
at large firms may be preoccupied with their role as monitors and fail to engage
actively in strategic considerations such as acquisition plans.
Finally, the results can be interpreted based on the findings of Harford and
Schonlau (2013). The authors find that as a CEO it pays to be involved in large
M&A’s irrespective of whether they are value-creating or value-destroying. Large
acquisitions, in particular, are associated with an increase in the number of subse-
quent board seats for the acquiring CEO, target CEO, and the directors involved.
Thus, from the directors point of view the involvement in large acquisitions and not
necessarily acquisition outcomes could be the most important consideration when
advising management. This interpretation challenges the notion that directors can
mitigate conflicts of interest between shareholders and management (Morck et al.,
1990; Jensen, 1986).
Our analysis complements a growing body of research that relates corporate gov-
ernance to a firm’s acquisition decision with particular attention to board structure
and the type of directors that sit on the board (Masulis and Mobbs, 2011; Fahlen-
brach et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2014; Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Renneboog and Zhao,
2014; Cai and Sevilir, 2012). It is also more broadly related to the literature on
the influence of individual managers and directors on corporate decisions (Bertrand
et al., 2003; Xuan, 2009). CEO award winners are well-suited for the purpose of
this study for several reasons. Their services are highly demanded, they are better
able to influence the board decision-making process due to their CEO-experience
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and proven track record and have access to large social networks that can be used
to gather information and identify suitable targets. As such, they are in a unique
position to positively affect acquisition outcomes.
Moreover, this paper opens new research avenues to better understand how
M&A’s affect director reputation. Reputation is considered the primary non-financial
risk concern of corporate directors and can serve as an incentive to allocate time and
resources to properly monitor management (Masulis and Mobbs, 2016, 2014; Jiang
et al., 2015; Fogel et al., 2014). Outside directors have a personal interest to monitor
and advice management carefully to not impede their ability to attain future board
positions (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Ertimur et al., 2012; Fos and Tsoutsoura,
2014; Brochet and Srinivasan, 2014). Further research should try to understand the
trade-off between increased visibility and reputation through larger firm size and
the risk of being associated with large and value-destroying acquisitions.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the empirical
predictions of this paper. Section 4.3 discusses the sample, data and gives descriptive
statistics. The results are presented in Section 4.4. The conclusion follows in Section
4.5.
4.2 Empirical predictions and methodology
M&A’s are among the most readily observable form of corporate investment. It is
well known that managers do not always act in the best interest of shareholders
and sometimes extract private benefits at their expense. Jensen (1986) argues that
managers can realize substantial personal gains from empire-building acquisitions
and posits that managers with abundant cash flows are more likely to make value-
destroying acquisitions than to return excess capital to shareholders. Conflicts of
interest are especially grave in the case of diversifying bids or those aimed at high
growth targets (Morck et al., 1990). As such, M&A’s can accentuate the conflicts of
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interest between managers and shareholders in large corporations (Berle and Means,
1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Advising management on M&A’s is one of the most important board functions.
In a recent paper covering listed firms in China, Jiang et al. (2015) show that
mergers and acquisitions is one of the most voted and discussed topics in corporate
board rooms. While it is well-known that corporate governance can affect a firm’s
acquisition performance (Masulis et al., 2007), recent evidence suggests that director
networks and specific director attributes are also important determinants of M&A
outcomes.
Award-winning CEOs are highly desirable as board members. They have exten-
sive managerial CEO-experience, market and industry-specific knowledge and can
avail of large social and business networks. While their role as CEOs has been
studied (Malmendier and Tate, 2009), little is known in respect to the role they
play as members of corporate boards. Given their overall profile, we anticipate that
firms benefit from their presence on the board and specifically evaluate their role in
relation to acquisition outcomes. In particular, we focus on M&A frequency, M&A
performance and several important deal structures.
4.2.1 M&A completion and diversifying acquisitions
M&A’s have been shown to be value-destroying for acquiring firm shareholders (Ishii
and Xuan, 2014; Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Andrade et al., 2001; Wang and Xie, 2009;
Renneboog and Zhao, 2014; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). The value-destruction is
particularly well documented for large firms and large public acquisitions (Moeller
et al., 2004). Being experienced executives, award-winning CEOs are likely to
have experience with acquisitions. Moreover, CEO experience and market knowl-
edge should equip award-winning outside directors to better advise management
on M&A’s and hence reduce the frequency and probability of value-destroying ac-
quisitions. Thereby, they would protect the interest of shareholders and limit the
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extraction of private benefits by the management.
Further, having advised a firm or its management on particularly value-destroying
acquisitions could be seen as a sign of weak monitoring and could impede the direc-
tor’s ability to attain directorships in the future. Instances of governance failure have
been shown to have a negative effect on a director’s future career (Fich and Shiv-
dasani, 2007; Brochet and Srinivasan, 2014; Fos and Tsoutsoura, 2014). It is thus
in the interest of directors to avoid being associated with large and value-destroying
deals.
Moreover, diversifying bids are viewed especially critically by shareholders. Many
studies have found that diversification is associated with a discount in firm value
(Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Servaes, 1996; Lamont and Polk,
2002). Moreover, Morck et al. (1990) and more recently Malmendier and Tate
(2008) find negative announcement effects to diversifying acquisitions. As such,
diversifying bids pose a greater risk to the management but also to the board of
directors who oversee the acquisition. Finally, diversifying bids are more likely for
small firms than for large firms (Moeller et al., 2004).
4.2.2 M&A performance
Several recent papers have pointed out that individual director attributes and board
connections can have a significant effect on a firm’s acquisition behaviour and per-
formance (Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Renneboog and Zhao, 2014;
Huang et al., 2014; Dittmann et al., 2010; Schmidt, 2015; Gu¨ner et al., 2008; Wu,
2011).
Several individual director characteristics and attributes have been studied in
relation to acquisition performance. Huang et al. (2014), for example, show that
investment banking experience of directors can lead to better M&A performance.
Based on their experience and expertise they are able to assist firms in identifying
suitable targets and reduce the costs associated with the deal. Similarly, Francis
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et al. (2015) provide evidence that academic directors can play an important role
on the board of directors and are associated with higher acquisition performance.
Further, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) find that firms with inside directors who also
have outside board positions make better acquisitions. Finally, looking at all CEO
directors, Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) find no effect on acquisition outcomes.
Moreover, several recent papers point to board connections as a potential de-
terminant of acquisition performance. Cai and Sevilir (2012) find that firms obtain
higher announcement returns when acquirer and target share a common director.
However, the association between networks and announcement returns is ambiguous.
Ishii and Xuan (2014) and Wu (2011) find a negative correlation between connections
and announcement returns for a sample of US acquisitions. Using social ties between
the CEO and the firm’s directors as a measure of board friendliness, Schmidt (2015)
finds higher announcement returns when advisory needs are high and lower returns
when monitoring needs are high.
Award-winning outside directors can contribute in different ways to the success
of a potential transaction. Valuable experience and market knowledge as well as
large social and business networks can provide distinct advantages. Thereby, allow-
ing firms to select better acquisition targets and shorten the required negotiation
time. Moreover, they might be able to achieve better acquisition returns because
shareholders view bids supported by the CEO more positively and associate it with
a smaller chance of failure.
4.2.3 Deal characteristics
Finally, we evaluate several deal structures that have been closely linked with partic-
ularly value-destroying acquisitions and examine whether firms with award-winning
CEOs are more likely to structure M&As in a way that will yield positive (or less
negative) outcomes.
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4.2.3.1 Deal value
Value destruction for acquiring firms is particularly well-observed for large acqui-
sitions. Henry and Jespersen (2002) report that more than half of all deals worth
at least $500 million end up destroying shareholder value. A report by Cools et al.
(2007) arrives at similar conclusions and finds that deals with $1 billion or more in
value destroy significantly more value than smaller deals.
Despite the known fact that large acquisitions are associated with larger losses,
large firms spent significantly more on acquisitions than small firms (Moeller et al.,
2004). One reason may be that overly confident managers tend to bid for larger firms
and overestimate their ability to extract benefits from the acquisition (Hayward and
Hambrick, 1997; Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Another reason may
be that firms may be willing to pay larger premia for large firms because they
provide high private benefits (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Harford and Li, 2007).
Interestingly, Moeller et al. (2004) also find that while large firms spent more in
total dollar value, they spent less in relative terms.
4.2.3.2 Negotiation time
The duration of negotiation times is another important aspect of M&A’s. From the
moment when the intention of an acquisitions becomes known to the market, the
target’s board of directors needs to decide how to react to the proposed acquisition.
The board can advise the shareholders to either accept or reject the acquisition
proposal. A rejection may lead the acquirer to make a better offer or initiate a
hostile takeover bid. The target firm can then accept the better offer or initiate
various defence mechanisms to protect itself from a hostile takeover (Martynova
and Renneboog, 2011).
Shorter negotiation times are in the interest of the acquiring firm. Longer nego-
tiation times due to the target’s restistance to accept the offer increases transaction
costs, uncertainty and the potential for moral hazard. Shorter negotiation times
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also mean lower transaction costs for the target firm, they reduce the probability of
alternative bidders (Renneboog and Zhao, 2014; Karsten et al., 2015).
Moeller et al. (2004) find that it takes large firms longer to complete an acquisi-
tion because of an increased importance of regulatory issues which can prolong the
negotiation process. However, several recent papers show that director characteris-
tics or board structure can have a significant effect on the time needed to close a
deal. Renneboog and Zhao (2014) find that connections between bidder and target
directors are associated with a higher probability of takeover success and shorter
negotiation times. Similarly, Karsten et al. (2015) show that legal expertise can
significantly affect negotiation times. Legal expertise on the side of the bidding firm
helps reducing the negotiation times whereas legal experts on the side of the target
firm lead to an increase in the time necessary to close the deal.
4.2.3.3 Payment method
Another important aspect of M&A negotiation is the method of payment. While
existing evidence suggests that the method of payment can affect acquisition per-
formance (Travlos, 1987; Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002) the issues surrounding
potential changes in corporate control following an equity offer seem to dominate
the choice of payment. A cash payment is strictly preferred over an equity payment
if the target’s ownership structure includes low to intermediate levels of institutional
ownership (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Finally, firm size also seems to play a role
in the method of payment. Moeller et al. (2004) find that cash payments are more
likely in acquisitions by small firms.
4.2.4 Methodology
We test our empirical predictions in a simple regression model:
Yt = α + β1AwODt + β2X
′
t + µt, (4.1)
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Y as the dependent variable is either the: total number of M&A’s, cumulative num-
ber of M&A’s, cumulative abnormal return, deal value or relative deal value or the
negotiation times in days. AwOD is the number of award-winning outside direc-
tors or an indicator variable indicating that a firm has at least one award-winning
outside director on the board. Control variables (Xt) include board characteristics,
firm characteristics and deal characteristics prior studies show are related to M&A
completion and performance. Further we control for industry- and year fixed effects.
Additionally, we estimate a logit model using the same set of control variables
where the dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether an acquisition is
diversifying or within-industry. Industry classes are defined using the Fama-French
48 industry classifications. And finally, we estimate a logit model to estimate the
probability of an all cash or mixed and an all equity or mixed form of payment.
4.3 Sample selection, data and descriptive statis-
tics
Our point of departure is the governance data from RiskMetrics. We include all firms
covered in the sample for the period 1996-2013. The sample of acquisitions comes
from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) US Mergers and Acquisitions database.
We select mergers and acquisitions of S&P 1500 firms covered by RiskMetrics. We
require the transaction is completed, the deal value is greater than $1 million, the
target is a public or private U.S. firm or a non-public subsidiary of a public or
private firm, and that the acquirer is in the RiskMetrics database. As a further
restriction, we consider only acquisitions in which the acquiring firm ends up with
all the shares of the acquired firm and where the acquiring firm controls less than
50% of the target firm’s shares before the announcement. We eliminate deals in
which the deal value relative to the market value of the acquirer is less than 1%.
We obtain a sample of 3,157 mergers and acquisitions. We match the M&A’s in our
sample to balance sheet data from Compustat and stock return data from CRSP.
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To identify award-winnings CEOs who serve as outside directors we use a hand-
collected list of CEO Awards. The awards are from different sources: Business Week,
Financial World, Forbes, Chief Executive, Morningstar.com, Electronic Business
Magazine, Industry Week and the Harvard Business Review (Malmendier and Tate,
2009; Shemesh, 2014). In total, our sample includes 839 CEO Awards between
1975-2013. After accounting for those CEOs who have received multiple awards, we
identify 582 individual award-winning CEOs. Of those, 429 appear as directors in
the RiskMetrics database.
We use the CEO awards to identify extremely successful and well-known CEOs
that are highly demanded as outside directors. Thereby we are able to test whether
individual high-profile and highly skilled directors can positively affect M&A out-
comes through their position on the board. Whereas it is difficult to imagine that the
average outside director has much command and influence over the board, award-
winning CEOs are powerful directors with a proven track record of success.
We define Award-winning outside directors as those directors who have won
at least one CEO award and hold an outside position at a firm in our sample. We
then match CEO Awards to individual directors and identify Award-winning outside
directors. Using this methodology we identify 236 M&A’s that were completed while
the acquirer had at least one award-winning CEO serving as outside director on its
board3.
Figure 4.1a shows the distribution of M&A’s across announcement years. The
distribution follows the pattern described in Moeller et al. (2004). The number of
completed M&A’s drops in the early 2000s, rebounds back in the mid 2000s and
dips again in 2008. Panel A in Table 4.1 presents the distribution of M&A’s of
the full sample, those deals with award-winning CEOs as outside directors, and
all other deals. Overall, the pattern of deals involving award-winning CEOs is
distinctively different from the overall distribution. We can observe a significant
3More details on the CEO Awards used in this study and the matching procedure are provided
in Appendix D.
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spike in the distribution of M&A announcements around 2000, 2004 and between
2009-2010. Especially in 2000, 2009 and 2010 they represented over 10% of all
completed M&A’s.
Figure 4.1: Number of M&A’s for S&P 1500 firms from 1996-2013
(a) All bids
(b) Award-winning outside directors
(c) No award-winning outside directors
Panel B of Table 4.1 shows the distribution of completed M&A deals across
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industries. Industries are defined according to the 12 Fama-French industry classifi-
cations (Fama and French, 1997). Finance, Business Equipment and Manufacturing
are the most active industries in our sample. Approximately 55% of all M&A’s in
our sample are completed by firms in one of these three industries. A similar pat-
tern emerges for deals with award-winning outside directors. A little under 60% of
all completed M&A’s take place in the Finance, Business Equipment and Manufac-
turing industry. Moreover, 15% of acquisitions in the Chemical products industry
are carried out by firms with award-winning CEOs on the board of directors. This
number is more than twice as large as the average representation across industries.
The following analysis will include both year and industry fixed-effects to control
for industry and year patterns affecting M&A activity.
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics. More details on the variable definitions
are provided in the Appendix C. The table reports mean values for all acquirer firms
in column (1), those firm’s with CEO award-winners as outside directors in column
(2) and those without CEO award winners (all other deals) in column (3). In column
(4) we report the difference between column (2) and column (3).
Overall, acquirer firms with award-winning CEOs as outside directors are much
larger in terms of total assets, have higher ROA, larger boards, a higher fraction
of outside directors and better governance. Moreover, completed deals are smaller
in relative size, need more time to be completed and are more likely to be tender
offers. Finally, firms with CEO award winners are more likely to acquire a public
target and significantly less likely to acquire a private target.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 M&A completion
In this section, we examine M&A frequency. We regress the total number of M&A’s
that a firm has completed on two different specifications of our variable of interest
and several control variables including board characteristics, financial performance
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Table 4.1: M&A sample distribution by announcement year
This table presents the sample distribution of 3,157 completed mergers and acquisitions. The sample contains all
completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions from SDC for all firms included in the RiskMetrics database from 1996-
2013. Included are mergers and acquisitions where the publicliy traded acquiring firm gains control of a public,
private or subsidiary target whose transaction value is at least $1 million and 1% of the acquirer’s market value.
Panel A and Panel B present the number and percentage of M&A transactions by announcement year and by ac-
quirer industry classification. The full sample is presented first, followed by a subsample based on the presence of
an award-winning outside director being present on the firm’s board and all other deals.
Panel A: By announcement year
Award-winning All Other
Outside Directors Deals
Year Full Sample Number Percentage Number Percentage
1996 91 5 0.05 86 0.95
1997 188 14 0.07 174 0.93
1998 248 9 0.04 239 0.96
1999 226 22 0.10 204 0.90
2000 217 29 0.13 188 0.87
2001 194 18 0.09 176 0.91
2002 184 13 0.05 171 0.95
2003 182 11 0.07 171 0.93
2004 198 16 0.08 182 0.92
2005 189 10 0.05 179 0.95
2006 178 12 0.07 166 0.93
2007 195 12 0.05 183 0.95
2008 162 11 0.07 151 0.93
2009 100 12 0.12 88 0.88
2010 162 18 0.11 144 0.89
2011 165 9 0.05 156 0.95
2012 171 8 0.05 163 0.95
2013 107 7 0.07 100 0.93
Total 3157 236 0.07 2921 0.93
Panel B: By acquirer industry
Award-winning All Other
12 Fama-French Outside Directors Deals
Industry Classifications Full Sample Number Percentage Number Percentage
Consumer nondurables 168 13 0.08 155 0.92
Consumer durables 73 5 0.07 68 0.93
Manufacturing 380 30 0.08 350 0.92
Energy 165 14 0.08 151 0.92
Chemical products 61 9 0.15 52 0.85
Business equipment 835 76 0.09 759 0.91
Telecom 71 4 0.06 67 0.94
Utilities 93 6 0.06 87 0.94
Wholesale and retail 202 13 0.06 189 0.94
Healthcare 286 19 0.07 267 0.93
Finance 528 34 0.06 494 0.94
Other 295 13 0.04 282 0.96
Total 3157 236 0.07 2921 0.93
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for 3,157 completed mergers and acquisitions. The sample contains all com-
pleted U.S. mergers and acquisitions from SDC for all firms included in the RiskMetrics database from 1996-2013.
Included are mergers and acquisitions where the publicliy traded acquiring firm gains control of a public, private or
subsidiary target whose transaction value is at least $1 million and 1% of the acquirer’s market value. The sample
means are presented in column (1), means for acquirer firm’s with award-winning CEOs as outside directors are in
column (2) and descriptives for all other acquirer’s are in column (3). Column (4) reports the difference between
column (2) and column (3). Variable definitions can be found in Appendix C. t − statistics given in parentheses
and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Full Sample Award-winning All Other
Outside Directors Deals (2)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquirer characteristics:
Assets ($M) 8,600 46,291 5,552 40,738∗∗∗
Tobin’s Q 1.97 2.18 1.95 0.22
ROA 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.02∗∗∗
Cash-to-assets 0.14 0.12 0.14 -0.02
Debt-to-assets 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.02
Board Size 9.03 10.67 8.90 1.78∗∗∗
Fraction Outside Directors 0.68 0.76 0.68 0.07∗∗∗
Entrenchment Index 2.21 2.02 2.23 0.21∗∗
Deal characteristics:
Deal value ($M) 708 2,240 585 1,655∗∗∗
Relative deal size 0.59 0.23 0.62 -0.39
Cash only 0.37 0.39 0.36 0.00
Percentage cash 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.01
Equity only 0.13 0.18 0.12 0.06∗
Diversifying 0.39 0.36 0.40 -0.04
Negotiation time 64.70 80.29 63.44 16.85∗∗∗
Tender offer 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.05∗∗∗
Hostile 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01∗
Public target 0.24 0.37 0.23 0.15∗∗∗
Private target 0.45 0.34 0.46 -0.12∗∗∗
Subsidy target 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.03
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and financial structure. First, we use the total number of award-winning CEOs
serving on a firm’s board and in a second specification we use an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the firm has at least one award-winning CEO on its board of directors.
In Panel A of Table 4.3, we regress the total number of M&A’s completed by each
firm on the average values of all control variables for the whole sample period.
We find that the coefficients on both measures of award-winning CEOs are neg-
ative and highly significant. The results indicate that, as the number of award-
winning CEOs on the board increases, the number of M&A’s a firm completes
decreases. Our results are statistically and economically significant. If a firm has
an award-winning CEO on its board of directors, the number of completed M&A’s
goes down by 0.87. Further, we find that firms that, on average, have larger boards
and higher levels of cash-to-assets complete fewer M&A’s. Most noteworthy, we find
that the negative coefficients on our variable of interest are in stark contrast to the
coefficient on firm size.
In Panel B of Table 4.3 we use the cumulative number of M&A’s as the dependent
variable. Using the cumulative number we are able to account for a firm’s M&A
activity in a given year while also taking into account the firm’s past M&A activity.
Our results are quantitatively similar to those reported in Panel A and confirm the
negative association between the number of completed M&A’s and the presence of
award-winning CEOs on the board of directors. An increase in ROA and cash-
to-assets is associated with a decrease in the number of completed M&A’s and
consistent with our previous result showing that firm size is positively related to the
number of completed acquisitions.
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Table 4.3: M&A completion
This table reports the OLS regression results with the total number of completed M&A’s in Panel A and the cu-
mulated number of M&A’s in Panel B. Award-winning outside directors is the number of outside directors who are
former or current CEOs and have won a CEO award. We use the total number of award-winning outside directors
that serve as outside directors and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one CEO award winner on its
board. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Fraction outside directors is the ratio of outside direc-
tors to board size. ROA is operating income before depreciation over total assets. Cash-to-assets is cash to lagged
assets. Debt-to-assets is short-term and long-term debt over total assets. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of
the firm’s total assets. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported. t− statistics given in parentheses
and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Total Number of M&A’s
Panel A (1) (2)
Average award-winning outside directors (Number) -0.340∗∗∗
(-2.85)
Average award-winning outside directors (Dummy) -0.871∗∗∗
(-5.11)
Average LN(Board size) -0.586∗∗∗ -0.594∗∗∗
(-2.61) (-2.65)
Average fraction outside directors -0.253 -0.220
(-0.80) (-0.70)
Average ROA 0.369 0.431
(0.64) (0.75)
Average Cash-to-assets -0.888∗∗ -0.895∗∗
(-2.35) (-2.39)
Average Debt-to-assets 0.487 0.478
(1.52) (1.49)
Average LN(Assets) 0.198∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(4.02) (4.58)
Industry FE Yes Yes
Observations 1310 1310
R2 0.094 0.101
Cumulative Number of M&A’s
Panel B (1) (2)
Award-winning outside directors (Number) -0.434∗∗∗
(-4.85)
Award-winning outside directors (Dummy) -0.453∗∗∗
(-3.47)
LN(Board size) -0.205 -0.223∗
(-1.64) (-1.78)
Fraction outside directors -0.316∗ -0.330∗
(-1.70) (-1.78)
ROA -0.964∗∗∗ -0.990∗∗∗
(-2.71) (-2.79)
Cash-to-assets -0.996∗∗∗ -1.008∗∗∗
(-4.55) (-4.59)
Debt-to-assets 0.295 0.300
(1.48) (1.50)
LN(Assets) 0.275∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗
(9.07) (8.77)
Industry FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 3138 3138
R2 0.205 0.204
We have previously shown that award-winning CEOs sit on the board of the
largest 10% of S&P 1500 firms. Large acquisitions aimed at large public targets
have been shown to be specifically value-destroying (Henry and Jespersen, 2002;
Cools et al., 2007; Moeller et al., 2004). Our findings could thus suggest that award-
winning CEOs can be valuable to shareholders of extremely large firm by reducing
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the probability or number of large and value-destroying acquisitions.
4.4.2 Diversifying acquisitions
Next, we evaluate the role of CEO award winners in respect to diversifying acquisi-
tions. We use a logistic regression model where the dependent variable is a binary
variable that is equal to one if a firm made a diversifying acquisition and zero oth-
erwise. Diversifying bids are identified using the 48 Fama-French industry groups.
The results are presented in Table 4.4.
Diversifying bids are viewed especially critically by shareholders and are more
likely to destroy shareholder wealth (Morck et al., 1990; Malmendier and Tate,
2008). Like Malmendier and Tate (2008) we use diversification as a proxy for deal
quality. Controlling for board characteristics, financial performance and financial
structure of the acquiring firm, we find some evidence that firms with award-winning
CEOs as outside directors are less likely to complete diversifying acquisitions. The
results of Moeller et al. (2004) suggest that large firms are generally less likely to
diversify. However, firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, is
not a significant predictor of diversification. A possible explanation may be that
the average firm size in our sample is considerably larger than the average firm in
Moeller et al. (2004). Indeed, the average firm in our sample is approximately $9.6
billion and whereas the average firm size in Moeller et al. (2004) is just $2.6 billion.
Overall, our results indicate that award-winning CEOs can potentially decrease
the number of value-destroying deals and prevent firms from engaging in diversifying
acquisitions.
4.4.3 M&A performance
4.4.3.1 Announcement returns
In this section, we study investor reactions to acquisition announcements. We cal-
culate announcement period abnormal returns following the standard methodology
outlined in Brown and Warner (1985). We estimate these abnormal returns over the
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Table 4.4: Diversifying Acquisitions
This table reports logit regression results where the dependent variable is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the
firm made a diversifying merger or acquisition in a given year. Diversification is measured using the 48 Fama-French
industry classifications. Award-winning outside directors is the number of outside directors who are former or cur-
rent CEOs and have won a CEO award. We use the total number of award-winning outside directors that serve as
outside directors and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms has at least one CEO award winner on its board.
Board size is the number of directors on the board. Fraction outside directors is the ratio of outside directors to
board size. ROA is operating income before depreciation over total assets. Cash-to-assets is cash to lagged assets.
Debt-to-assets is short-term and long-term debt over total assets. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s
total assets. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported. t − statistics given in parentheses and ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Diversifying Acquisitions
(1) (2)
Award-winning outside directors (Number) -0.204∗
(-1.76)
Award-winning outside directors (Dummy) -0.261∗
(-1.65)
LN(Board size) 0.381∗ 0.380∗
(1.91) (1.91)
Fraction outside directors 0.317 0.326
(1.05) (1.08)
ROA 0.151 0.164
(0.25) (0.27)
Cash-to-assets -0.246 -0.250
(-0.76) (-0.77)
Debt-to-assets 0.135 0.129
(0.42) (0.40)
LN(Assets) -0.0593 -0.0553
(-1.38) (-1.29)
Industry FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 3088 3088
Pseudo R2 0.184 0.184
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Table 4.5: Cumulative abnormal returns around acquisition announcements
This table presents mean and median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) upon acquisition announcements by the
acquiring firm. We report CARs over the three-day event window [-1,1], five-day event window [-2,2], and eleven-
day event window [-5,5]. Numbers for the full sample are reported first, followed by deals completed by firms with
at least one award-winning outside director and all other deals. Finally, we report differences between column (3)
and column (5) and report the results from a t-test and Wilcoxon test in column (7) and (8). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Award-winning All
Full Sample Outside Directors Other Deals Difference (3)-(5)
Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard t-Value z-Value
(Median) Deviation (Median) Deviation (Median) Deviation (t-test) (Wilcoxon test)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CAR[-1,1] 0.32% 0.064 -0.52% 0.052 0.39% 0.065 2.04∗∗ 2.18∗∗
(0.17%) ( -0.22%) (0.20%)
CAR[-2,2] 0.33% 0.072 -0.81% 0.058 0.43% 0.073 2.46∗∗ 2.50∗∗
(0.25%) (-0.25%) 0.32%
CAR[-5,5] 0.15% 0.093 -1.01% 0.087 0.25% 0.093 1.95∗ 2.03∗∗
(0.22) (-0.35%) (0.27)
three-day (-1,+1), five-day (-2,+2) and elven-day (-5,+5) event window using the
CRSP value-weighted index as the market return and estimate the market model
for the (-205,-6) interval.
We examine the announcement returns in Table 4.5. We report mean, median
and the standard deviation of the announcement returns over the three event win-
dows (-1,+1), (-2,+2) and (-5,+5) in Table 4.5. Results for all acquisitions are
reported in column (1) and (2), deals completed by firms with award-winning out-
side directors are presented in column (3) and (4), deals completed by firms without
award-winning outside directors in column (5) and (6) and two test of statistical
differences in the means in column (7) and (8).
The announcement returns for all S&P 1500 firms from 1996-2013 are positive
across all event windows. Announcement returns for firms with award-winning out-
side directors, on the other hand, are negative. The effect becomes more pronounced
as the size of the event window increases. For the eleven-day (-5,+5) event window
the average announcement return is -1.01%. The differences compared to all other
deals across the event windows range from 0.96% for the three-day (-1,+1) event
window to 1.26% for the eleven-day (-5,+5) window and are statistically significant.
Our univariate results do not lend support to the notion that firms with CEO award
winners as outside directors make better acquisitions.
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Next, we report announcement returns across different deal characteristics. We
compare different types of acquisitions, target firms, payment methods and relative
deal size. Except for all equity payments, announcement returns for firms with
award-winning CEOs as outside directors are more negative compared to those of
all other firms. However, the effect is only significant for diversifying acquisitions
and those acquisitions paid using a mix of cash and equity. The effect is strongest
for acquisitions with a relative deal size of more than 25%. The difference in an-
nouncement returns is 2.40%.
Having established significant differences in our univariate results, we now eval-
uate the role of CEO award winners in a formal regression model. The results
are presented in Table 4.7. We find some evidence that suggests that firms with
award-winning outside directors experience significantly more negative announce-
ment returns. However, the significance disappears upon the inclusion of standard
control variables. Overall, the findings suggest that firm size is the only consistent
negative predictor of announcement returns (Moeller et al., 2004)4.
4.4.3.2 Abnormal dollar returns
The literature mostly focusses on percentage returns to acquisition announcements.
This approach does not capture the change in wealth for acquiring firm shareholders.
Percentage returns do not reflect the size of the acquiring firm and thus fail to ac-
curately reflect the change in wealth experienced by shareholders (Malatesta, 1983).
Moeller et al. (2004) and Moeller et al. (2005) show that there is a significant size
effect in the percentage and dollar returns to acquisitions. We use abnormal dollar
returns to capture the change in wealth experienced by shareholders. Abnormal
dollar returns are defined as the gross change in the value of the acquirer’s equity
minus the predicted change from the market model. Dollar returns are expressed
in 2005 dollars. We present two sets of results. An overview including transaction
4We observe relatively low coefficients of determination. However, the size of the observed
coefficients is not unusual in regression models employing CARs as the dependent variable. See,
for example, (Masulis et al., 2007).
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Table 4.7: Determinants of Acquirer Returns
This table reports results of OLS regressions for acquirer cumulative abnormal returns. The dependent variable is
the three-day [-1,1] cumulative abnormal return for the acquirer. Award-winning outside directors is the number of
outside directors who are former or current CEOs and have won a CEO award. We use the total number of award-
winning outside directors that serve as outside directors and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms has at least
one CEO award winner on its board. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Fraction outside directors
is the ratio of outside directors to board size. Diversifying is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer and tar-
get are not in the same industry. Industries are classified according to the Fama-French 48 industry classification.
Tender offer indicates a tender offer. Hostile is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bid was hostile. Cash deal is
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bid was fully financed with cash. Relative deal value is the deal value divided
by the acquirer’s market value of equity. ROA is operating income before depreciation over total assets. Cash-to-
assets is cash to lagged assets. Debt-to-assets is short-term and long-term debt over total assets. Ln(Assets) is the
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported. t− statistics
given in parentheses and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
CAR[-1,1]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Award-winning outside directors (Number) -0.452∗ -0.251 -0.121
(-1.70) (-0.91) (-0.42)
Award-winning outside directors (Dummy) -0.730∗ -0.474 -0.348
(-1.93) (-1.20) (-0.85)
LN(Board size) -0.978∗ -0.959∗ -0.675 -0.670
(-1.94) (-1.91) (-1.23) (-1.22)
Fraction outside directors -0.763 -0.737 -0.580 -0.555
(-0.88) (-0.85) (-0.67) (-0.64)
Diversifying -0.151 -0.155 -0.175 -0.178
(-0.55) (-0.57) (-0.64) (-0.65)
Tender offer -0.338 -0.328 -0.332 -0.329
(-0.55) (-0.53) (-0.54) (-0.53)
Hostile -2.114 -2.035 -1.973 -1.908
(-1.16) (-1.13) (-1.07) (-1.05)
Relative deal value -0.00403 -0.00412 -0.00373 -0.00385
(-0.43) (-0.44) (-0.38) (-0.39)
ROA 2.798 2.843
(1.46) (1.48)
Cash-to-assets -1.709 -1.713
(-1.61) (-1.61)
Debt-to-assets 1.597∗ 1.583∗
(1.75) (1.73)
LN(Assets) -0.244∗∗ -0.233∗∗
(-2.24) (-2.14)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2987 2987 2956 2956 2949 2949
R2 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.031 0.036 0.036
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values, abnormal dollar returns and announcement returns in Table 4.8 and large
loss deals with losses greater than $1 billion in Table 4.9.
We find that between 1996-2013 S&P 1500 firms spent $2.24 trillion on mergers
and acquisitions and accumulated losses of $63 billion. While the positive overall
announcement returns implies that firms created value, the dollar losses accumulated
are significant. Finding positive announcement returns but negative abnormal dollar
returns suggests the existence of a size effect among S&P 1500 firms (Moeller et al.,
2004).
The positive announcement return and negative abnormal dollar returns are evi-
dence that the size effect persists over time and can be observed for S&P 1500 firms
(Moeller et al., 2004). Large firms tend to perform considerably worse during acqui-
sitions and cause the major share of the dollar loss associated with all mergers and
acquisitions. The average firm in our sample loses $20 million in market value upon
the announcement of an acquisition. Firms with award-winning outside directors on
the other hand lose 9 times more, equivalent to a loss of $183 million per acquisition.
This is especially striking compared to all other firms in the sample who, on average,
lose just $6 million.
In line with our earlier results, firms with award-winning outside directors per-
form considerably worse in respect to acquisitions. Acquisitions with award-winning
outside directors make up 7% of all acquisitions but 24% of the aggregate transac-
tion value and 68% of all losses incurred through acquisitions. However, almost 50%
of those losses were accumulated between 2000 and 2001.
Next, we examine deals that caused losses equal or greater than $1 billion. While
a third of these so-called large loss deals occurred between 2000 and 2001, the number
of large loss deals completed by firms with award-winning outside directors is more
evenly spread across the sample period. Despite only representing 7% of the total
M&As sample, they are involved in 45% of all deals associated with losses greater
or equal to $1 billion.
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Our results show that firms with award-winning CEOs as outside directors do
not outperform other firms, but instead they are responsible for a large share of the
overall losses incurred through M&As. The results indicate that firms, irrespective
of directors with managerial experience and expertise, destroy shareholder wealth
through M&A activity.
4.4.3.3 M&A long-term performance
We find no evidence suggesting that firms with award-winning outside directors
on the board are able to make better acquisition decisions. If anything, abnormal
dollar returns and the distribution of large loss deals suggest that award-winning
outside directors are associated with particularly value-destroying M&As. However,
it might be the case that investors simply fail to realize or misjudge the potential
of the proposed acquisition. To address this concern, we evaluate the long-term
consequences of M&As.
For long-term stock return performance analysis, we investigate three year stock
return performance in the post-event period starting from the effective date of a
completed deal (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). To evaluate M&A long-term perfor-
mance we use a calendar-time approach. Using this approach we calculate monthly
calendar-time portfolio returns for firms that complete M&A’s. Then, we calcu-
late the monthly abnormal return by estimating the intercept of the calendar-time
portfolio using the Fama and French (1993) three factor model.
(4.2)ARit = Rit −Rft − βi1(Rmt −Rft)− βi2HMLt + βi3SMBt
where ARit or Alpha is the monthly abnormal return of the calendar-time portfolio.
HMLt and SMBt are the Fama-French book-to-market and size factor. Among
others, Fama (1998) points out that this methodology has a few distinct advantages
over approaches such as “buy-and-hold abnormal return” to evaluate long-term per-
formance. Portfolios with monthly calendar-time returns take into account all cross-
correlations across event firms and the distribution of calender-time monthly returns
also provides a better approximation of the normal distribution.
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The results are presented in Table 4.10. The results are based on the Fama-
French three factor model using value-weighted monthly portfolio returns of acquir-
ing firms. The results are computed using the weighted least square technique. We
present three different sets of results. Regression results for all cases are presented in
Panel A, non-overlapping cases in Panel B and overlapping cases in Panel C. Cases
are considered “overlapping” if a firm makes an acquisition within three years of a
previous acquisition.
Several earlier studies based on US data have reported that acquiring firms expe-
rience significant negative abnormal returns over a one to three year period following
an acquisition (Agrawal et al., 1992; Moeller et al., 2003). However, Fama (1998)
and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) point to methodological issues surrounding these
conclusions. Methodological choices and various deal characteristics may explain
the negative long-term performance following acquisitions. Consistent with these
concerns, Dutta and Jog (2009) use a more robust methodology and find no signs
of M&A underperformance for a sample of Canadian acquisitions.
Similarly, we find no evidence of a significant underperformance. The alpha (or
intercept) is slightly negative and insignificant across all subsamples. The coefficients
on SMB and HML are positive and significant. A positive coefficient on SMB implies
that the average size of acquiring firms in the portfolio is quite small. A significant
positive coefficient on HML indicates that most of the firms in the portfolio are value
firms with lower price-to-book ratios.
4.4.4 Deal characteristics
Having analyzed the frequency and performance of M&A’s, we now focus on deal
characteristics that have been specifically linked to acquisition outcomes.
4.4.4.1 Deal value
We begin our analysis by looking at the total and relative deal size. Table 4.11
presents OLS regression models with the natural logarithm of total deal value and
137
Table 4.10: Long-term M&A performance: Fama-French 3-Factor Regression
This table reports results from Fama-French (FF) three factor regressions to detect abnormal returns. RMRF is the
difference between monthly stock return portfolio and 91-day T-bill rate. SMB is the difference between the returns
of small size firm portfolios and large size firm portfolios. HML is the difference between the returns of value firm
portfolios and growth firm portfolios. We use the weighted least square (WLS) technique in the value-weight port-
folio analysis, in which the square root of the number of firms in each month is used as the weight in the regression
model. The reported results are based on the 36 months following an acquisition. The “Alpha” value reported in the
regression model indicates the monthly average abnormal return of the sample. Panel A present results for all cases
(N=3,157). Panels B and C present results for “non-overalpping” (N=1,744) and “overlapping” (N=1,413) cases.
If a firm makes an acquisition within three years of a previous acquisition, the cases are considered “overlapping”.
t− statistics given in parentheses and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Factors Model Characteristics
Alpha RMRF SMB HML Adj. R2 F-stat
Panel A: All cases
All bids -0.0000 1.1589∗∗∗ 0.3688∗∗∗ 0.4511∗∗∗ 0.8851 609.26∗∗∗
(N=3157) (-0.02) (39.08) (9.36) (10.97)
Award-winning outside directors 0.0004 1.1694∗∗∗ 0.1631∗∗ 0.2984∗∗∗ 0.8054 322.45∗∗∗
(N=236) (0.21) (29.61) (3.08) (5.46)
No award-winning outside directors -0.0000 1.1578∗∗∗ 0.3861∗∗∗ 0.4644∗∗∗ 0.8828 596.28∗∗∗
(N=2921) (-0.09) (38.50) (9.66) (11.13)
Panel B: Non-overlapping cases
All bids -0.0002 1.1768∗∗∗ 0.3890∗∗∗ 0.4547∗∗∗ 0.8909 646.02∗∗∗
(N=1744) (-0.15) (40.36) (10.19) (11.24)
Award-winning outside directors -0.0005 1.1912∗∗∗ 0.1863∗∗∗ 0.2880∗∗∗ 0.8117 335.82∗∗∗
(N=144) (-0.29) (30.09) (3.56) (5.29)
No award-winning outside directors -0.0001 1.1757∗∗∗ 0.4076∗∗∗ 0.4706∗∗∗ 0.8873 623.24∗∗∗
(N=1600) (-0.10) (39.49) (10.47) (11.38)
Panel C: Overlapping cases
All bids 0.0003 1.1766∗∗∗ 0.3545∗∗∗ 0.4526∗∗∗ 0.8540 459.24∗∗∗
(N=1413) (0.21) (33.97) (7.76) (9.56)
Award-winning outside directors 0.0018 1.1377∗∗∗ 0.1212∗ 0.3155 0.6365 132.89∗∗∗
(N=92) (0.65) (19.14) (1.49) (3.80)
No award-winning outside directors 0.0002 1.1360∗∗∗ 0.3581∗∗∗ 0.4606∗∗∗ 0.8581 474.74∗∗∗
(N=1,321) (0.10) (34.13) (7.95) (9.98)
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the relative deal value as dependent variables. The relative deal size is the ra-
tio of the target’s equity capitalization to the acquirer’s equity capitalization. We
regress our dependent variables on board characteristics, deal characteristics, finan-
cial performance and financial structure variables. As before we use the number of
award-winning outside directors and an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has at
least one award-winning outside director on its board as our variable of interest. We
find that firms with award-winning outside directors complete significantly larger
mergers and acquisitions. Hostile deals are significantly larger and deals paid for
using only cash are significantly smaller. Overall, firm size, ROA and cash-to-assets
are positively associated with total deal size. Somewhat surprisingly, none of our
variables have any predictive power in relation to the relative deal size.
It is known that large deals are particularly value-destroying (Henry and Jes-
persen, 2002; Cools et al., 2007). Alexandridis et al. (2013) show that the result
cannot be explained by larger premia paid for larger targets. Rather they show
that large targets are acquired at a significant discount. The authors argue that the
complexities involved in relatively larger deals and difficulties around post-merger
integration can hinder the realization of potential merger gains (Shrivastava, 1986;
Hayward, 2002; Ahern, 2010).
4.4.4.2 Negotiation time
In this section, we examine the M&A negotiation time and test whether the time
needed to complete a deal is affected by the number of award-winning outside direc-
tors on the board of directors. Renneboog and Zhao (2014), for example, show that
firms can benefit from director connections between target and bidder firm. They
argue that director connections can facilitate information exchange and help reduce
the time needed to complete M&A’s.
We use a (left censored) tobit model with the negotiation time as the dependent
variable. Negotiation time is the number of days between the first public M&A
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Table 4.11: Deal Value
This table presents OLS regression results with the natural logarithm of the total deal dollar value and the rela-
tive deal value as dependent variables. Award-winning outside directors is the number of outside directors who are
former or current CEOs and have won a CEO award. We use the total number of award-winning outside directors
that serve as outside directors and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms has at least one CEO award winner on
its board. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Fraction outside directors is the ratio of outside di-
rectors to board size. Diversifying is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer and target are not in the same
industry. Industries are classified according to the Fama-French 48 industry classification. Tender offer indicates
a tender offer. Hostile is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bid was hostile. Cash deal is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the bid was fully financed with cash. Relative deal value is the deal value divided by the acquirer’s mar-
ket value of equity. ROA is operating income before depreciation over total assets. Cash-to-assets is cash to lagged
assets. Debt-to-assets is short-term and long-term debt over total assets. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of
the firm’s total assets. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported. t− statistics given in parentheses
and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
LN(Dollar Deal Value) Relative Deal Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Award-winning outside directors (Number) 0.319∗∗∗ -0.528
(4.25) (-0.92)
Award-winning outside directors (Dummy) 0.308∗∗∗ -0.789
(3.14) (-0.95)
LN(Board size) -0.0970 -0.0819 0.510 0.498
(-0.83) (-0.70) (0.70) (0.70)
Fraction outside directors 0.00275 0.0175 1.843 1.856
(0.02) (0.10) (1.08) (1.08)
Diversifying -0.0382 -0.0375 -0.349 -0.353
(-0.65) (-0.64) (-1.27) (-1.26)
Tender offer 0.0735 0.0718
(0.58) (0.57)
Hostile 1.327∗∗ 1.298∗∗ 0.205 0.305
(2.02) (1.98) (0.29) (0.46)
All cash -0.166∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ 0.427 0.431
(-3.04) (-3.12) (0.96) (0.96)
ROA 2.739∗∗∗ 2.766∗∗∗ -2.858 -2.836
(7.48) (7.53) (-1.37) (-1.37)
Cash-to-assets 0.766∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ -1.741 -1.755
(3.95) (3.99) (-1.26) (-1.26)
Debt-to-assets -0.133 -0.138 -1.266 -1.276
(-0.74) (-0.76) (-1.05) (-1.05)
LN(Assets) 0.602∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.0341 0.0383
(24.42) (24.67) (0.16) (0.17)
Industry FE
Year FE
Observations 3117 3117 3117 3117
R2 0.302 0.300 0.022 0.022
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announcement and the completion of the deal. Similar to our previous model, we
control for board characteristics, deal characteristics, financial performance and fi-
nancial structure variables. The results are presented in Table 4.12. We present
two different sets of results. Controlling for year fixed-effects we find that, indeed,
the negotiation period seems to be shorter for firms with award-winning outside
directors. However, when we control for industry effects the significant association
disappears. Our results indicate that negotiation times vary significantly across in-
dustries and that certain industries may require, on average, less time to complete
acquisitions. All models have low coefficient of determination. However, the size
of the observed coefficients are comparable to those observed by Renneboog and
Zhao (2014). Regarding the control variables we find that diversifying and cash bids
are associated with significantly shorter negotiation periods. Further, our results
indicate that diversifying and cash deals need less time to be completed and that
hostile bids, tender offers and firm size lead to an increase in negotiation time.
4.4.4.3 Payment method
In this section, we analyse the method of payment. The proposed payment method
can have important implications for the short-term acquisition performance (Travlos,
1987; Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002), and aggravate issues surrounding changes in
corporate control and voting power (Faccio and Masulis, 2005).
We estimate a logit model with a binary dependent variable indicating the
method of payment. First, we use an indicator variable equal to one for all deals
involving cash (an all cash transaction or mixed payment) and zero in case of an
all equity payment. Second, we use offers involving equity (in case of an equity or
mixed payment the dummy equals one, and equals zero in case of an all cash offer).
Our results are presented in Table 4.13. We find some evidence that firms with
award-winning outside directors are less likely to use an all cash or mixed cash bid
to conclude deals. Being less likely to conclude deals in cash, which is generally
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Table 4.12: Negotiation Time
This table reports the (left censored) tobit regression results of the negotiation time in M&A transactions. Nego-
tiation time is the difference between the announcement date and the date the deal is completed. Award-winning
outside directors is the number of outside directors who are former or current CEOs and have won a CEO award.
We use the total number of award-winning outside directors that serve as outside directors and a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firms has at least one CEO award winner on its board. Board size is the number of directors on
the board. Fraction outside directors is the ratio of outside directors to board size. Diversifying is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the acquirer and target are not in the same industry. Industries are classified according to the
Fama-French 48 industry classification. Tender offer indicates a tender offer. Hostile is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if the bid was hostile. Cash deal is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bid was fully financed with cash. Rel-
ative deal value is the deal value divided by the acquirer’s market value of equity. ROA is operating income before
depreciation over total assets. Cash-to-assets is cash to lagged assets. Debt-to-assets is short-term and long-term
debt over total assets. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Intercept is included in all
regressions but not reported. t − statistics given in parentheses and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Negotiation Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Award-winning Outside Directors (Number) -7.582∗ 0.0270
(-1.92) (0.01)
Award-winning Outside Directors (Dummy) -12.71∗ -3.703
(-1.94) (-0.59)
LN(Board size) 31.52∗∗∗ 7.758 31.32∗∗∗ 7.949
(4.45) (1.07) (4.42) (1.10)
Fraction outside directors 7.736 -5.013 8.212 -4.511
(0.67) (-0.44) (0.71) (-0.39)
Diversifying -33.38∗∗∗ -26.82∗∗∗ -33.43∗∗∗ -26.85∗∗∗
(-9.55) (-7.16) (-9.56) (-7.17)
Tender offer 23.42∗∗∗ 29.23∗∗∗ 23.62∗∗∗ 29.29∗∗∗
(3.36) (4.47) (3.39) (4.47)
Hostile 140.8∗∗∗ 157.6∗∗∗ 142.2∗∗∗ 158.3∗∗∗
(3.03) (3.45) (3.07) (3.46)
Cash deal -16.83∗∗∗ -14.55∗∗∗ -16.75∗∗∗ -14.59∗∗∗
(-4.68) (-4.12) (-4.66) (-4.13)
Relative Deal Value 4.303∗∗ 2.212 4.283∗∗ 2.223
(1.99) (1.16) (1.98) (1.16)
ROA -50.28∗∗ -17.02 -49.57∗∗ -16.08
(-2.51) (-0.79) (-2.47) (-0.74)
Cash-to-assets -4.403 1.884 -4.372 1.902
(-0.39) (0.16) (-0.39) (0.16)
Debt-to-assets -3.601 -7.888 -4.068 -8.155
(-0.31) (-0.65) (-0.35) (-0.68)
LN(Assets) 20.60∗∗∗ 15.99∗∗∗ 20.74∗∗∗ 16.23∗∗∗
(13.60) (10.55) (13.61) (10.62)
Industry FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3117 3117 3117 3117
Pseudo R2 0.023 0.032 0.023 0.032
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Table 4.13: Payment Type
This table presents the results of logit regressions on the type of means of payment in the transaction. The depen-
dent variables are Cash or Mixed and Equity or Mixed. Cash or Mixed is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
deal was fully or partially financed with cash. Equity or Mixed is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the deal was
fully or partially financed with equity. Award-winning outside directors is the number of outside directors who are
former or current CEOs and have won a CEO award. We use the total number of award-winning outside directors
that serve as outside directors and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms has at least one CEO award winner on
its board. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Fraction outside directors is the ratio of outside di-
rectors to board size. Diversifying is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer and target are not in the same
industry. Industries are classified according to the Fama-French 48 industry classification. Tender offer indicates
a tender offer. Hostile is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bid was hostile. Cash deal is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the bid was fully financed with cash. Relative deal value is the deal value divided by the acquirer’s mar-
ket value of equity. ROA is operating income before depreciation over total assets. Cash-to-assets is cash to lagged
assets. Debt-to-assets is short-term and long-term debt over total assets. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of
the firm’s total assets. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported. t− statistics given in parentheses
and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
All Cash or Mixed All Equity or Mixed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Award-winning Outside Directors (Number) -0.281∗∗ 0.0474
(-2.56) (0.34)
Award-winning Outside Directors (Dummy) -0.287∗ 0.0128
(-1.89) (0.07)
LN(Board size) 0.0880 0.0757 -0.177 -0.175
(0.50) (0.43) (-0.84) (-0.83)
Fraction outside directors 0.334 0.324 -0.408 -0.402
(1.21) (1.18) (-1.31) (-1.29)
Diversifying 0.152∗ 0.152∗ -0.114 -0.114
(1.68) (1.67) (-1.01) (-1.01)
Tender offer 1.371∗∗∗ 1.373∗∗∗ -0.617∗∗ -0.617∗∗
(6.50) (6.51) (-2.34) (-2.34)
Hostile -1.127 -1.100 1.674∗∗ 1.677∗∗
(-1.30) (-1.26) (2.16) (2.16)
Relative Deal Value 0.0133 0.0125 0.0356 0.0360
(0.25) (0.24) (0.63) (0.64)
ROA 0.488 0.470 -2.854∗∗∗ -2.842∗∗∗
(0.90) (0.86) (-4.29) (-4.27)
Cash-to-assets 0.533∗ 0.525∗ 0.0707 0.0720
(1.78) (1.76) (0.20) (0.21)
Debt-to-assets -0.304 -0.302 -0.269 -0.272
(-1.07) (-1.06) (-0.77) (-0.78)
LN(Assets) 0.0374 0.0313 0.0105 0.0137
(0.98) (0.82) (0.22) (0.29)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3114 3114 3073 3073
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.097 0.147 0.146
associated with positive announcement returns, is likely be a reflection of the large
target size. Results on the use of equity reveal no significant relationship between
award-winning directors and the method of payment. Moreover, the evidence sug-
gests that tender offers are more often completed using cash. Moreover, higher levels
of cash-to-assets are also linked to a higher likelihood to complete a transaction us-
ing only cash or a mix involving cash. In regard to all equity or mixed payments,
we find a negative association with ROA and hostile takeover bids.
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4.5 Conclusion
Several recent papers link acquisition outcomes to director characteristics and board
structure (Masulis and Mobbs, 2011; Fahlenbrach et al., 2010; Francis et al., 2015;
Huang et al., 2014; Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Renneboog and Zhao, 2014; Cai and Sevilir,
2012). The rational is that CEO experience, industry expertise or social networks
should allow the board to select better acquisition targets and improve acquisitions
outcomes. However, so far, the literature has failed to produce clear and consistent
evidence.
We analyze the role of award-winning CEOs on corporate boards and examine
whether they can improve acquisition outcomes. These so-called Superstar CEOs
are highly demanded and particularly influential outside directors, as such they are
well-suited for the purpose of this study.
At most, our results suggest that award-winning CEOs may indirectly affect
merger outcomes by reducing the number of completed M&A’s. However, there is no
evidence that award-winning CEOs can help firms make better acquisitions. Rather,
they are involved in a disproportionally high number of highly value-destroying deals.
Overall, our results suggest that the impact of individual directors on M&A
outcomes is limited. It is well-known that large deals completed by larger firms are
viewed especially critical by the market (Moeller et al., 2004, 2005). We conclude
that while there is evidence that those firms complete less mergers and especially
diversifying bids, the completed M&A’s are value-destroying. The total dollar loss
incurred through acquisitions is substantial. They are involved in less than a tenth
of the acquisitions in our sample but responsible for over two-thirds of the dollar
losses. Our evidence shows that the ability of individual directors to improve M&A
performance is limited or non existent. Firm and deal size, on the other hand, are
the main determinants of acquisition performance and deal structure.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Conclusion
As primary agents to protect shareholder interest, outside directors play a vital role
on the boards of directors. To understand what motivates outside directors to ef-
fectively monitor senior management has been, and still is, a key issue in corporate
governance. It feeds into the design and composition of the board of directors and is
of great importance to shareholders. Unlike most economic systems, the market for
outside directors is not primarily governed by financial incentives. Instead, reputa-
tion is recognized as the primary incentive device in the market for outside directors.
It is thus essential to understand how reputation shapes the director selection pro-
cess, its implications and consequences for the appointing firm and, ultimately, for
the shareholders.
The thesis introduces a novel way to approach the analysis of director reputation.
We use a hand-collected sample of CEO awards from major national publications
and identify the outside board positions of CEO award winners. Exploiting the
award-induced shift in a director’s reputation, we are able to design new empirical
tests to better understand how director reputation affects the market for outside
directorships. Overall, the results presented throughout this thesis underscore the
important role ascribed to director reputation. We show that the consequences of
an economic system where reputation serves as a commodity and incentive device
alike are directly observable at the director- and firm level.
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First, we demonstrate that director reputation is of great importance in the
director-firm matching process. Reputation determines what board seats are avail-
able to which directors. High profile outside directors are appointed to firms that
have significantly outperformed prior to the appointment. While it is not clear
whether reputation-based matching will result in a board structure that will ensure
effective monitoring, our firm-level evidence suggests that high profile outside direc-
tor appointments can be viewed positively by shareholders. We find that firms with
reputable directors (or a higher number of reputable directors) have a significantly
higher firm value and better governance provisions in place. This is a result of the
matching process itself, but also a reflection of investor perceptions.
Using a sample of director appointments, we are able to show that the positive
association between outside director reputation and firm value is, at least partially,
the result of a causal link. Based on an event study, we show that the investor reac-
tion to a director appointment is significantly stronger if that director is considered
more reputable. Reputation is recognized as part of a firm’s human capital stock
and signals financial stability and the potential for future growth. The positive in-
vestor reaction results in a short-term value premium that, given the large size of
the firms that succeed in appointing highly reputable directors, translates into an
economically significant effect.
One would expect that the appointment of high-profile outside directors would
result in observable performance effects. However, looking at M&A’s and long-
term performance there is little or no evidence that individual outside directors
contribute value through their board position. Our findings indicate that the role
generally ascribed to outside directors may be more limited than often assumed.
The empirical results documented in this thesis are to a large extent a reflection
of the director selection process and do not support the notion that firms benefit
from high-profile outside director appointments in the long run. This interpretation
is further supported by the fact that high-profile outside directors are significantly
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more likely to miss board meetings and have significantly more commitments outside
the board room. High profile outside directors are highly time constrained and likely
not in a position to be diligent monitors. The results presented here directly feed
into the literature on board composition and the importance of individual outside
directors.
The thesis indicates the importance of identifying new ways to empirically test
the implications of director reputation in the market for outside directors. Designing
new empirical tests that circumvent or address the well-known endogeneity issues,
can yield a substantial improvement of the understanding of how outside directors
can be incentivized to be effective monitors and protect shareholder value.
5.1.1 Limitations and future research
As highlighted in each chapter of this thesis, there are significant additions to the
research on director reputation and the importance of individual outside directors.
Most notably, with the introduction of a new tool to identify some of the most
reputable directors and study how their selection and presence affects firm outcomes.
However, the research also points out certain limitations of this research and avenues
for future research.
Endogeneity is a concern for all empirical research that aims to uncover relation-
ships between director- and board-level variables and firm outcomes (Hermalin and
Weisbach, 1998; Hermalin et al., 2003). Endogeneity is less of a concern for event
study (Chapter 2) and in relation to specific firm outcomes (Chapter 4). Neverthe-
less, these empirical set-ups are not perfect remedies and uncovered relationships or
associations have to be interpreted carefully. However, this is a limitation that is in
no way specific to this thesis and applies to (almost) all empirical research in this
area.
The research and findings presented throughout this thesis are based on an inves-
tigation on the largest public firms in the US, the S&P 1500. The use of this dataset
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is motivated by practical consideration such as data availability and coverage of the
board of directors. However, it is important to keep in mind that the S&P 1500 does
not represent the entire population of US firms. It does not cover smaller public
firms or any kind of private entity. While large US firms are often in the focus of
investors and the media, they cannot be considered representative of all firms.
Moreover, the majority of corporate finance research is carried out using US
data. Using US data has significant advantages in terms of data coverage, depth
and accuracy. However, focussing on other large countries such as the UK, Japan
and other large western European countries offers the potential for out of sample
validation and the comparison of different governance and legal frameworks.
A further limitation in this respect, however, is the lack of comparable CEO
awards in other countries. Extending the thesis to cover to cover non-US data
would offer the opportunity to test different hypotheses around director reputation
in different countries.
A limitation more specific to the methodology employed throughout this thesis
is that it only applies to a small subset of outside directors. While this approach
also has advantages, it does not allow us to design a measure or construct tests of
director reputation in general. However, the same limitation applies to the existing
studies in this area (Masulis and Mobbs, 2011, 2014; Jiang et al., 2015).
Despite the scope and contributions of the research, avenues for future research
exist. First, the introduced methodology could be applied and tested in additional
contexts such as CEO compensation or CEO turnover. It is possible that the influ-
ence of CEO award winners extends to other important board functions.
Second, future research could aim to identify suitable instruments or other sta-
tistical tests that allow for causal inference. This would add further robustness to
the results and address the aforementioned endogeneity concerns. However, suitable
instruments and natural quasi-experiments are difficult to identify.
Third, it would be interesting to extend the thesis to include director awards
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and compare investor reactions to the appointments of director award winners to
those of CEO award winners. This would allow us to better understand whether the
award itself, or the award in connection with the CEO position is what investors
react to. To date, the existing sample of director awards is too small and the period
in which they have been awarded too short.
Finally, it would be interesting to study how competitors react to the appoint-
ment of high-profile directors. It is likely that the direct competitor will feel pressure
to appoint equally well-known and reputable directors. Again, it is not clear whether
a competition for reputable directors is in the best interest of the shareholder.
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Appendix A
Variable Definition
Outside director appointments are collected through LexisNexis, accounting data
are from Compustat and stock return data are from CRSP. Additional information
is collected from NNDB and Who’s Who in Finance and Business.
Variable Definition Data source
Panel A: Awards
First Award An indicator variable equal to 1 if the
director has won an award at the time
of appointment.
CEO awards; Lexis-
Nexis
Total Number Awards The total number of awards the director
wins throughout his or her career.
CEO awards
Panel B: Director characteristics
CEO An indicator variable equal to 1 if the
director is a CEO at the time of ap-
pointment
NNDB; Who’s Who in
Finance and Business,
Execucomp
Other Chief Executive An indicator variable equal to 1 if the
director is a chief executive other than
CEO at the time of appointment
NNDB; Who’s Who in
Finance and Business;
Execucomp
Other Executive An indicator variable equal to 1 if the
director holds a non-chief executive po-
sition at the time of appointment
NNDB; Who’s Who in
Finance and Business;
Execucomp
Retired An indicator variable equal to 1 if the
director is retired at the time of the ap-
pointment.
NNDB; Who’s Who in
Finance and Business;
Execucomp
Female An indicator variable equal to 1 if the
director is female
NNDB; Who’s Who in
Finance and Business
Founder/CoFounder An indicator variable equal to 1 if the
director is a founder or co-founder of a
publicly traded company
NNDB; Who’s Who in
Finance and Business
International Appoint-
ment
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the
director’s primary work is outside the
United States.
NNDB; Who’s Who in
Finance and Business
Number of Board Seats Number of outside board seats director
held at time of appointment
LexisNexis, NNDB,
Bloomberg Business-
week, RiskMetrics
More Than 4 Board
Seats
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the
director held more than 4 outside board
seats at the time of appointment.
LexisNexis, NNDB,
Bloomberg Business-
week, RiskMetrics
Ph.D/J.D./M.D. An indicator variable equal to 1 if the
director has a Ph.D, J.D. or M.D.
NNDB; Who’s Who in
Finance and Business
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Variable Definition Data source
Ivy League An indicator variable equal to 1 if the
director has completed at least parts of
his or her education at an ivy league
institution
NNDB; Who’s Who in
Finance and Business
Panel C: Appointing and appointee firm characteristics
Assets ($M) Total assets. Compustat
Market Capitalization Market capitalization. CRSP
Market-to-Book Market capitalization over book equity. CRSP; Compustat
R&D Expense R&D expenditure over lagged assets.
Missing values are substituted with ze-
ros unless indicated.
Compustat
ROA Operating income before depreciation
over lagged assets.
Compustat
Additional results
Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity
This table reports collinearity diagnostics such as the variance inflation factor (VIF), the square root of the variance
inflation factor (SQRT VIF), tolerance, and the R2.
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R2
CEO 1.75 1.32 0.5722 0.4278
First Award 1.46 1.21 0.6839 0.3161
Total Number Awards 1.11 1.06 0.8977 0.1023
Other Chief Executive 1.28 1.13 0.7812 0.2188
Other Executive 1.67 1.29 0.5976 0.4024
Founder/CoFounder 1.12 1.06 0.8949 0.1051
Female 1.22 1.11 0.8179 0.1821
Number of Board Seats 1.12 1.06 0.8905 0.1095
Ph.D./J.D./M.D. 1.03 1.01 0.9716 0.0284
Ivy League 1.06 1.03 0.9433 0.0567
International Appointment 1.08 1.04 0.9291 0.0709
LN(Assets) 1.21 1.10 0.8288 0.1712
Market-to-Book 1.32 1.15 0.7567 0.2433
R&D Expense 1.63 1.28 0.6139 0.3861
ROA 3.48 1.87 0.2873 0.7127
ROA(t− 1) 3.34 1.83 0.2997 0.7003
Mean VIF 1.56
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Additional descriptives: Alpha and beta
Alpha and beta: Additional descriptives
This table reports reports descriptive statistics for alpha and beta based on 1 year of trading data prior to the direc-
tor appointment. The table reports the number of observations, mean, median, variance, minimum and maximum,
the range and the 75th and 90th percentile.
Beta Alpha
Observations 432 432
Mean 1.0511 0.0003
Median 1.0104 0.0003
Variance 0.2454 0.0000
Min -0.2843 -0.0047
Max 3.7021 0.0096
Range 3.9864 0.0143
P75 1.2975 0.009
P90 1.5662 0.0017
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Alpha and beta coefficients
Beta coefficients
This table reports individual beta coefficients estimated using 1 year of trading data prior to the director appoint-
ment.
ID Date Beta Alpha ID Date Beta Alpha ID Date Beta Alpha
1 2003-10-15 0.67 0.00 51 2002-02-25 1.01 0.00 101 2008-05-28 1.02 0.00
2 2007-03-13 1.16 0.00 52 2005-03-10 1.44 0.00 102 1995-07-24 1.88 0.00
3 2007-07-24 1.34 0.00 53 1997-12-02 0.74 0.00 103 1997-03-26 0.86 0.00
4 2007-01-29 0.39 0.00 54 2003-07-05 #N/A #N/A 104 1998-07-09 -0.28 0.00
5 2013-02-19 1.30 0.00 55 2002-08-12 0.87 0.00 105 1988-11-10 1.24 0.00
6 2008-03-11 0.98 0.00 56 2002-01-25 0.04 0.00 106 2002-02-19 0.33 0.00
7 1985-02-26 1.20 0.00 57 2005-10-06 1.00 0.00 107 1993-02-22 #N/A #N/A
8 1989-02-17 0.91 0.00 58 2007-08-21 0.90 0.00 108 1993-08-12 1.53 0.00
9 1992-08-26 0.56 0.00 59 2009-09-28 1.28 0.00 109 2003-11-06 1.24 0.00
10 1999-12-22 1.70 0.00 60 1988-12-20 1.56 0.00 110 2005-02-22 1.54 0.00
11 2004-12-17 1.40 0.00 61 1988-12-21 1.46 0.00 111 2007-02-28 1.01 0.00
12 2005-11-22 1.07 0.00 62 1995-09-15 0.72 0.00 112 2011-11-16 0.85 0.00
13 2007-04-24 0.91 0.00 63 1987-06-04 1.16 0.00 113 2006-08-29 1.48 0.00
14 2013-07-31 1.52 0.00 64 2003-06-18 1.57 0.00 114 1995-01-26 0.79 0.00
15 1996-08-14 1.31 0.00 65 2011-03-17 1.42 0.00 115 2004-04-26 0.43 0.00
16 2000-09-26 0.53 0.00 66 2002-02-01 0.22 0.00 116 2002-06-13 1.23 0.00
17 1998-07-06 1.29 0.00 67 2012-07-20 1.09 0.00 117 1986-04-16 1.80 0.00
18 2008-01-07 1.28 0.00 68 1998-01-28 #N/A #N/A 118 1989-10-04 0.83 0.00
19 2008-01-17 0.39 0.00 69 1999-10-28 0.40 0.00 119 1992-08-13 0.75 0.00
20 2000-12-07 0.85 0.00 70 2014-11-05 1.41 0.00 120 1996-09-25 0.82 0.00
21 2001-01-03 0.73 0.00 71 2007-07-17 1.23 0.00 121 1995-06-13 1.66 0.00
22 2000-08-15 1.64 0.00 72 2002-05-01 1.35 0.00 122 1996-09-03 #N/A #N/A
23 2001-04-20 0.83 0.00 73 2011-10-25 0.71 0.00 123 1999-01-06 #N/A #N/A
24 2006-07-20 0.72 0.00 74 1997-06-06 0.61 0.00 124 2002-01-08 1.10 0.00
25 1997-10-15 0.46 0.00 75 1998-11-11 1.17 0.00 125 2002-05-03 1.09 0.00
26 2004-12-14 0.31 0.00 76 2007-01-18 1.18 0.00 126 2003-06-09 1.25 0.00
27 2011-06-08 1.12 0.00 77 2010-03-29 #N/A #N/A 127 2005-12-22 1.23 0.00
28 2012-03-20 1.04 0.00 78 2008-11-12 2.58 0.00 128 2015-04-08 1.09 0.00
29 1999-01-12 0.98 0.00 79 1987-06-18 1.43 0.00 129 2011-09-29 0.92 0.00
30 2003-11-25 0.44 0.00 80 1990-11-01 1.49 0.00 130 1998-08-05 0.68 0.00
31 2001-01-31 -0.03 0.00 81 1990-03-12 1.49 0.00 131 2002-08-07 1.31 0.00
32 2004-10-13 1.35 0.00 82 1991-01-22 0.52 0.00 132 2008-12-08 0.65 0.00
33 2002-02-15 1.25 0.00 83 1992-08-17 0.95 0.00 133 1998-01-27 0.66 0.00
34 2004-01-27 1.01 0.00 84 1990-11-02 0.63 0.00 134 2014-03-19 1.16 0.00
35 1994-03-23 1.07 0.00 85 1997-07-21 0.81 0.00 135 2003-01-30 0.59 0.00
36 2004-09-02 0.76 0.00 86 1999-02-24 0.70 0.00 136 2002-03-18 1.31 0.00
37 2007-12-12 1.20 0.00 87 2000-09-20 0.40 0.00 137 1991-01-18 0.88 0.00
38 2000-05-08 0.60 0.00 88 2004-11-16 1.10 0.00 138 1993-09-24 0.95 0.00
39 2002-05-30 0.39 0.00 89 1992-11-03 1.12 0.00 139 2001-07-17 0.52 0.00
40 2015-02-10 0.87 0.00 90 1992-02-26 0.85 0.00 140 1999-07-29 0.62 0.00
41 1993-04-26 2.13 0.00 91 1993-01-13 1.23 0.00 141 1999-03-05 0.86 0.00
42 1979-06-22 2.96 0.00 92 2003-04-22 0.90 0.00 142 2004-05-13 0.59 0.00
43 1980-11-05 0.67 0.00 93 1993-10-20 0.82 0.00 143 2005-01-12 1.09 0.00
44 1987-04-24 1.22 0.00 94 2002-03-25 0.94 0.00 144 2002-07-17 2.30 0.00
45 1993-12-14 1.07 0.00 95 1996-06-05 0.79 0.00 145 2010-03-19 1.46 0.00
46 1994-02-01 0.75 0.00 96 1987-07-21 0.95 0.00 146 1989-07-25 1.37 0.00
47 1986-05-05 0.71 0.01 97 1989-05-25 1.24 0.00 147 1991-11-04 0.85 0.00
48 1997-10-30 0.61 0.00 98 2005-04-08 0.73 0.00 148 1998-01-20 1.22 0.00
49 2000-03-06 0.75 0.00 99 1988-09-28 0.99 0.00 149 1996-09-16 0.73 0.00
50 2000-04-13 0.25 0.00 100 1990-11-06 1.14 0.00 150 2001-01-17 0.99 0.00
153
Beta coefficients
This table reports individual beta coefficients estimated using 1 year of trading data prior to the director appoint-
ment.
ID Date Beta Alpha ID Date Beta Alpha ID Date Beta Alpha
151 1999-06-22 0.54 0.00 201 1994-02-04 1.05 0.00 251 2010-03-16 2.40 0.00
152 1981-02-20 0.48 0.00 202 1994-04-26 0.96 0.00 252 2010-09-20 0.68 0.00
153 1997-09-12 1.50 0.00 203 1995-02-21 #N/A #N/A 253 1991-05-20 0.25 0.00
154 1998-12-03 0.88 0.00 204 1999-11-09 1.72 0.00 254 1999-07-30 0.86 0.00
155 1999-03-08 0.93 0.00 205 2005-08-29 0.71 0.00 255 1992-10-30 1.25 0.00
156 2005-09-15 1.24 0.00 206 2001-03-01 0.10 0.00 256 1999-09-14 1.19 0.00
157 2002-01-14 1.38 0.01 207 2003-07-25 0.71 0.00 257 2001-09-18 3.70 0.00
158 1999-03-29 0.93 0.00 208 2007-07-26 1.22 0.00 258 2001-02-14 1.02 0.00
159 1995-02-03 1.25 0.00 209 1984-01-31 1.16 0.00 259 2004-03-09 0.97 0.00
160 1995-08-08 0.68 0.00 210 1985-03-22 0.98 0.00 260 1995-08-08 0.98 0.00
161 1996-10-07 0.76 0.00 211 2002-02-05 0.97 0.00 261 1986-04-03 2.01 0.00
162 2011-01-25 1.10 0.00 212 2000-04-17 1.21 0.00 262 1993-11-19 0.64 0.00
163 2007-12-06 1.82 0.00 213 1999-02-11 1.59 0.00 263 1999-09-08 1.33 0.00
164 1977-03-14 1.14 0.00 214 2005-08-04 0.78 0.00 264 1995-10-25 1.30 0.00
165 1992-08-25 1.74 0.00 215 2005-12-22 1.37 0.00 265 1985-07-11 1.27 0.00
166 1986-06-12 1.23 0.00 216 2002-04-16 1.15 0.00 266 1990-12-19 1.17 0.00
167 1995-09-21 1.28 0.00 217 2003-11-06 0.38 0.00 267 1999-03-22 1.63 0.00
168 2005-02-17 0.86 0.00 218 2012-02-07 1.03 0.00 268 2001-10-01 1.55 0.00
169 1989-03-02 1.06 0.00 219 2013-10-22 1.52 0.00 269 2005-04-21 1.22 0.00
170 1991-01-24 0.99 0.00 220 2002-06-12 2.47 0.00 270 2011-02-28 #N/A #N/A
171 1997-11-07 0.44 0.00 221 2006-09-27 1.53 0.00 271 2001-02-06 1.23 0.00
172 2002-04-03 1.52 0.00 222 2006-12-07 0.86 0.00 272 2013-11-06 1.15 0.00
173 2001-08-10 0.55 0.00 223 2000-01-13 0.95 0.00 273 2006-06-26 1.06 0.00
174 2002-01-03 0.51 0.00 224 2000-01-26 1.61 0.00 274 2003-08-01 0.29 0.00
175 1997-03-11 1.15 0.00 225 1992-09-21 1.41 0.00 275 2016-01-12 #N/A #N/A
176 2000-05-11 1.85 0.00 226 1995-02-21 0.82 0.00 276 1991-02-28 0.62 0.00
177 2010-03-26 0.39 0.00 227 1998-09-24 0.68 0.00 277 1995-08-03 2.20 0.00
178 1995-11-21 0.97 0.00 228 2014-11-25 0.80 0.00 278 2004-11-17 2.69 0.00
179 1998-08-26 1.02 0.00 229 1995-03-21 1.69 0.00 279 2010-09-24 0.53 0.00
180 1999-09-29 0.67 0.00 230 2001-05-04 1.95 0.00 280 2014-03-10 1.54 0.00
181 2001-11-19 0.62 0.00 231 2008-05-28 0.76 0.00 281 2000-05-24 0.44 0.00
182 2011-01-13 #N/A #N/A 232 1994-12-02 0.88 0.00 282 2006-02-06 1.70 0.00
183 2011-04-05 #N/A #N/A 233 1997-11-03 0.66 0.00 283 2007-01-16 1.11 0.00
184 1997-09-30 0.60 0.00 234 1992-07-08 1.47 0.00 284 2014-09-22 0.70 0.00
185 1994-03-14 1.19 0.00 235 1995-05-04 0.72 0.00 285 2006-12-21 0.83 0.00
186 1998-01-22 1.87 0.00 236 1998-10-19 1.43 0.00 286 2013-02-01 0.61 0.00
187 2000-02-18 2.05 0.00 237 2008-11-19 0.97 0.00 287 2006-05-08 0.72 0.00
188 1995-11-09 0.95 0.00 238 1988-09-28 0.65 0.00 288 2003-09-02 1.99 0.01
189 1999-10-26 -0.08 0.00 239 1992-05-14 0.62 0.00 289 1995-08-01 0.95 0.00
190 1992-09-29 1.54 0.00 240 1998-10-27 1.13 0.00 290 1996-08-05 0.97 0.00
191 1999-10-12 0.91 0.01 241 1987-05-13 1.51 0.00 291 2002-06-10 0.61 0.00
192 2009-11-18 1.79 0.01 242 1993-10-26 1.24 0.00 292 1989-04-19 1.13 0.00
193 1984-03-20 0.50 0.00 243 2000-10-17 3.26 0.01 293 1993-10-21 1.33 0.00
194 1992-03-10 0.93 0.00 244 1993-12-09 0.52 0.00 294 1998-08-28 #N/A #N/A
195 2000-06-22 #N/A #N/A 245 1999-01-28 0.60 0.00 295 2011-03-16 1.52 0.00
196 2004-01-08 0.87 0.00 246 2003-10-06 1.37 0.00 296 1999-10-04 1.12 0.00
197 2007-09-20 0.59 0.00 247 2007-03-02 0.86 0.00 297 2005-07-20 0.71 0.00
198 2000-05-19 2.39 0.00 248 2003-03-26 1.46 0.00 298 1992-07-29 1.21 0.00
199 2004-06-01 1.41 0.00 249 1995-06-28 0.48 0.00 299 1995-02-01 0.83 0.00
200 1990-02-05 0.83 0.00 250 1996-06-25 0.43 0.00 300 1997-02-12 #N/A #N/A
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Beta coefficients
This table reports individual beta coefficients estimated using 1 year of trading data prior to the director appoint-
ment.
ID Date Beta Alpha ID Date Beta Alpha ID Date Beta Alpha
301 1998-07-30 1.02 0.00 351 1991-05-06 1.32 0.00 401 1989-10-19 1.12 0.00
302 1999-07-29 1.10 0.00 352 1989-07-10 1.01 0.00 402 2006-07-26 1.49 0.00
303 2006-12-19 #N/A #N/A 353 1994-09-30 0.66 0.00 403 2010-02-12 0.44 0.00
304 2013-12-16 0.88 0.00 354 2000-02-23 0.66 0.00 404 1983-12-21 1.36 0.00
305 2015-04-13 0.94 0.00 355 2000-01-20 0.32 0.00 405 2002-05-21 2.81 0.00
306 1991-09-23 1.34 0.00 356 2014-08-08 0.53 0.00 406 2006-06-14 0.94 0.00
307 1997-07-08 0.70 0.00 357 1997-10-30 1.17 0.00 407 1999-12-07 0.39 0.00
308 2007-02-23 1.63 0.00 358 2003-04-02 0.50 0.00 408 2000-10-12 0.42 0.00
309 1993-03-15 1.82 0.00 359 2011-06-20 1.25 0.00 409 2009-10-08 0.75 0.00
310 1995-05-15 #N/A #N/A 360 2008-05-30 1.31 0.00 410 1992-09-25 0.63 0.00
311 1990-01-02 0.84 0.00 361 1998-07-21 0.93 0.00 411 2003-05-20 0.61 0.00
312 2002-07-29 1.47 0.00 362 1998-07-29 1.20 0.00 412 1985-02-05 0.59 0.00
313 2004-03-04 1.16 0.00 363 1999-11-30 0.73 0.00 413 1985-08-07 1.03 0.00
314 1994-03-23 0.55 0.00 364 1999-11-02 1.21 0.00 414 1986-10-16 0.63 0.00
315 1999-10-06 #N/A #N/A 365 1997-01-27 1.37 0.00 415 1989-07-19 #N/A #N/A
316 1988-02-09 0.82 0.00 366 2000-03-22 1.50 0.00 416 1997-11-18 0.25 0.00
317 1997-12-11 0.60 0.00 367 1989-02-14 1.01 0.00 417 1996-08-08 0.64 0.00
318 2001-05-08 1.31 0.00 368 2012-05-03 0.78 0.00 418 1998-01-28 0.96 0.00
319 1990-05-09 1.22 0.00 369 1993-11-24 1.55 0.00 419 1992-04-27 0.53 0.00
320 1998-07-27 1.18 0.00 370 1995-01-30 0.99 0.00 420 1983-08-05 0.46 0.00
321 2008-12-17 1.40 0.00 371 1997-09-22 0.85 0.00 421 2000-07-27 0.70 0.00
322 1996-03-13 1.20 0.00 372 1999-12-03 0.53 0.00 422 2000-10-30 0.40 0.00
323 2000-03-08 1.93 0.00 373 2002-11-18 1.68 0.00 423 1989-04-25 1.06 0.00
324 1995-10-15 #N/A #N/A 374 1996-04-12 1.06 0.00 424 1998-07-29 1.02 0.00
325 1998-11-03 0.66 0.00 375 1999-09-09 1.55 0.00 425 1993-05-26 1.04 0.00
326 2005-03-01 2.26 0.00 376 2005-11-29 1.22 0.00 426 2002-12-18 1.17 0.00
327 2013-02-04 1.46 0.00 377 2000-11-16 0.40 0.00 427 2005-05-25 0.95 0.00
328 1994-10-18 1.20 0.00 378 2007-03-15 1.03 0.00 428 1992-04-20 0.78 0.00
329 1993-05-12 1.21 0.00 379 2007-05-30 0.92 0.00 429 1998-12-04 0.58 0.00
330 1996-11-06 1.02 0.00 380 1996-02-05 0.95 0.00 430 1995-02-03 1.07 0.00
331 2005-01-19 1.70 0.00 381 2003-02-05 0.78 0.00 431 1998-04-23 1.08 0.00
332 2011-11-15 0.75 0.00 382 2007-12-04 1.03 0.00 432 1987-11-12 1.06 0.00
333 2002-07-22 1.41 0.00 383 1998-12-16 0.14 0.00
334 2008-05-15 1.04 0.00 384 1983-07-13 0.74 0.00
335 1983-11-22 0.59 0.00 385 1988-05-18 0.79 0.00
336 1986-01-06 1.30 0.00 386 2000-03-31 1.36 0.00
337 1990-02-22 1.60 0.00 387 1999-03-01 0.81 0.00
338 1994-02-03 2.04 0.00 388 1987-01-27 0.89 0.00
339 1995-01-10 1.13 0.00 389 1998-05-15 0.73 0.00
340 2000-09-18 0.15 0.00 390 2001-04-04 0.72 0.00
341 2007-10-29 1.03 0.00 391 2003-04-25 1.26 0.00
342 2004-01-22 0.99 0.00 392 2005-06-17 1.39 0.00
343 2005-06-10 0.95 0.00 393 1992-04-07 0.50 0.00
344 2009-10-21 1.56 0.00 394 2003-03-11 0.76 0.00
345 2003-11-05 1.01 0.00 395 2009-10-26 0.79 0.00
346 1995-07-26 0.37 0.00 396 1992-07-16 2.17 0.00
347 2000-02-01 0.81 0.00 397 1998-01-28 1.10 0.00
348 1985-04-23 1.28 0.00 398 2000-09-21 0.34 0.00
349 1989-02-02 1.49 0.00 399 1987-07-15 #N/A #N/A
350 1989-11-30 1.12 0.00 400 1989-07-20 1.49 0.00
155
Alternative abnormal return calculation: Market-adjusted
CARs
Market-adjusted CARs: Full Sample
This table reports regression results with the 3-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return associated with
an outside director appointment as dependent variable. The sample consists of 432 outside director appointments
of 238 individual directors from 1977 to 2015. t− statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors cor-
rected for heteroskedasticity and director-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels.
CAR[-1,1]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CEO × First Award 0.0190∗∗ 0.0182∗∗ 0.0184∗∗ 0.0184∗∗ 0.0188∗∗
(2.53) (2.43) (2.41) (2.40) (2.46)
CEO -0.0135∗ -0.0133∗ -0.0132∗ -0.0135∗ -0.0140∗
(-1.89) (-1.85) (-1.84) (-1.87) (-1.96)
First Award -0.0113∗ -0.0103 -0.0102 -0.0102 -0.0107
(-1.73) (-1.57) (-1.54) (-1.53) (-1.64)
Total Number Awards -0.00182 -0.00173 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018
(-0.81) (-0.73) (-0.78) (-0.78) (-0.78)
Other Chief Executive 0.00170 0.00108 0.00127 0.0014 0.0016
(0.17) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15)
Other Executive -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.0210∗∗∗ -0.0209∗∗∗ -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0205∗∗∗
(-3.12) (-3.24) (-3.21) (-3.20) (-3.18)
Female -0.0155∗∗∗ -0.0160∗∗∗ -0.0162∗∗∗ -0.0164∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗
(-2.64) (-2.63) (-2.60) (-2.59) (-2.64)
Founder/CoFounder -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0018
(-0.17) (-0.21) (-0.20) (-0.22)
International Appointment 0.0008 0.0012 0.0015 0.0013
(0.11) (0.16) (0.20) (0.18)
Number of Board Seats -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0013
(-0.84) (-0.93) (-0.89)
More Than 4 Board Seats -0.0067
(-1.47)
Ph.D./J.D./M.D. -0.0041 -0.0040 -0.0041
(-0.79) (-0.78) (-0.79)
Ivy League 0.0016 0.0019 0.0019
(0.38) (0.44) (0.42)
Industry CEO 0.0042 0.0038
(0.43) (0.38)
LN(Assets) -0.00133 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0014
(-1.30) (-1.32) (-1.34) (-1.27) (-1.32)
Market-to-Book -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009
(-1.34) (-1.43) (-1.42) (-1.43) (-1.45)
R&D Expense -0.0057 -0.0043 -0.0034 -0.0032 -0.0047
(-0.26) (-0.20) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.21)
ROA 0.0705∗ 0.0710∗ 0.0698∗ 0.0703∗ 0.0723∗
(1.74) (1.72) (1.70) (1.71) (1.78)
ROA(t−1) -0.0265 -0.0263 -0.0254 -0.0249 -0.0276
(-0.63) (-0.61) (-0.59) (-0.57) (-0.64)
Intercept 0.0281∗∗ 0.0306∗∗ 0.0310∗∗ 0.0303∗∗ 0.0298∗∗
(2.30) (2.47) (2.50) (2.42) (2.41)
Observations 398 398 398 398 398
R2 0.060 0.062 0.063 0.064 0.066
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Market-adjusted CARs: CEO director appointment
This table reports regression results with the 3-day cumulative abnormal return associated with an outside director
appointment as dependent variable. The sample consists of 432 outside director appointments of 238 individual di-
rectors from 1977 to 2015. t−statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedas-
ticity and director-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
CAR[-1,1]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Award 0.0087∗∗ 0.0090∗∗ 0.0093∗∗ 0.0094∗∗
(2.00) (2.02) (2.07) (2.06)
Total Number Awards -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019
(-0.65) (-0.67) (-0.69) (-0.69)
Female -0.0201 -0.0204 -0.0208 -0.0211
(-1.34) (-1.36) (-1.36) (-1.36)
Founder/CoFounder 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.00) (-0.03) (-0.06) (-0.05)
International Appointment 0.0047 0.0038 0.0038 0.0042
(0.50) (0.39) (0.38) (0.41)
Number of Board Seats -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0012
(-0.69) (-0.67) (-0.63)
Ph.D./J.D./M.D. -0.0055 -0.0055
(-0.92) (-0.91)
Ivy League 0.0004 0.0008
(0.08) (0.14)
IndustryCEO 0.0031
(0.29)
LN(Assets) -0.0025∗ -0.0025∗ -0.0025∗ -0.0025∗
(-1.85) (-1.81) (-1.83) (-1.73)
Market-to-Book -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0013
(-1.52) (-1.58) (-1.53) (-1.51)
R&D Expense -0.0105 -0.0085 -0.0072 -0.0083
(-0.25) (-0.21) (-0.17) (-0.20)
ROA 0.0612 0.0613 0.0599 0.0600
(1.41) (1.39) (1.38) (1.36)
ROA(t−1) -0.0334 -0.0317 -0.0309 -0.0295
(-0.75) (-0.69) (-0.67) (-0.62)
Intercept 0.0284∗ 0.0309∗ 0.0315∗ 0.0304∗
(1.82) (1.88) (1.90) (1.74)
Observations 237 237 237 237
R2 0.053 0.055 0.057 0.058
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Alternative event window specification: (0,2) and (0,3)
Alternative event windows
This table reports regression results with alternative event windwos. We report 3-day (0,2) and 4-day (0,3) cumula-
tive abnormal returns associated with an outside director appointment as dependent variable. The sample consists
of 432 outside director appointments of 238 individual directors from 1977 to 2015. t − statistics given in paren-
theses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and director-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
CAR[0,2] CAR[0,3]
(1) (2)
CEO × First Award 0.0126∗ 0.0149∗
(1.81) (1.95)
CEO -0.0112∗ -0.0135∗
(-1.70) (-1.93)
First Award -0.0079 -0.0063
(-1.39) (-1.07)
Total Number Awards -0.0017 0.0003
(-0.73) (0.14)
Other Chief Executive -0.0032 -0.0048
(-0.40) (-0.62)
Other Executive -0.0194∗∗∗ -0.0231∗∗∗
(-3.41) (-3.67)
Female -0.0130∗∗ -0.0088
(-2.60) (-1.53)
Founder/CoFounder 0.0141∗ 0.0145
(1.80) (1.62)
International Appointment 0.0100∗ 0.0097
(1.77) (1.36)
More Than 4 Board Seats -0.0082∗ -0.0155∗∗∗
(-1.84) (-2.86)
Ph.D./J.D./M.D. -0.0002 -0.0039
(-0.03) (-0.78)
Ivy League 0.0036 0.0095∗
(0.79) (1.79)
Industry CEO 0.0058 0.0072
(0.63) (0.64)
LN(Assets) -0.0004 -0.0006
(-0.51) (-0.63)
Market-to-Book -0.0018∗∗∗ -0.0026∗∗∗
(-3.42) (-3.89)
R&D Expense -0.0020 -0.0040
(-0.11) (-0.19)
ROA 0.0314 0.0934∗∗∗
(0.80) (2.76)
ROA(t−1) 0.0259 -0.0244
(0.63) (-0.59)
Intercept 0.0183 0.0181
(1.65) (1.49)
Observations 398 398
R2 0.088 0.118
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Female directors
Female directors: Additional descriptives
This table reports additional statistics on the cumulative abnormal return for female directors. The 3-day cumula-
tive abnormal return is estimated using 1 year of trading data. Column (1) reports results for the overall sample,
column (2) reports results for female directors and results for all non-female directors are reported in column (3).
Overall Female directors All non-female directors
(1) (2) (3)
Mean 0.0031 -0.0135 0.0048
Median 0.0018 -0.0135 0.0025
Variance 0.0014 0.0013 0.0014
Max 0.1324 0.0880 0.1324
Min -0.0936 -0.0916 -0.0936
P75 0.0192 0.0117 0.0217
P90 0.0492 0.0228 0.0515
Observations 432 38 394
Female directors: Individual announcement returns
This table reports mean and median cumulative abnormal returns using 1 year of trading data for all female direc-
tors in our sample.
ID Observations Mean Median
8 2 -0.0383 -0.0383
9 1 -0.0190 -0.0190
21 1 -0.0384 -0.0384
22 2 -0.0144 -0.0144
23 2 0.0305 0.0305
29 5 -0.0015 0.0018
30 1 -0.0250 -0.0250
45 1 0.0228 0.0228
59 2 0.0030 0.0030
86 1 -0.0491 -0.0491
99 2 0.0105 0.0105
114 1 -0.0111 -0.0111
119 1 0.1324 0.1324
126 3 -0.0148 -0.0199
127 2 -0.0308 -0.0308
128 3 -0.0035 0.0117
144 1 -0.0407 -0.0407
151 1 0.0222 0.0222
167 2 -0.0526 -0.0526
197 3 -0.0110 -0.0334
212 3 -0.0132 -0.0153
Total 38 -0.0098 -0.0114
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Long-term pre-appointment performance: Fama-French 3-
factor model
Long-term firm performance before director appointments
This table reports results from Fama-French (FF) three factor regressions to detect abnormal returns around out-
side director appointments. This table specifically looks at the pre-appointment period. Panel A reports results for
the 12-month, Panel B for the 24-month and Panel C for the 36-month pre-appointment period. RMRF is the dif-
ference between monthly stock return portfolio and 91-day T-bill rate. SMB is the difference between the returns of
small size firm portfolios and large size firm portfolios. HML is the difference between the returns of value firm port-
folios and growth firm portfolios. We use the weighted least square (WLS) technique in the value-weight portfolio
analysis, in which the square root of the number of firms in each month is used as the weight in the regression model.
The “Alpha” value reported in the regression model indicates the monthly average abnormal return of the sample.
t− statistics given in parentheses and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Factors Model Characteristics
Alpha RMRF SMB HML Adj. R2 F-stat
Panel A : Event window -12-0 (month)
All appointments 0.0053∗∗∗ 1.0591∗∗∗ 0.2693∗∗∗ 0.0138 0.6859 317.61∗∗∗
(N = 420) (3.25) (26.67) (5.66) (0.25)
CEO appointments 0.0059∗∗∗ 1.0162∗∗∗ 0.1692∗∗∗ -0.0941∗ 0.6000 211.53∗∗∗
(N = 244) (3.19) (21.12) (3.06) (-1.40)
Award-winner appointment 0.0056∗∗∗ 1.1643∗∗∗ 0.2686∗∗∗ 0.0299 0.6344 201.68∗∗∗
(N = 236) (2.43) (21.43) (4.30) (0.41)
Award-winning CEO appointment 0.0064∗∗ 1.1162∗∗∗ 0.0418 -0.1663∗∗ 0.5278 118.37∗∗∗
(N = 108) (2.24) (15.74) (0.54) (-1.76)
Panel B : Event window -24-0 (month)
All appointments 0.0058∗∗∗ 1.1160∗∗∗ 0.2102∗∗∗ 0.0954∗∗ 0.8001 634.56∗∗∗
(N = 420) (4.83) (39.05) (5.89) (2.31)
CEO appointments 0.0059∗∗∗ 1.1093∗∗∗ 0.1508∗∗∗ 0.0131 0.7573 472.08∗∗∗
(N = 244) (4.32) (33.06) (3.63) (0.27)
Award-winner appointment 0.0050∗∗∗ 1.2073∗∗∗ 0.1915∗∗∗ 0.1048∗∗ 0.7624 411.65∗∗∗
(N = 237) (3.07) (31.84) (4.27) (2.03)
Award-winning CEO appointment 0.0040∗∗ 1.2192∗∗∗ 0.0288 -0.0526 0.7107 308.94∗∗∗
(N = 108) (2.11) (26.91) (0.55) (-0.85 )
Panel C : Event window -36-0 (month)
All appointments 0.0063∗∗∗ 1.1217∗∗∗ 0.1787∗∗∗ 0.1143∗∗∗ 0.8446 893.83∗∗∗
(N = 420) (6.31) (46.97) (5.96) (3.31)
CEO appointments 0.0059∗∗∗ 1.1296∗∗∗ 0.1028∗∗∗ 0.0476 0.8126 687.75∗∗∗
(N = 244) (5.22) (41.08) (2.96) (1.17)
Award-winner appointment 0.0065∗∗∗ 1.2036∗∗∗ 0.1726∗∗∗ 0.1152∗∗∗ 0.7938 509.25∗∗∗
(N = 236) (4.49) (35.63) (4.30) (2.48)
Award-winning CEO appointment 0.0050∗∗∗ 1.2249∗∗∗ 0.0189 0.0017 0.7546 401.84∗∗∗
(N = 108) (3.07) (31.49) (0.41) (0.03)
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Appendix B
Variable Definition
The governance data used in this study are from RiskMetrics, accounting data are
from Compustat, compensation data are from Execucomp, stock return data from
CRSP, and institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters - Institutional (13f)
Holdings.
Variable Definition Data source
Panel A: Award-winning CEO outside director variables
AwCeo outside directors (Number) Number of outside directors who serve
as CEO of another company and have
won a CEO award.
RiskMetrics;
CEO awards
AwCeo outside directors (Dummy) Indicator variable equal to one if firm
has at least one outside director who
serves as CEO of another company and
has won a CEO award.
AwCeo outside directors (Fraction) Fraction of directors who serve as CEO
of another company, have won a CEO
award and are listed as outside director
on the board of director.
Panel B: Performance and governance measures
Tobin’s Q Total assets plus the market value of
equity minus the book value of equity
and deferred taxes over total assets.
Compustat
ROA Operating income before depreciation
over lagged assets.
Compustat
Entrenchment index Entrechment index from Bebchuk et al.
(2009).
RiskMetrics
Panel C: Control variables
Retired AwCeo outside directors (Num-
ber)
Number of outside directors who are re-
tired CEOs of other firms and have won
a CEO award.
RiskMetrics;
CEO awards
Retired AwCeo outside directors
(Dummy)
Indicator variable equal to one if firm
has at least one outside director who is
a retired CEO of another company and
has won a CEO award.
Retired AwCeo outside directors (Frac-
tion)
Fraction of directors who serve are re-
tired CEOs of other companies, have
won a CEO award and are listed as out-
side director on the board of director.
Current CEO award winner An indicator variable equal to one if
a firm’s current CEO has won a CEO
award.
RiskMetrics;
CEO awards
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Variable Definition Data source
Board size Total number of directors on the board. RiskMetrics
Fraction outside directors Fraction of outside directors on the
board.RiskMetrics
R&D expense R&D expenditure over lagged assets.
Missing values are substituted with ze-
ros unless indicated.
Compustat
Capital expenditures Capital expenditures over lagged assets. Compustat
Capital intensity Net property, plant and equipment over
sales.
Compustat
Leverage Long-term debt and debt in current li-
abilities to stockholders’ equity.
Compustat
LN(Sales) Natural logarithm of sales. Compustat
Risk Standard deviation of daily returns. CRSP
Segments Number of Business Segments. Compustat
CEO ownership Is the percentage of common shares
outstanding owned by the CEO.
Execucomp
Panel D: Additional control variables
Firm age Max. years on Compustat or CRSP. Compustat;
CRSP
Fraction female directors Fraction of female directors to total
board size.
RistMetrics
Fraction international directors Fraction of international directors to to-
tal board size.
Blockholder Indicator variable equal to 1 if an insti-
tutional investor owns more than 10%
of the common shares outstanding.
Thomson-
Reuters 13f
Holdings
CEO chair An indicator variable equal to one if the
CEO is also chairman of the board.
Execucomp
Outside directors number of CEO
awards
Total number of CEO awards held by
all outside directors who are currently
serving as CEO of another firm.
RiskMetrics;
CEO awards
ROS Operating income before depreciation
over lagged sales.
Compustat
Market-to-book Market capitalization over book equity. CRSP; Com-
pustat
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Additional Results
CEO directors and firm performance
CEO directors and firm performance
The table below reports regression results where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q and ROA. Tobin’s Q is the
ratio of total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred takes to total
assets. ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation and taxes. AwCEO outside director is the number
of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms and have won a CEO award. We use the number in column (1), an
indicator variable equal to one if the firm has at least one AwCEO outside director in column (2) and the fraction
of AwCEO outside director with respect to the total board size in column (3). All variables are winsorized at 1st
and 99th percentile values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported.
t− statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clus-
tering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Panel A Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3)
CEO outside directors (Number) 0.0106
(1.57)
CEO outside directors (Dummy) 0.0364
(0.85)
CEO outside directors (Fraction) 0.116
(1.60)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23128 23128 23128
R2 0.338 0.338 0.338
Panel B ROA
(1) (2) (3)
CEO outside directors (Number) -0.0010
(-1.55)
CEO outside directors (Dummy) -0.0058
(-1.21)
CEO outside directors (Fraction) -0.0109
(-1.56)
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23239 23239 23239
R2 0.281 0.281 0.281
Firm performance changes around director appointments
In this subsection, we examine long-term performance impacts around director ap-
pointments (Fich, 2005). We collect a total of 8,064 outside director appointments,
3,023 CEO outside director appointments and 264 award-winning CEO outside di-
rector appointments. Again, we focus on our two previous performance measures:
Tobin’s Q and ROA. We report results for mean and median performance changes
all three different types of directors. Moreover, we account for industry effects and
calculate industry-adjusted mean and median performance changes. The industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q, for example, is the difference between Tobin’s Q and the median
163
industry Tobin’s Q, where industry is defined using the Fama-French 48 industry
classifications. Finally, we calculate the respective performance changes across 6
different time windows: (-3,-1), (-1,+1), (-1,+2), (-1,+3), (0,+3) and (+1,+3). We
keep only those observations for which all performance measures can be calculated
across all different time windows. One drawback of this methodology is that it fails
to take into account other major board or company news that took place during this
period and potentially represent an event that is more important than the director
appointment.
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We concentrate on the discussion of the industry-adjusted results because the
results account for cross-sectional industry differences and are thus more likely to be
an accurate representation of performance changes around director appointments.
The performance changes in Tobin’s Q presented in the above table show that per-
formance changes are generally positive around director appointments. In partic-
ular, we find that the changes in Tobin’s Q associated with the appointment of
an award-winning CEO outside director are substantially more positive than those
observed for outside directors or CEO outside directors. This observation supports
our argument that the appointment of an award-winning CEO outside directors is
particularly valuable from a firm’s perspective.
Moreover, in accordance with our main results the analysis reveals positive per-
formance changes around the appointment of award-winning CEO outside directors.
In contrast, the appointment of outside directors or CEO outside directors results
in no significant unadjusted or industry-adjusted performance changes. In particu-
lar, we find significant performance changes in 4 out of 6 time windows. Namely,
the (-1,+2), (-1,+3), (0,+3) and the (+1,+3) event window. We find no positive
performance change in the event window prior to the appointment (-3,-1). This find-
ing further supports our hypothesis because it shows that the positive performance
cannot be attributed to the period prior to the appointment.
Looking at changes in operating performance (ROA) around director appoint-
ments is also in accordance with the results reported in the main analysis. While
we find small performance effects for the unadjusted post-appointment period for
CEO and award-winning CEO outside directors, this effect disappears when we
account for cross-section correlation. Performance changes are uniformly positive
but insignificant. Overall, the results lend strong support to our hypothesis that
award-winning CEO outside directors can help firms realize their growth potential.
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Firm performance around director appointments: Difference-
in-difference approach
In this subsection, we take a different approach to better capture differences in
performance changes between different types of director appointments. We evaluate
performance changes using a difference-in-difference approach (Fahlenbrach et al.,
2010). This approach allows us to design a formal test to compare changes in
performance around director appointments. In order to uncover the biggest possible
contrast, we compare average performance measures for the appointments of outside
director and award-winning CEO outside directors.
Tobin’s Q around director appointments - differences-in-differences
The table below reports long-term performance changes around director appointments using the difference-in-
difference methodology. Firm performance is measured using Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of total assets plus
the market value of equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred takes to total assets. Directors are clas-
sified as outside directors and award-winning CEO outside directors. Performance prior to the appointment is cal-
culated as the average over event years -2 and -3. Performance after the appointment is calculated as the average
over event years +1 through +3. A two-sample t-test is used to determine whether the mean for outside directors
and award-winning CEO outside directors are significantly different. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Type of appointment
Award-winning
Outside Director CEO Director Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Tobin’s Q
Before 1.956 2.399 0.443 ∗∗∗
After 1.791 2.053 0.262 ∗∗∗
Difference -0.181
Type of appointment
Award-winning
Outside Director CEO Director Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B: Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q
Before 0.352 0.643 0.291∗∗∗
After 0.245 0.376 0.131∗
Difference -0.160
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Operating performance around director appointments - differences-in-differences
The table below reports long-term performance changes around director appointments using the difference-in-
difference methodology. Firm performance is measured using ROA. ROA is defined as operating income before
depreciation and taxes. Directors are classified as outside directors and award-winning CEO outside directors. Per-
formance prior to the appointment is calculated as the average over event years -2 and -3. Performance after the
appointment is calculated as the average over event years +1 through +3. A two-sample t-test is used to determine
whether the mean for outside directors and award-winning CEO outside directors are significantly different. ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Type of appointment
Award-winning
Outside Director CEO Director Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: ROA
Before 0.157 0.174 0.017∗∗
After 0.147 0.159 0.012∗
Difference -0.005
Type of appointment
Award-winning
Outside Director CEO Director Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B: Industry-adjusted ROA
Before 0.143 0.158 0.014∗∗
After 0.138 0.149 0.010∗∗
Difference -0.004
Our analysis reveals significant differences in the unadjusted and industry-adjusted
Tobin’s Q before the appointment of an award-winning CEO outside director. The
findings are consistent with the notion that award-winning CEOs join the boards
of firms that have higher Tobin’s Q to being with. The differences between out-
side director appointments and the appointments of award-winning CEO outside
directors is large and economically meaning but seems to diminish over time. The
differences in post-appointment industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q are much smaller and
also less significant.
A similar picture emerges for changes in operating performance around director
appointments. CEO award winners tend to sit on the board of firms that have
performed well before the appointment and continue to perform better after the
appointment, but less so.
However, most importantly there is no indication that there are significant differ-
ences between the pre- and post-appointment performance between the two different
groups of directors.
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Additional results entrenchment index and individual gover-
nance provisions
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Additional results: Award-winning CEO outside directors and the entrenchment
index
The table below reports regression results where the dependent variable is the entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al.,
2009). The index comprises six individual governance provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments.
AwCEO outside director is the number of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms and have won a CEO award.
All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in
all regressions but not reported. t− statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Entrenchment Index
(1) (2) (3)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) -0.0987∗ -0.100∗ -0.102∗
(-1.84) (-1.88) (-1.89)
LN(Board size) 0.249∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(2.86) (2.86) (2.87)
Fraction outside directors 0.372∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(3.11) (3.10) (3.12)
R&D expense 0.467 0.384 0.341
(0.83) (0.68) (0.61)
Capital expenditures -0.509∗ -0.481∗ -0.563∗
(-1.75) (-1.65) (-1.93)
Capital Intensity -0.0395 -0.0470 -0.0366
(-0.68) (-0.80) (-0.63)
Leverage 0.150 0.149 0.166∗
(1.59) (1.57) (1.77)
LN(Sales) 0.0619 0.0630 0.0652
(1.38) (1.41) (1.46)
Risk -0.349∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗
(-3.68) (-3.98) (-3.80)
Tobin’s Q -0.0752∗∗∗
(-4.61)
LN(Tobin’s Q) -0.200∗∗∗
(-4.38)
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q -0.0647∗∗∗
(-3.99)
Segments 0.0208∗ 0.0206∗ 0.0211∗
(1.75) (1.74) (1.78)
CEO ownership 2.640∗∗∗ 2.653∗∗∗ 2.638∗∗∗
(3.45) (3.48) (3.43)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20014 20014 20014
R2 0.026 0.026 0.026
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Additional results: Award-winning CEO outside directors and the entrenchment
index
The table below reports regression results where the dependent variable is the entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al.,
2009). The index comprises six individual governance provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments.
AwCEO outside director is the number of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms and have won a CEO award.
All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in
all regressions but not reported. t− statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Entrenchment Index
(1) (2) (3)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) -0.112∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.111∗∗
(-2.03) (-2.10) (-2.02)
Blockholder -0.0372
(-1.52)
LN(Firm age) 0.147
(1.26)
Fraction female directors 0.0204
(0.10)
Fraction international directors -0.0748∗∗
(-2.22)
LN(Board size) 0.242∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(2.76) (2.57) (2.98)
Fraction outside directors 0.387∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗
(3.24) (3.15) (3.20)
R&D expense 0.356 0.351 0.338
(0.64) (0.63) (0.61)
Capital expenditures -0.308 -0.271 -0.296
(-1.02) (-0.90) (-0.98)
Capital intensity -0.0302 -0.0262 -0.0284
(-0.52) (-0.45) (-0.49)
Leverage 0.172∗ 0.167∗ 0.167∗
(1.81) (1.76) (1.76)
LN(Sales) 0.110∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.111∗∗
(2.40) (2.16) (2.41)
Risk -0.382∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗∗
(-3.99) (-3.80) (-3.92)
ROA(t) -0.475∗∗∗ -0.447∗∗ -0.471∗∗∗
(-2.61) (-2.45) (-2.60)
ROA(t-1) -0.263∗ -0.252∗ -0.257∗
(-1.79) (-1.71) (-1.75)
ROA(t-2) -0.0839 -0.0596 -0.0837
(-0.63) (-0.44) (-0.63)
Segments 0.0219∗ 0.0218∗ 0.0217∗
(1.84) (1.82) (1.82)
CEO ownership 2.632∗∗∗ 2.572∗∗∗ 2.625∗∗∗
(3.43) (3.36) (3.43)
Observations 19941 19941 19941
R2 0.026 0.026 0.026
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Alternative dependent variable: Sales/Assets
Alternative dependent variables and firm performance
The table below reports regression results of our baseline regression using the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q and
the natural logarithm of an industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in Panel A and the Market-to-book ratio and return on
sales (ROS) as an alternative measure of valuation and operational efficiency in Panel B. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of
total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred takes to total assets.
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is calculated as a firm’s Tobin’s Q minus the median industry Tobin’s Q. Industry is
defined using the 48 industry classifications of Fama and French. Market-to-book is market capitalization over book
equity and ROS is operating income before depreciation over lagged sales. AwCEO outside director is the number
of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms and have won a CEO award. All variables are winsorized at 1st
and 99th percentile values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions but not reported.
t− statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clus-
tering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Sales/Assets
(1)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) -0.0167
(-1.23)
LN(Board size) -0.0722∗∗∗
(-3.12)
Fraction outside directors 0.00426
(0.13)
R&D expense 1.117∗∗∗
(6.51)
Capital expenditures 0.0720
(0.81)
Capital intensity -0.267∗∗∗
(-15.33)
Leverage -0.152∗∗∗
(-4.70)
LN(Sales) 0.0754∗∗∗
(5.56)
Risk 0.107∗∗∗
(4.52)
ROA(t) 0.526∗∗∗
(8.84)
ROAt−1 -0.0459
(-1.26)
ROAt−2 -0.0872∗∗∗
(-2.66)
Segments -0.00471∗
(-1.80)
CEO ownership 0.113
(0.62)
Firm FE Yes
Year FE Yes
Observations 23128
R2 0.167
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Missing R&D values
Baseline regression: Missing R&D values
The table below reports regression results of our baseline regression using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. To-
bin’s Q is the ratio of total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred takes
to total assets. AwCEO outside director is the number of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms and have
won a CEO award. We have dropped observations with missing R&D expenditures from the sample. All variables
are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions
but not reported. t − statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity
and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Tobin’s Q
(1)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.138∗∗∗
(3.03)
LN(Board size) -0.068
(-1.23)
Fraction outside directors 0.033
(0.47)
R&D expense 4.489∗∗∗
(6.68)
Capital expenditures 0.319
(1.23)
Capital intensity -0.192∗∗∗
(-5.68)
Leverage -0.497∗∗∗
(-7.35)
LN(Sales) -0.397∗∗∗
(-12.71)
Risk 0.327∗∗∗
(5.71)
ROA(t) 4.414∗∗∗
(24.48)
ROAt−1 0.450∗∗∗
(3.95)
ROAt−2 0.520∗∗∗
(4.91)
Segments -0.018∗∗∗
(-2.70)
CEO Ownership -0.587
(-1.26)
Constant 3.806∗∗∗
(16.63)
Firm FE Yes
Year FE Yes
Observations 22315
R2 0.3452
Additional robustness tests
In this section we provide additional robustness tests. We present results controlling
for outliers and the exclusion of specific industries. To further evaluate whether our
results are driven by observations in the tail of the distributions we compare our
results for the non-winsorized case, a 2.5% winsorization and a 5% winsorization.
We then exclude observations that fall into the top 1% of within-firm standard
deviation among the performance measures and our measure of award-winning CEO
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outside directors. In a second step, we examine whether our results are robust to the
exclusion of certain industries. First, we exclude financial (6000-6999) and utility
(4900-4999) firms and second we exclude technology (7370) firms from the sample.
Robustness to outliers
Robustness: Outliers
The table below reports results for our baseline regression controlling for the effect of outliers in our data. The
dependent variables are Tobin’s Q and ROA. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of total assets plus the market value of equity
minus the book value of equity minus deferred takes to total assets and ROA is defined as operating income before
depreciation and taxes. AwCEO outside director is the number of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms
and have won a CEO award. Panel A presents results based on a non-winsorized sample, Panel B results for a sam-
ple winsorized at the top and bottom 2.5%, Panel C presents results for a sample winsorized at top and bottom
5%. t− statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level
clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Panel A No winsorization
Tobin’s Q ROA
(1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.1600∗∗∗ -0.0022
(2.58) (-0.52)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 23128 23239
R2 0.190 0.207
Panel B Winsorization: 2.5%
Tobin’s Q ROA
(1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.1250∗∗∗ -0.0022
(3.14) (-0.61)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 23128 23239
R2 0.345 0.294
Panel C Winsorization: 5%
Tobin’s Q ROA
(1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.0997∗∗∗ -0.0021
(2.97) (-0.60)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 23128 23239
R2 0.342 0.292
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Robustness: Outliers
The table below reports results for our baseline regression controlling for the effect of outliers in our data. The
dependent variables are Tobin’s Q and ROA. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of total assets plus the market value of equity
minus the book value of equity minus deferred takes to total assets and ROA is defined as operating income before
depreciation and taxes. AwCEO outside director is the number of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms
and have won a CEO award. Panel A for a sample where observations in the top 1% of within-firm standard de-
viation in the performances measures are dropped and Panel B for a sample where observations in the top 1% of
within-firm standard deviation in the award-winning CEO outside director variable are dropped. t−statistics given
in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and
∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Panel A
Standard deviation performance
measures greater than 1%
Tobin’s Q ROA
(1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.1340∗∗∗ -0.0023
(3.04) (-0.60)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 23128 23238
R2 0.339 0.281
Panel B
Standard deviation award-winning CEO
outside director greater than 1%
Tobin’s Q ROA
(1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.1340∗∗∗ -0.0023
(3.04) (-0.60)
Control Variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No
Control Variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 23128 23239
R2 0.339 0.281
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Robustness to exclusion of certain industries
Robustness: Exclusion of certain industries
The table below reports results for our baseline regression excluding financial (6000-6999) and utility (4900-4999)
firms in Panel A and excluding technology firms (7370) in Panel B. The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q and ROA.
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity minus deferred
takes to total assets and ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation and taxes. AwCEO outside direc-
tor is the number of outside directors who are CEOs of other firms and have won a CEO award. All variables are
winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile values and expressed in 2005 dollars. Intercept is included in all regressions
but not reported. t − statistics given in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity
and firm-level clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Panel A Excluding financial (6000-6999)
and utility (4900-4999) firms
Tobin’s Q ROA
(1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.1440∗∗∗ -0.0019
(2.98) (-0.45)
Control variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No
Control variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 18396 18496
R2 0.351 0.308
Panel B Excluding IT (7370) firms
Tobin’s Q ROA
(1) (2)
AwCEO outside directors (Number) 0.1260∗∗∗ -0.0021
(2.83) (-0.54)
Control variables as in Table 3.4 Yes No
Control variables as in Table 3.5 No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 22747 22857
R2 0.336 0.283
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Appendix C
Variable Definition
The governance data are from RiskMetrics, accounting data are from Compustat,
stock return data are from CRSP and M&A data from SDC. The data is for the
period from 1996-2013.
Variable Definition Data source
Acquirer characteristics
Award-winning outside
directors
Number of outside directors who have won a CEO
Award.
RiskMetrics/
CEO Awards
Board size Total number of directors on the board. RiskMetrics
Fraction outside directors Fraction of outside directors on the board. RiskMetrics
Assets Total assets. Compustat
ROA Operating income before depreciation over total as-
sets.
Compustat
Debt-to-assets Short-term and long-term debt over total assets. Compustat
Cash-to-assets Cash over total assets. Compustat
Deal characteristics
Total number of M&A’s Total number of completed M&A’s by bidder in
throughout the sample period.
SDC
Cumulative number of
M&A’s
Cumulative number of completed M&A’s by the bid-
der throughout the sample period.
SDC
Negotiation time The gap between the announcement of the deal com-
pletion and the first public announcement of takeover
negotiations.
SDC
Diversifying Indicator variable: One if acquirer and target are
not from the same industry, zero otherwise. Indus-
tries are defined using the Fama-French 48 industry
classification.
SDC
Tender offer Indicator variable: One for a tender offer, zero oth-
erwise.
SDC
Hostile Indicator variable: One if the bid was hostile, zero
otherwise.
SDC
Cash deal Indicator variable: One if deal was fully financed
with cash, zero otherwise.
SDC
All Cash or Mixed Indicator variable: One if deal is fully or partially
financed with cash.
SDC
Dollar deal value Total dollar value of the deal. SDC
Relative deal value Deal value divided by acquirer’s market value of eq-
uity.
SDC/CRSP
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Additional Results
Equally-weighted long-term calendar-time portfolio results
Long-term M&A performance: Fama-French 3-Factor Regression
This table reports results from Fama-French (FF) three factor regressions to detect abnormal returns. RMRF is
the difference between monthly stock return portfolio and 91-day T-bill rate. SMB is the difference between the
returns of small size firm portfolios and large size firm portfolios. HML is the difference between the returns of
value firm portfolios and growth firm portfolios. We use equal-weight monthly portfolio returns and estimate an
ordinary least square (OLS) model for the 36 months following the acquisition. The “Alpha” value reported in the
regression model indicates the monthly average abnormal return of the sample. Panel A present results for all cases
(N=3,157). Panels B and C present results for “non-overalpping” (N=1,744) and “overlapping” (N=1,413) cases.
If a firm makes an acquisition within three years of a previous acquisition, the cases are considered “overlapping”.
t− statistics given in parentheses and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Factors Model Characteristics
Alpha RMRF SMB HML Adj. R2 F-stat
Panel A: All cases
All bids 0.0010 1.1164∗∗∗ 0.4082∗∗∗ 0.4354∗∗∗ 0.8772 570.33∗∗∗
(N=3157) (0.74) (31.09) (4.24) (7.07)
Award-winning outside directors 0.0003 1.1179∗∗∗ 0.1395∗ 0.3174∗∗∗ 0.7924 299.95∗∗∗
(N=236) (0.15) (25.58) (1.94) (4.24)
No award-winning outside directors 0.0010 1.1163∗∗∗ 0.4268∗∗∗ 0.4456∗∗∗ 0.8755 561.04∗∗∗
(N=2921) (0.75) (30.27) (4.30) (7.13)
Panel B: Non-overlapping cases
All bids 0.0011 1.1351∗∗∗ 0.4251∗∗∗ 0.4275∗∗∗ 0.8844 610.46∗∗∗
(N=1744) (0.83) (32.20) (4.42) (7.17)
Award-winning outside directors -0.0005 1.1324∗∗∗ 0.1864∗∗∗ 0.3065∗∗∗ 0.7974 309.23∗∗∗
(N=144) (-0.25) (23.98) (2.85) (4.19)
No award-winning outside directors 0.0012 1.1341∗∗∗ 0.4451∗∗∗ 0.4404∗∗∗ 0.8813 592.48∗∗∗
(N=1600) (0.88) (30.97) (4.45) (7.20)
Panel C: Overlapping cases
All bids -0.0010 1.0640∗∗∗ 0.3871∗∗∗ 0.4047∗∗∗ 0.8014 333.30∗∗∗
(N=1413) (-0.61) (24.61) (3.55) (4.62)
Award-winning outside directors 0.0018 1.1377∗∗∗ 0.1212∗ 0.3155 0.6365 132.89∗∗∗
(N=92) (0.65) (19.14) (1.49) (3.80)
No award-winning outside directors 0.0002 1.1360∗∗∗ 0.3581∗∗∗ 0.4606∗∗∗ 0.8581 474.74∗∗∗
(N=1,321) (0.10) (34.13) (7.95) (9.98)
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Appendix D
CEO Awards: Overview
CEO Awards
This table provides an overview on the sources of CEO awards. The table reports a description, an estimate of the
circulation and the period of circulation.
Issue Description Circulation Period
Business Week Best Manager 970,000 1992-2009
Financial World CEO of the Year (Gold) 430,000 1975-1997
Financial World CEO of the Year (Silver) 430,000 1975-1997
Forbes Best Performing CEO 910,000 2001-2012
Chief Executive CEO of the Year 42,000 1986-2013
Morningstar.com CEO of the Year Website 1999-2013
Electronic Business Magazine CEO of the Year 65,000 1997-2006
Industry Week CEO of the Year 250,000 1993-2006
Harvard Business Review 50 Best-Performing CEOs 250,000 2010
Harvard Business Review 100 Best-Performing CEOs 250,000 2013
Award Description
Business Week : The editorial staff awards two types of annual awards. Best Man-
ager and Best Entrepreneur. Only Best Manager awards are included in the sample.
Included are awards from 1992-2009. The total number of Best Manager awards
during the sample period is 304. Awards for 2006 and 2007 are missing.
Financial World : For more than 20 years the editorial stuff choose the “CEO of
the Year” and published it until 1997. The CEO of the Year were classified into
“Gold”, “Silver” and “Bronze”. There was one “Gold” winner and about 10 “Silver”
winners per year until 1994, one award per industry per year in 1995 and 1996, and
5 winners in 1997. In total there are 199 awards throughout 1975-1997.
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Forbes : Forbes has published a list of “Best Performing CEOs”, selected by the
editorial board, since 2001. There were 5 winners in 2001, and roughly 10 winners
since 2002. In total there are 112 awards between 2001-2012.
Chief Executive: Since 1986, the editorial staff of Chief Executive has published
the “CEO of the Year”. There has been one winner each year and 27 winners in
total.
Morningstar.com: The editorial staff of Morningstar.com began publishing a “CEO
of the Year” in 1999. There were 2 winners 1999, 2001 and 2004 and 1 winner for
all other years. The website awarded 18 awards during the period of 1999-2013.
Electronic Business Magazine: The editorial staff has named a “CEO of the Year”
each year from 1997-2006.
Industry Week : 2001 is missing. 18 awards total. 1993-2006. Since 1996 on award
each year.
Harvard Business Review : Harvard Business Review published a list of the “50
Best-Performing CEOs” in 2010 and a list of “The Top 100 Best-Performing CEOs
in the World” in 2013. From the 2014 list we exclude CEOs who had assumed their
role before 1995 or after April 30, 2012.
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Appendix E
RiskMetrics
RiskMetrics: Firm identifier
Our governance data are drawn from RiskMetrics. In 2007, RiskMetrics changed
the methodology used to collect data. As a result, the data on directors are provided
in two datasets: 1) Directors Legacy from 1996-2006 and 2) Directors from 2007-
2013. As outlined in great detail in Coles et al. (2014), there is no unique firm
or director identifier across the entire sample period 1996-2013. For example, from
1996-2006 the CUSIP provided is the 6-digit CUSIP and after 2007 the CUSIP
provided is the 9-digit CUSIP. The 6-digit CUSIP in the Directors Legacy dataset
is the header CUSIP, which means that whenever the database was updated the
CUSIP was updated and applied to the entire history of the firm. Since the dataset
was discontinued in 2006, the 6-digit CUSIP was the CUSIP for the firm as of 2006
or the last year the firm was included in the database. The 8-digit CUSIP, on
the other hand, refers to the actual CUSIP for the firm for a given year. We use
the CUSIP, the TICKER and NAME associated with each firm for a given year
to uniquely identify firms. We follow the procedure outlined in Coles et al. (2014)
to obtain unique GVKEY-YEAR combinations to merge the RiskMetrics dataset
with Compustat, PERMNO to merge with CRSP, NCSUIP to merge with Thomson
Reuters 13F database.
We start with all observations in the RiskMetrics database. There are 166,375
director-year observations in the Director Legacy dataset and 96,679 director-year
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observations in the Directors dataset. Director-year observations are then aggre-
gated to firm-year observations. We are able to to find a unique PERMNO for 2956
firms. Overall, the sample from the RiskMetrics contains 26,609 firm-year obser-
vations (downloaded as of July 2015) for the period 1996-2013. Of those 16,364
correspond to the pre-2007 and 10,246 correspond to post-2007 sample.
RiskMetrics: Director identifier
There is no unique director identifier across the two RiskMetrics datasets. Two direc-
tor IDs are maintained: 1) LEGACY˙DIRECTOR˙ID and 2) DIRECTOR˙DETAIL˙ID.
The DIRECTOR˙DETAIL˙ID is supplied by WRDS and populated from 2004 on-
ward. All directors who started in 2004 and directors who started prior to 2004 and
still serve on a board as of 2004 have a valid DIRECTOR˙DETAIL˙ID. However,
directors who quit before 2004 do not have a valid DIRECTOR˙DETAIL˙ID. Thus,
prior to 2004, some directors have no DIRECTOR˙DETAIL˙ID.
Pre-2004, the unique identifier is LEGACY˙DIRECTOR˙ID. This variable is pop-
ulated for directors who were on the database prior to 2004. Directors who joined
on or after 2004 will not have a LEGACY˙DIRECTOR˙ID. For directors who joined
firms listed in the database in or after 2004, only DIRECTOR˙DETAIL˙ID is avail-
able. For those directors who are not listed on the database before 2004, only
LEGACY˙DIRECTOR˙ID is avaiable.
Coles et al. (2014) provide detailed examples of the problems associated with the
inconsistent use of director identifiers and the resulting implications for sample and
variable construction. Following Coles et al. (2014), we use both IDs to identify all
directors in the RiskMetrics database.
DIRECTOR˙DETAIL˙ID
Coles et al. (2014) further outline issues around specific DIRECTOR˙DETAIL˙IDs.
The DIRECTOR˙DETAIL˙ID of 35025 belonging to H. Paulett Eberhart, for exam-
ple, has been wrongly assigned in certain ways. We follow the authors directions
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and correct known mistakes associated with DIRECTOR˙DETAIL˙ID. In particu-
lar, Coles et al. (2014) have identified problems associated with director JOHN M
KEANE (DIRECTOR˙DETAIL˙ID 35937), MARY L GOOD (inconsistent naming
and DIRECTOR˙DETAIL˙IDs). We correct inconsistencies where possible and drop
all remaining inconsistent observations from the sample.
MEETINGDATE
Another issue that emerges when working with the RiskMetrics database is the
identification of the correct time period. The dataset provides two time variables:
MEETINGDATE (date of the annual meeting)and YEAR (year of the MEETING-
DATE). However, as outlined by Coles et al. (2014), the YEAR variable does not
always match the year in MEETINGDATE. We adjust the YEAR (or MEETING-
DATE) variable where necessary.
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